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This thesis empirically investigates three questions of key importance to policy making 
in developing countries such as India.  
The first chapter documents the effect of preschools on cognitive skills in rural India. 
Using a lagged score value added model, the analysis finds that children who attend 
preschool before starting primary school have a significant premium in cognitive test 
scores as compared to children who attend primary school without any preschool 
exposure. On further investigation into the management type of the preschool, I find 
that this result is driven by those who attended private preschool.  
The second chapter studies the intra-household decision-making process in extended 
households in rural Uttar Pradesh, India. Using a series of public goods games played 
between pairs of adult household members, the study finds that spouses residing in 
extended households are less efficient than those in nuclear households. Moreover, the 
study finds that relationships within extended households are not equally efficient, with 
the relationship between daughter-in-law and mother-law particularly inefficient. 
Supplementary evidence suggests inefficiencies arise from fragmented decision-making 
power, and limited ability of young married women to assert their preferences in 
extended households.  
The final chapter studies the impact of a two-month long female adult literacy 
programme on a range of female empowerment measures. Set up as a randomized 
control trial, the programme increases the treated woman’s freedom of movement, such 
as, going to the shops or calling her natal family without requiring permission. 
Additionally, the treated woman is more likely to open a personal bank account. An 
investigation into spillovers reveals that the program has a positive externality on the 
control woman’s freedom of movement as well. This suggests that while the freedom of 
movement effects might be a result of increased confidence and a ‘role model’ effect, 
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1. Introduction to the thesis 
This thesis aims to study three topics relevant for policy making and human 
development in low- and middle- income countries – early childhood education, 
decision-making in complex households, and adult literacy programmes as a means of 
female empowerment.  
Educational participation is an important facilitator of economic and social development 
given its potential to correct for the ‘accident of birth’. There is a strong case, in 
particular, for enrolment in the early years, considering the complementarity between 
inputs applied at various stages of growing up (Cunha et al., 2006). Participation in 
education in the early years can shield the child from the negative impact of being born 
amidst poverty or unstimulating home environment and bridge the skill development 
gaps, as well as improve access to future opportunities (Cunha & Heckman, 2008; Fryer 
& Levitt, 2006; Barnett, 2011). However, only about half the children across the world 
are enrolled at a preschool at the age of 5 (UNESCO, 2020).  
While missed development opportunities during the critical years of life continue to 
drive national policy and international agenda, on the other end of the spectrum, the 
world has 773 million adults who have had no formal education (UNESCO, 2020). Of 
these adult illiterates, 63 percent are female (UNESCO, 2020). Hence, adult literacy 
programmes become crucial not just because functional literacy and numeracy skills 
have practical value, but also, they are of value to the society in increasing gender 
equality. The focus on female empowerment is justified because it is an inherent good 
and because it leads to other desirable development goals, such as investment in 
household public goods, children’s education and nutrition, and a change in  gender 
beliefs and aspirations (see, among others, Ashraf et al., 2010; Beamen et al., 2012;  
Beamen et al., 2009; Duflo, 2012; Duflo, 2003). Considering that illiteracy is a low- and 
middle-income country phenomenon, the puzzling question remains - whether adult 
literacy programmes can mimic some of the benefits of formal education. In particular, 
can adult literacy programmes targeted at women, be a cost-effective way of achieving 
empowerment?  
One cannot study female empowerment without alluding to the gendered household 
dynamics that dictates the distribution of labour, income, investment and consumption. 
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While female empowerment is a wide-ranging concept investigating the relationship of 
the woman to her society – economic, social and political; the household remains a 
critical decision-making unit. Thus, understanding the intra-household decision-making 
process is key to uncovering how household- and gender-based development initiatives 
need to be designed. This is perhaps why the study of the household is not a new topic 
in economics and dates all the way back to Becker (1974). However, intra-household 
economics has continued to ignore the complex nature of household composition, one 
that may be more than just spouses and their children. Most complex households (co-
residence of multiple generations, multiple adult married siblings, polygamous 
households) are situated in low- and middle-income countries. Add to this, the 
countries’ struggle with human capital development, such as those related to illiteracy 
and gender inequality – these countries need effective policies to address the social ills. 
Without a better understanding of decision-making in complex households, we run the 
risk of poorly designed and targeted policies.  
In the remainder of the introduction, I will summarise the methodology and main 
findings of the three empirical chapters and highlight their contribution to the political 
and scientific discourse.  
In Chapter 2 (Do preschools add ‘value’? Evidence on achievement gaps from rural 
India), I study the learning premium of attending a preschool before starting primary 
school. Moreover, I explore the heterogeneity in the value-added of preschools by their 
management type.  
 
UNESCO (2020) estimates that almost 80 percent of the children who remain 
unenrolled in preschools at the age of five are situated in low- and middle-income 
countries. However, what sets India apart is that despite being a developing country it 
boasts a preschool enrolment rate equivalent to that of high-income developed nations. 
Among the sample of children in this study, the preschool enrolment rate is as high as 
89 percent for rural households. This is attributable to India’s preschool policy which 
first came into play in 1975. In recent years, India has re-affirmed the importance of 
preschools in child development in its new National Education Policy (Government of 
India, 2020) promising that ‘provisioning of quality early childhood development, care 





Despite such a long-standing preschool policy and investment in preschool 
infrastructure in India, a rigorous evaluation of preschools remains virtually absent. 
Singh and Mukherjee (2017) using Young Lives data from Andhra Pradesh, find long-
term effects of private preschool attendance on cognitive skills and subjective well-
being at the age of 12. However, this study does not estimate the impact of having 
preschool exposure (public or private) versus none. Moreover, by looking at the impact 
of preschool exposure at age 12, it fails to consider the educational participation of the 
children between ages 6 and 12. A further limitation is the focus on data from Andhra 
Pradesh; thus the paper fails to address the question of  regional heterogeneity in 
preschool quality in a country as geographically diverse as India. For instance, the 
preschool funding guideline in India is skewed to benefit economically underdeveloped 
regions1. While the Central government contributes 90 percent of the construction and 
operational costs in these states, in other states (such as Andhra Pradesh), the Central 
government contributes 75 percent of the construction cost and 60 percent of the 
operational cost.  
 
In Chapter 2, I seek to improve on the limited evidence on Indian preschools. I use data 
from three geographically and economically distinct states in India to provide a more 
representative evaluation of preschools. I study the immediate (1 year) impact of 
preschool attendance to minimise the risk of other educational inputs confounding the 
results. Moreover, I estimate the effect of attending a preschool versus having no 
preschool exposure. I complement this analysis with a study of private-public gap in 
learning.  
 
Employing a lagged-score Value Added Model (VAM), I find that there is a positive 
and significant premium of attending a preschool before starting primary school on the 
achievement test. However, the entire effect is driven by children who attend private 
preschools. I find that children who attend public preschools before starting primary 
school do not have a significant advantage over children who start primary school with 
no preschool experience. There is considerable regional heterogeneity in the private-





preschool premium. Conducting additional robustness checks on test score construction 
and investigating the bias due to child’s and parent’s motivation, I find that the VAM 
estimates are reliable.  
 
This chapter’s contribution to the literature is threefold. First, it is one of the few large-
scale rigorous evaluation of the 40-year long preschool system in India. Second, it 
contributes to the current literature on the private-public learning gap in India, which 
has so far neglected the effect of preschools on primary school performance. Third, it 
contributes to the wider literature on evaluation of universal preschool provision. This 
literature is sparse, even in developed countries and the results continue to be mixed.  
While some studies find that universal preschool education is associated with improved 
literacy and numeracy skills at primary school entry age (for US, see Loeb et al., 2007; 
Fitzpatrick, 2008; for UK, see Melhuish et al., 2008; for Argentina, see Berlinski et al., 
2009), others find that these positive effects dissipate as early as the end of first grade 
(for US, see Magnuson et al., 2007; for Quebec, see Baker et al., 2008).    
 
The results of this chapter are particularly relevant in the backdrop of a rapidly changing 
education policy in India. The new National Education Policy (Government of India, 
2020) stresses the need to improve foundational literacy and numeracy skills as early as 
in the preschool years. Given the findings of this chapter, public preschools would need 
considerable overhaul to be able to deliver on closing the learning gaps. Moreover, the 
varying levels at which children start primary school based on their preschool 
experience highlight the need for educators to develop innovative pedagogical tools to 
effectively address learning heterogeneity within the classroom. ‘Teaching at the Right 
Level’ is one such pedagogical innovation developed by Pratham NGO which has been 
shown promising results (Banerjee et al., 2017; Banerji & Chavan, 2020).  
 
Chapter 3, co-authored with Dr. Annemie Maertens and Dr. Christopher Ksoll, (Intra-
household Efficiency in Extended Family Household: Evidence from rural India) 
studies the intra-household decision-making process in complex households in rural 
Uttar Pradesh, India where multiple generations and/or married siblings co-reside. It 
documents that the traditional household model (nuclear households) studied in intra-
household theoretical literature is qualitatively distinct from complex households. 
Additionally, even within complex households, the decision-making process is 
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governed by relationships between in-laws, particularly between a mother-in-law and a 
daughter-in-law.  
 
The extended household is common in developing countries, especially in South Asia and 
Sub-Saharan Africa. The benefits of an extended family structure are, in general terms, 
akin to the benefits of marriage. Gains include cost-sharing of household public goods 
such as residence, meals, and children; economies of scale and specialization in the 
production process; and risk-sharing (Becker, 1974; Bergstorm, 1997; LaFave & 
Thomas, 2017; Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1985). However, larger households might also 
suffer from significantly more free-riding, as more adults are in charge of production 
and public good provision (see Baland et al., 2016; Jakiela & Ozier, 2015, on the effect 
of a sharing tax and Cox & Fafchamps, 2007, for an overview on extended families and 
kinship networks more generally).  
 
Despite its importance, there is relatively little literature in economics on the topic of 
extended families. Most existing literature focuses on the implications for agricultural 
productivity of African extended families (see Guirkinger et al., 2015; Kazianga & 
Wahhaj, 2013). However, decision-making in extended households can be key to 
understanding female empowerment. Dhanaraj and Mahambare (2019), show that 
norms around decision making of daughters-in-law in extended families prevent these 
women from taking up employment opportunities. Similarly, Saikia and Singh (2009) 
find that women in extended households are less likely to utilize maternal health 
services.  
 
Using a lab-in-the-field public goods experiment in rural Uttar Pradesh, India, the 
chapter examines Pareto Efficiency of an allocation in which it is not possible to make 
one individual better off without making another individual worse off. The public goods 
experiment implemented in this study (and also extensively in other contexts, see 
Munro, 2015) is designed to uncover inefficiency which arises due to concealing of 
personal resources instead of contributing them to the household, with potentially larger 
shared benefits. We draw on the qualitative interviews to argue that household members 
in extended households do hide resources in processes that our experiment mimics.   
 
Our study shows that spouses in extended households are less efficient in maximizing 
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surplus than spouses in nuclear households. Within extended households, not all 
relationships are equally inefficient. Household members related by blood are less prone 
to inefficient behavior than members related by in-law status, the relationship between 
mother-in-law and daughter-in-law displaying highest levels of inefficiency. We further 
supplement the experimental results with survey data on primary decision makers and 
qualitative interviews. We find that these inefficiencies within extended households 
exist due to multiple decision-makers and fragmented decision-making power, and 
limited ability of young married women to assert their preferences in extended 
households.  
 
These findings fill an important gap in the literature, as the economics literature, has 
largely struggled to understand complex households, even though they are a central part 
of many non-Western societies. It is important to understand decision making in 
extended households in order to study allocation of resources within the household and 
better design policies that target households.  
 
Expanding on the co-operative bargaining framework within a collective framework, 
Browning et al. (2014) note that the assumption of efficiency might be violated “when 
existing social norms impose patterns of behavior that may conflict with efficiency.” 
We show how one such social norm, the norm of patrilocality, relevant in developing 
countries, undermines efficiency.  
 
Cox and Fafchamps (2007), summarising the extensive literature on the role of kinship 
(friends and relatives) in risk sharing and inter-household transfers, highlight that ‘Too 
often, economic models are gender blind, populated with generic parents and children 
and “spouses 1 and 2”, rather than husbands, wives, fathers, mothers, sons and 
daughters.’ In this chapter, we unpack these generic ‘controls’ into explicit relationships 
within the household that can potentially be used to enrich other economic models.  
 
The results of this chapter have a direct implication for policies that target specific 
recipients within a household, such as cash-transfer programs in the context of societies 
with extended households. Duflo (2012) notes the importance of targeting transfers to 
the ‘woman’ in the household, with the aim of promoting gender equality as well as 
improving other desirable outcomes such as health and education. However, we show 
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that in the context of an extended household, the identity of this ‘woman’ is ambiguous, 
so that simply targeting transfers on the basis of gender might fail to achieve desired 
outcomes.  
 
Chapter 4 (Female Adult Literacy Programme and Empowerment: Evidence from RCT 
in rural India) using a Randomised Control Trial (RCT), analyses the impact of an adult 
female literacy programme empowerment, measured as decision-making power within 
the household, freedom of movement, and control over assets.  
India, the country in which this study is set, accounts for a third of the world’s illiterate 
population at 252 million illiterate adults (UNESCO, 2020). The Indian Census (2011) 
puts the adult (18 years and above) female illiteracy rate at 43 percent versus 22 percent 
for men2. Given the size of the illiterate population in India and the associated gender 
bias, the provision of adult literacy programmes is common and desired. The 
Government of India launched the Sakshar Bharat adult literacy campaign in 2009 with 
an additional focus on closing the gender gap in literacy. By focusing on women, these 
campaigns also aim to promote female empowerment. However, there continues to be a 
paucity of evidence on adult literacy programmes beyond the intended effect of 
achieving functional literacy and numeracy. 
In India, there are two main studies looking at the impact of literacy programme on 
female empowerment. While Banerji et al. (2017) find no significant impact of a 
maternal literacy programme on mothers’ decision-making power, Kandpal et al. (2012) 
find a positive and significant impact of a female adult literacy programme on female 
empowerment measures.  The insignificant intent-to-treat effects reported by Banerji et 
al. (2017) can be attributed to the low literacy programme take-up in their sample – self-
reported records show that 40 percent of the mothers attended these classes. On the 
other hand, the positive impacts documented by Kandpal et al. (2012) could be due to 
selection on unobservables. The authors rely on propensity score matching between 
women from treated and un-treated districts based on observables combined with an IV 
strategy using the roll-out of the programme. The identification strategy raises the 
concern if the programme was purposely rolled out in some districts because of worse 
 
2 Calculated from Table DDW-0000C-O8, Census of India, 2011. Restricted to all persons above the age of 17 years. 
Literacy is defined as being able to read and write. 
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gender equality metrics in those areas, which can lead to biased estimates. Second, 
Kandpal et al. (2012) use a very narrow set of three measures for empowerment, namely 
having a National Rural Employment Guarantee card, the ability to leave the house 
without permission, and participation in village council meetings. It may be argued that 
these are not sufficient proxies for female empowerment and a more robust study is 
required that encompasses a wider range of measures.  
I use an RCT to overcome the selection issue like Banerji et al. (2017), but with a 
greater treatment compliance of 79 percent of the treatment group women attending the 
literacy classes. To address limitations of female empowerment measurement, I use a 
wide range indicators and indices - decision-making on different subjects, the ability to 
leave the house freely for a range of tasks, and control of different financial assets.  
I find that the literacy programme had a significant and substantial increase in woman’s 
ability to leave the house without having to seek permission, and an increase in the 
likelihood of the woman having a personal bank account. I find no evidence of an 
increase in decision-making power over daily household decisions such as those 
involving household purchases and cooking. The chapter also studies a limited form of 
spillover where the control group woman lives at the same location as a treatment group 
woman.  I find suggestive evidence of positive spillovers, but I have low power to 
detect significance. I hypothesise that these spillovers may be a ‘role model’ (Beamen et 
al., 2012) effect where the aspirations of the control group women shift due to 
observing the change in behaviour of the treatment group women. Investigating the 
correlates of the programme take-up, I find that women from backward and scheduled 
castes (the lower castes) were more likely to take up the literacy programme. 
Since the literacy programme required women to leave the house daily to attend these 
classes, this might explain the impacts I find on mobility indicators. Alternatively, this 
change may be due to an increase in self-confidence and self-esteem as suggested by 
qualitative research (see Egbo, 2000 in Nigeria; Archer & Cottingham, 1997 in 
Bangladesh; Stromquist, 1997 in Brazil). The increased likelihood of owning a personal 
bank account, post the literacy programme, may be a more direct result of becoming 
literate if the women are now being able to read, fill out, and sign bank forms.   
The null results for within household decision making may point to the strong 
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patriarchal family and societal structures that exist in India, particularly in rural Uttar 
Pradesh. Other studies in Uttar Pradesh looking at the impact of formal education on 
female empowerment found similar null results on decision-making power of the 
woman within the household, while finding positive impacts on women’s mobility 
(Bloom et al., 2001; Jejeebhoy & Sathar, 2001).  
This study contributes to the sparse literature on socio-economic impacts of adult 
literacy programmes. It is one of the few rigorous evaluations of adult literacy 
programmes. In finding positive impacts of the literacy programme on empowerment, 
this paper opens up exciting avenues for the evaluation of such programmes.  There is a 
need for evaluation projects to include a wider range of measures to capture the change 
in self-esteem, beliefs about the self and gender roles, and aspirations to understand how 
literacy translates into female empowerment. Moreover, there is a need to push the 
frontier of the measurement of female empowerment to find more reliable measures that 
are appropriate for different contexts (such as, experimental measures explored in 
Almas et al., 2018). 
In the final chapter, Chapter 5 of this thesis, I reflect on the limitations of each empirical 





2. Do preschools add ‘value’? Evidence on 








The preschool system in India, as anywhere else, is the first step towards education. 
India stands out from most developing countries, in its recognition of the importance of 
preschool education as early as 1975. In recent years, the Indian education policy has 
seen rapid and welcome changes. While the landmark Right of Children to Free and 
Compulsory Education (RTE) Act, 2009 guaranteed the access to free and quality 
education to all children aged 6-14 as a fundamental right, it excluded early childhood 
education from its legal ambit. The National Education Policy (Government of India, 
2020) stands to correct its former mistake. The policy acknowledges that with lack of 
preschool exposure, a large proportion of children fall behind in learning levels, within 
a few weeks of starting Grade 1 (Government of India, 2020, para 2.5). Thus, 
preschools have been brought to centre stage by the new policy, promising that 
‘provisioning of quality early childhood development, care and education must thus be 
achieved as soon as possible, and no later than 2030’ (Government of India, 2020, para 
1.1). 
 
The uniqueness of the Indian education system lies in the coexistence of two parallel 
sectors – a low cost fee-charging private and a free-of-cost public (government) sector. 
This introduces a degree of variability in the schooling trajectory followed by Indian 
children, and hence can potentially produce variability in learning levels.  
 
Public preschools in India, commonly known as anganwadis/balwadis are part of the 
bigger umbrella program – Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS). The ICDS 
scheme has been in implementation since 1975 and performs six services – 
supplementary nutrition, preschool education, immunisation, health check-up, referral 
services, and nutrition and health education to mothers. There are 1.3 million ICDS 
centres across the country, with the policy stipulating that there be at least one centre in 
every village3. Public preschools are expected to cater to children in the age group 3 to 





necessary preparation for primary schooling.  
 
Private preschools, on the other hand, are fee charging institutions, consisting of nursery 
and/or kindergarten classes. Their main draw is English language instruction. They are 
more formal in their structure and organisation with well-defined curricula and teaching 
hours. 
 
The quality of public preschool education is often seen as poor, partly due to the Indian 
education policy failing to incorporate preschool education formally into its pedagogical 
framework. In reality, ICDS centres have come to be seen as health centres for children 
in early years, with the preschool function reduced to a free day care facility. A major 
shift in this realm comes with the new National Education Policy (2020), which will 
bring the preschool function of ICDS formally into what it terms ‘school clusters’. This 
would imply that preschool education function of ICDS would shift from the Ministry 
of Women and Child Development to the Ministry of Human Resource Development4. 
This anticipated shift will integrate the preschool years with the rest of the education 
system in India, allowing the National Council of Educational Research and Training 
(NCERT)5 to develop preschool curricula and pedagogy.  
 
While variability in learning outcome due to the diverse private and public sector in 
education is well documented in India at the primary school level (Muralidharan & 
Sundararaman, 2015), very little is known at the school entry age or before that. Studies 
that document the learning gaps in the private and public sectors have overwhelmingly 
focussed on primary school without any knowledge of the early childhood years. One 
needs a careful assessment of the learning gap literature in India – whether these are 
gaps that arise due to primary school education or whether these are pre-existing gaps 
decreasing/increasing over time. From the policy perspective, it is vital to know when 
and where public spending should be focused to yield the highest return. 
 
There is widespread recognition of the fact that early childhood factors and environment 
 
4 The Ministry of Human resource Development, India oversees all aspects of education – primary, secondary, higher 
education, technical and vocational training centres.  
5 NCERT currently oversees the development of curriculum, pedagogy, teacher training of all primary and secondary 
education in India.  
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have a significant impact on future outcomes, cognitive and non-cognitive. Quality 
early childhood education can improve children’s learning skills and help with the 
transition to primary school (see Yoshikawa et al., 2013 for a review). Given such 
evidence, the less than satisfactory evaluation of preschool education in India is a major 
limitation. One of the main reasons for such an omission, is the lack of data in the 
education sector, and even more so in the preschool sector. The data set I use for this 
study is the only large-scale data set I know of which specifically aimed to collect 
information on preschools in India6.  
 
In this chapter, I attempt to address this gap in literature and study the differences in test 
scores, which exist even before starting primary school, due to preschool participation 
and the public-private preschool divide in India. Specifically, using the ASER data on 
Early Childhood Education collected in 2011-12, I present the estimates from Value 
Added Models (VAM) of the effect of participation in preschools on test scores. I 
explore the differential impact of attending a private and public preschool and discuss 
the quality differences in the two management types. Moreover, I study the regional 
heterogeneity and find that achievement gaps vary by Indian states, drawing caution on 
interpreting studies based on data from a single Indian state as a universal estimate for a 
country as diverse as India.  
2.2. Related Literature 
Early years of life are critical for the acquisition of skills and concepts. While positive 
experiences are thought to be crucial in determining the formation of cognitive and non-
cognitive skills (Cunha & Heckman, 2008), negative experiences in the form of poverty, 
malnutrition, and unstimulating home environment can be detrimental to cognitive, 
motor, and socio-economic skill development (Grantham-McGregor et al., 2007). Since 
skill begets skill and there is complementarity between inputs applied at various stages 
of growing up (Cunha et al., 2006) there is a strong case for intervention in the 
preschool years. Although certain socio-emotional functions and health can be observed 
even before the age of three (preschool starting age), most successful early childhood 
 
6 ASER recently conducted a national survey in 2019 of children’s enrolment status and skills with a focus on early 
years – ages 4 to 8. However, the survey does not have any information on the preschools themselves. It is also 
limited in its information on households.  
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interventions begin in preschool years. These can also be complemented with earlier 
‘antenatal investment’ (Doyle et al., 2009). 
 
There is now a large body of literature which documents the effectiveness of early 
childhood interventions, particularly in the US (Heckman & Mosso, 2014). In the 
context of the US, much of the literature to explain when and why gaps in cognitive 
(and non-cognitive) achievement surface has focused on the racial bias (see Fryer & 
Levitt, 2004, 2006). The second theme in early childhood intervention research in the 
US has been to document the persistent positive impacts of such interventions into 
adulthood – for example, Perry Preschool Project in the US (Schweinhart et al., 2005), 
and Head Start Preschool intervention (Garces et al., 2002). While the results from these 
studies are useful, the programmes evaluated involved disadvantaged children from 
select cities in the US. The evidence on the impact of universal preschool policy in 
developed countries remains scarce, and the evidence on short-run outcomes is mixed. 
While some studies find that universal preschool education is associated with improved 
literacy and numeracy skills at primary school entry age (for US, see Loeb et al., 2007; 
Fitzpatrick, 2008; for UK, see Melhuish et al., 2008), others find that these positive 
effects dissipate as early as the end of first grade (for US, see Magnuson et al., 2007; for 
Quebec, see Baker et al., 2008).    
 
On the other hand, studies in developing countries overwhelmingly document positive 
effects of universal preschool on future educational outcomes. This is likely due to 
preschools providing an opportunity for positive developmental environment to children 
exposed to poverty, inadequate home stimulation and nutrition in developing countries 
(Grantham-McGregor et al., 2007). While an estimated 500 million children under the 
age of 5 live in developing countries with India accounting for 20 percent of the 
children, the evidence on the evaluation of preschools in such regions remain scarce. 
 
In developing countries, the evidence on evaluation of universal preschool is even more 
limited. Berlinski, Galiani, and Manacorda (2008) study the effect of preschool 
education on years of education using a Uruguayan household survey. They use the 
within household estimator exploiting the variation in education trajectories between 
siblings. The authors report that by the age of 15, children who had attended preschools 




In another study from Argentina, Berlinski, Galiani, and Gertler (2009) investigate the 
impact of large scale expansion of universal preschool education on subsequent primary 
school performance, and find that one year of preschool education increases the average 
third grade test scores by 23 percent of the standard deviation.  
 
In Cambodia, Rao et al. (2012) evaluate the effectiveness of the different early 
childhood programmes and find that ,while some programmes are more effective than 
others, some preschool experience is better than none at all. However, a recent study 
evaluating the impact of preschool construction in Cambodia on children’s short-term 
cognitive and socio-emotional development finds that there are no impacts of preschool 
attendance (Bouguen et al., 2018). Further, they find that there are significant negative 
impacts of preschool attendance on children with the longest exposure to preschools.  
 
In urban Ethiopia, Woldehanna (2016) using Young Lives data find that preschool 
attendance is correlated with better cognitive performance at the primary school starting 
age of five.  
 
Other than the above-mentioned studies, there have been smaller sample studies. 
Mwaura et al. (2008) study the impact of preschool experience on cognitive 
achievement in a sample of 423 children in East Africa under a quasi-experimental 
framework. They find that children who went to Madrasa type preschools (faith-based 
organization) performed better than those who attended non-Madrasa type preschools or 
none. Moore et al. (2008) design a pre-post intervention-control framework to evaluate 
the effect of revised preschool versus a regular preschool in rural Bangladesh. In their 
sample of 138 children, they find that after seven months, children in the revised 
program performed better than those in the regular program, although the quality of the 
regular program had also improved. Most of these studies suffer from the problem of 
small sample and focus on comparing different type of preschools rather than a 
universal preschool programme.  
 
A related strand of literature from developing countries looks at the impact of quality of 
preschools on child outcomes – for instance, the effect of teacher quality (Araujo et al., 
2016 in Ecuador;  Wolf et al., 2019 in Ghana; Yoshikawa et al., 2015 in Chile) and the 
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effect of increasing preschool and parent communication (Ozler et al., 2016 in Malawi) 
 
In the context of India, there are two papers that evaluate universal preschool provision. 
In Andhra Pradesh, India, Singh and Mukherjee (2017) employ propensity score 
matching and find long-term effects of private preschool attendance on cognitive skills 
and subjective well-being at the age of 12. However, this study does not estimate the 
impact of having preschool exposure (public or private) versus none. Moreover, by 
looking at the impact of preschool exposure at age 12, it fails to consider the 
educational participation of the children between ages 6 and 12.  A further limitation is 
the focus on data from Andhra Pradesh; thereby, failing to address the question of  
regional heterogeneity in preschool quality in a country as diverse as India. 
 
Another study using Young Lives data from Andhra Pradesh, India, demonstrates that 
test score gaps between children in schools exist even at the school-entry age, and this 
gap can in part be attributed to attending a preschool and type of preschool attended 
(Singh, 2014). However, the author mentions that drawing causality is beyond the scope 
of his paper and is at most able to establish correlations. This paper serves as a valid 
starting point for my exercise – once established, that test score gaps exist even before 
starting primary school, I attempt to explain such a gap through preschool attendance 
and the management type of the preschools.  
 
In this study, I seek to improve on the limited evidence on Indian preschools. First, I use 
data from three geographically and economically distinct states in India to provide a 
more representative evaluation of preschools. Second, I study the immediate (1 year) 
impact of preschool attendance to minimise the risk of other educational inputs 
confounding the results. Third, I estimate the effect of attending a preschool versus 
having no preschool exposure. I complement this analysis with a study of private-public 
gap in learning.  
 
The focus on management type of preschools is motivated by the existing literature on 
the private-public achievement gap divide in India. The private sector in Indian 
education has been growing rapidly in the last two decades (Kingdon, 2007), and it is 
now well-known that there are significant gaps in the average achievement scores 
between private and public schools in India. Muralidharan and Kremer (2008) find that 
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private unaided low fee-charging schools are widespread in rural India, particularly in 
areas where the public system is dysfunctional. This is a result of both demand-side 
variables (desire for English medium instruction, smaller classes, and more accountable 
teachers) and supply-side variables (availability of educated unemployed youth).  
 
It has been found that private schools are associated with higher student achievement 
even after accounting for pre-existing differences in socio-economic background using a 
range of econometric methodologies. French and Kingdon (2010) use family fixed 
effects and within household variation to control for selection into private schools. 
Desai et al. (2009) use Heckman selection correction model using the existence of 
private school in the village as an exclusion restriction. Chudgar and Quin (2012) find 
positive effects of attending private primary schools while using regression analysis. 
However, when they conduct regressions on matched samples, the private school gain is 
less consistent across specifications. Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2015) do not 
find across the board gains of attending private schools in their experimental approach 
(school choice voucher scheme) and claim that private school children perform better in 
certain subjects (English and Hindi), but not in others (Telugu, Maths and 
Environmental Studies). Singh (2015) shows that private primary schools show 
significant positive gains in certain domains and age groups using Value Added Model, 
and that these results match up to the estimates of the experimental study of 
Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2015).  
 
Most of these studies in India and beyond (with the exception of Singh & Mukherjee, 
2017; Singh, 2014), have focused only on primary schools without any reference to 
prior preschool education. Given the widespread recognition of the importance of early 
childhood factors on future cognitive outcomes, this omission is a major limitation to 
the literature as it stands today.  
 
I study the impact of preschool on cognitive achievement, and in particular, the 
differential impact of public versus private preschools. Since the question is similar to 
the literature which exists for primary schools in India, one could potentially use any 
one of the empirical strategies described earlier. However, family fixed effects are not 
satisfactory as parents can change their behavior based on preschool experience and it 
also requires assuming that there is perfect knowledge of intra-household allocation 
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between siblings. Coming across a valid instrument which only affects school choice 
and not educational outcome is also a tall order. The instrument used by Desai et al. 
(2009) being, whether the village has a private facility, cannot satisfy the exclusion 
restriction. As noted, the presence of private facilities can be driven by demand side 
variables like the aspirations of parents and community. This would also affect the 
educational outcome.  
 
An alternative identification strategy under-utilized in such research questions is one of 
lagged score Value Added Models (VAM). VAMs are used extensively in teacher and 
class effectiveness literature, particularly in the US. Overall evidence suggests that 
lagged score VAM estimates are valid and consistent, estimating average treatment 
effects with limited bias. Kane and Staiger (2008) while analyzing results from an 
experiment in Los Angeles that assigned children randomly across classrooms, report 
that teacher effects estimated from lagged score VAM yielded similar unbiased results. 
Andrabi et al. (2011) while documenting the evidence of public-private school test score 
gap in Pakistan, show that VAM estimates obtained from OLS provide similar results as 
the estimates from data extensive GMM estimation methods.  Chetty et al. (2014) find 
no evidence of bias in VAM estimates when studying the long-term impact of teachers 
on adult outcomes.  
2.3. Data 
2.3.1. Sampling  
The data for this paper has been provided by ASER, India which had been collected as 
part of their 5-year longitudinal study, Early Childhood Education Impact Study7. This 
chapter only covers two rounds of the data collection – the first round in September-
December 2011 and the second round in October-December 2012.  
 
The data covers three major states of India – Andhra Pradesh, Assam, and Rajasthan. 
States were purposively selected to maximize differences in geographical location as 
well as demographic, socio-economic, and educational characteristics. Within each 
state, two districts were selected at random for inclusion in the study - Medak and 
 
7 http://www.asercentre.org/Keywords/p/342.html#br03d  
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Warangal in Andhra Pradesh, Dibrugarh and Kamrup in Assam, and Ajmer and Alwar 
in Rajasthan. Within each district, a total of 50 villages were selected with a population 
of between 2000-4000. Given that the primary objective of this study was to examine 
the relationship between preschool and learning outcomes, sampling of villages was 
deliberately restricted to larger villages in order to maximize the likelihood of finding 
different types of preschool facilities (public and private) within a single village. 
Systematic random sampling was utilized in order to ensure that at least one village was 
included from each block in the district.  
 
Within each village, the objective was to select 50 children in the age group 3.5-4.5 
years at the time of the first round (September-December 2011). Integrated Child 
Development Services (ICDS) records were used to create a sample of all children in 
the above-mentioned age group. These records are maintained by government 
(Anganwadi) workers in each village. If the number of children in the required age 
group exceeded 50, then 50 children were randomly selected. If this number was less 
than 50, then all the children in the village were selected. In theory, at most 2500 
children should have been selected for each district. However, in practice this was not 
achieved.  Table 2.1 shows the distribution of the sampled children across the six 
districts and three states. While 42 percent of the children are in Rajasthan, 31 percent 
are in Assam and 27 percent are in Andhra Pradesh. Moving from Round 1 to Round 2 
of the data collection, the study was able to track 89 percent of the children, with 
Rajasthan having the lowest attrition rate. This paper utilises the sample of 8124 
children who are present in both Rounds 1 and 2.  
Table 2.1. Distribution of sample by state and district 
State District 
Sample Size at 
Round 1  
Sample Size at 
Round 2 % of Round 1 
Andhra Pradesh Warrangal 1031 931 90.3 
 
Medak 1477 1265 85.6 
Assam Kamrup  1662 1450 87.2 
 
Dibrugarh 1163 998 85.8 
Rajasthan Alwar 1896 1762 92.9 
 
Ajmer 1892 1718 90.8 
Total   9121 8124 89.1 
This table presents the sample size in each district surveyed at Round 1 and at Round 2. Round 1 
was conducted in Sept-Dec 2011 and Round 2 was conducted roughly a year apart in Oct-Dec 2012.  
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2.3.2. Survey and Questionnaire 
During 2011-2012, sampled children were visited four times, approximately once every 
three months. The first round of data collection occurred in September-December 2011 
and the second round in October-December 2012. Between Rounds 1 and 2, two 
tracking visits occurred. Table 2.2 shows the information collected in each round. 
Table 2.2. Timeline of survey and information collected 
Survey instrument 
Round 1 
Sep - Dec 
2011 
Tracking Visit 1 
Feb – Mar 2012 
Tracking Visit 2 
Jul – Aug 2012 
Round 2 
Oct - Dec 
2012 
Household questionnaire X   
 
Assessment X   X 
Child tracking X X X X 
Preschool questionnaire X   X 
 
The household questionnaire includes detailed information on the level of education of 
the parents, employment status, religion, caste, consumer durables owned by the 
household, sampled child’s learning environment, and questions on parent’s aspirations 
and expectations from preschool. The questions on parent’s aspirations and expectations 
from preschool were only administered to parents where the child was enrolled in a 
preschool.  
 
The child tracking was used to only track the enrolment status of the child – whether the 
sampled child was going to a preschool, or a primary school. 
 
The preschool questionnaire was conducted for all preschools in the village, irrespective 
of whether the sampled child was enrolled in them or not. Key aspects of infrastructure, 
classroom teaching observation, and availability of learning materials for children were 
observed in each preschool facility visited. However, the data provided for this paper 
did not link the preschool to the sampled child. Additionally, no unique preschool 
identifier was used between Rounds 1 and 2, which implies that I cannot link the 
preschools from Round 2 with Round 1.  
 
The assessment tool used for this study is the School Readiness Inventory (SRI). It was 
administered one-on-one by a trained field investigator to the children at home. The test 
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was developed by the World Bank in conjunction with Centre for Early Childhood 
Education and Development, New Delhi. It is intended to test children’s cognitive skill, 
and early language and numeracy skills8. Within these broad categories, the children 
were administered 24 items. Appendix A Table A.1 gives detail of the breakdown of the 
test.  
 
I used a two-parameter logistic (2-PL) model of the Item Response Theory (IRT) to 
evaluate the performance of each item in uncovering the latent trait/skill parameter. 
Based on this model, I found Items 22 and 23 to perform poorly; and hence, excluded 
them for calculating the total score. Appendix A Section A.1 details the methodology 
used to construct the test score. While one can use test scores generated by IRT, for ease 
of interpretation, I do not do so in the main paper9. Instead, I assign a point for each of 
the 22 items administered and calculate the total test score. This is referred to as the raw 
score in the paper and ranges from 0 to 22. Second, I standardise this test score to have 
a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. This standardised score is used in all analyses. 
Children were assessed twice roughly a year apart. I shall refer to the test score from 
Round 1 as Lagged test score and the test score from Round 2 as Current test score. 
2.3.3. Participation status 
Table 2.3 summarises the participation trajectory of the 8124 sampled children from 
Round 1 to Round 2. Only 1.2 percent of the children (N=100) remain unenrolled by 
Round 2 and all these children were from Rajasthan. 89 percent of the children were 
already attending a preschool at the time of the first data collection (Round 1). This is 
unsurprising as enrolment rates have been consistently high for India in the recent years 
– for instance, ASER Early Years Report (ASER Centre, 2020) documents that 84 
percent of their nationally representative rural sample of 4-year old children were 
enrolled in preschool. Of these children in my data, most continued to attend a 
preschool in Round 2. 1861 children started attending a primary school in Round 2 after 
preschool in Round 1 - 95 percent of these children were in Rajasthan or Andhra 
Pradesh. This is because the school starting age in Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh is 5 
 
8While most School Readiness instruments administered in early childhood studies also have dimensions on socio-
emotional skills and motor skills (for e.g., see Yoshikawa et al., 2015; Wolf et al., 2019), the SRI tool administered in 
this study had a narrow focus on cognitive and language skills.  
9 In Appendix A Table A.3 and Table A.4, I report the main results using IRT constructed scores.  
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years, while it is 6 years in Assam.   However, the slight anomaly, are the children (9 
percent of the overall sample or 761 children) who were already attending a primary 
school at Round 1 and continue to do so in Round 2. While officially these children 
would be too young to be attending primary school, it is common for the enforcement of 
formal school entry regulations to be lax10. Given the difference in educational norms 
and trends by states, I control for village fixed effects in all my analysis. The choice to 
have village instead of state fixed effects is to capture the differences in facilities 
provision by village.  
Table 2.3. Distribution of sample by educational participation 
Participation Total Andhra Pradesh Assam Rajasthan 


























                  
Not enrolled 100   0   0   100   
Preschool  5402 1861  1258 787  2350 98  1794 979 
Primary school   761   151   0   610 
This table presents the sample by each educational participation category, and by the states. 
 
I categorise the children who were attending preschool in both Rounds 1 and 2, as 
children who have been to preschool (67 percent of the overall sample or 5402 
children). The children who attended preschool in Round 1 and then enrolled in a 
primary school in Round 2 are categorised as children who have been to both preschool 
and school (23 percent of the overall sample or 1861 children). The children who were 
attending primary school in both Rounds 1 and 2 are treated as primary school goers (9 
percent of the overall sample or 761 children) without having ever attended a preschool. 
The last category are the children who are never enrolled (1 percent of the overall 
sample or 100 children). 
 
For additional analysis, I also categorise the children by the management type of 
preschools as shown in Table 2.4. 49 percent of those who were attending preschool, 
attended a private preschool – majority of these children are from Rajasthan. Children 
who attended a public preschool are mostly located in Assam. Most children, who start 
going to a primary school in Round 2 after preschool, come from a public preschool.  
 
10 For example, see Singh (2020) where he documents that there is no regression discontinuity involving official 
school age entry for the Indian sample. Also, see ASER Early Years (ASER Centre, 2020) which documents 8 
percent of their nationally representative rural sample at age 4 were enrolled in primary school. 
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Table 2.4. Distribution of preschool goers by management type 
  Overall 
Andhra 
Pradesh Assam Rajasthan 
Attending private preschool 2649 881 451 1317 
Attending public preschool 2753 377 1899 477 
Attending private preschool and school 623 117 5 501 
Attending public preschool and school 1238 670 93 475 
 The table provides a further breakdown for children who either are or have attended a preschool by 
management type. The 5402 children who have been attending a preschool in both Rounds 1 and 2 are 
further distinguished into ‘attending a private preschool’ and ‘attending a public preschool’. The 1861 
children who were attending a preschool in Round 1 and started going to a primary school in Round 2 
are further distinguished as attending a private preschool and school; and attending a public preschool 
and school. 
 
I keep children who have attended both preschool and primary school as a separate 
category because the change in test scores from Round 1 to Round 2 is now a function 
of both preschool and primary school input. Using the data from tracking visits, I 
confirm that these 1861 children would still have had substantial exposure to preschool 
between Rounds 1 and 2. Table 2.5 shows that no child switched to a primary school in 
February. Most children switch in July – this is expected because the academic calendar 
runs from June/July in Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh (and from January in Assam). 
Based on these tracking visits, I can confirm that these children would have had at least 
six months of preschool exposure after Round 1. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that 
the value added between Rounds 1 and 2 would be a function of both preschool and 
primary school. 
Table 2.5.  Switching from preschool to primary school 
From preschool in Round 1 to primary school in Round 2 N 
Switch occurs at tracking visit 1 (Feb-Mar 2012) 0 
Switch occurs at tracking visit 2 (Jul-Aug 2012) 1215 
Switch occurs at Round 2 (Sept-Dec 2012) 646 
Sample size 1861 
This table shows the approximate time when the 1861 children who were attending 
a preschool in Round 1 would have switched to a primary school.  
2.3.4. Test scores 
Figure 2.1 presents the distribution of the standardised score at Round 1 and Round 2 by 
participation status of the children. I distinguish the preschool goers further by 
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management type. The test scores are presented by the following categories – never 
enrolled, going to a primary school (with no previous preschool exposure), going to a 
public preschool, going to a private preschool, going to a public preschool with primary 
school, and going to a private preschool with primary school.  
 
Looking at the lagged test score, there emerges a clear hierarchy in selection – children 
who are not enrolled performing the worst, followed by children in primary school, then 
children in public preschool, and finally children in private preschool. When the 
children are tested again after one year in Round 2, all categories see a reduction in the 
proportion of children scoring very low. This could be a result of being tested on the 
same tool and the resulting familiarity or the effect of age. By Round 2, the primary 
school sample has caught up with the public preschool sample, with the two 
distributions almost overlapping. The public preschool goers who have started attending 
a primary school at Round 2 are slightly better off than those with only public preschool 
or with only primary school. The biggest gain in test scores come from the private 
preschool goers. The private preschool goers who may have attended at most six 
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I present further summary statistics on the test scores by particpation categories in Table 
2.6. Looking at the raw test score, the average score for the overall sample is quite low 
at 7.8 (out of a total of 22) in Round 1 and just about half of the total at 11.8 in Round 2. 
There is a substantial proportion of children who score 0 on the test in Round 1 (12 
percent of the overall sample). Most of these children are those who were not enrolled. 
This proportion drops across all particpation categories in Round 2. Additionally, while 
less than 1 percent of the overall sample score the full total of 22 in Round 1, in Round 


























and school Total 
Round 1         
Raw score 4.46 6.36 8.55 7.89 8.26 7.19 7.84 
Proportion scoring 0 0.29 0.17 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.14 0.12 
Proportion scoring full 0 0.001 0.007 0.004 0.003 0 0.004 
Standardised score -0.714 -0.313 0.150 0.0101 0.0883 -0.138 0.0 
Round 2         
Raw score 6.70 10.79 13.10 10.69 13.47 11.65 11.80 
Proportion scoring 0 0.15 0.049 0.016 0.043 0.016 0.031 0.032 
Proportion scoring full 0 0.013 0.034 0.015 0.032 0.020 0.023 
Standardised score -0.241 0.624 1.112 0.602 1.188 0.805 0.836 
N 100 761 2649 2753 623 1238 8124 
This table presents different statistics on the test score in Round 1 (lagged) and in Round 2 (current) by the 
educational participation categories. The categories are never enrolled, primary school with no preschool exposure, 
attending a private preschool in both Rounds 1 and 2, attending a public preschool in both Rounds 1 and 2, 
attending a private preschool before starting primary school, attending a public preschool before starting primary 
school, and the overall sample. The raw score is sum of correctly answered questions and ranges from 0 to 22. The 
standardised score is the raw score standardised using the Round 1 mean and standard deviation.  
2.3.5. Sample characteristics  
Table 2.7 reports the mean (and standard deviation) for the children by the participation 
categories. Column 1 reports the summary statistics for never enrolled; Column 2 for 
children in primary school (with no preschool exposure); Columns 3 for preschool 
(private and public) goers; Column 4 for private preschool goers; Column 5 for public 
preschool goers; Column 6 for children with both preschool (private and public) and 
primary school; Columns 7 and 8 differentiate the preschool participation among these 
children by private and public management types respectively; and Column 9 reports 
the summary statistics for the entire sample11.  
 
Older children are more likely to be in primary school or to have switched to primary 
school from preschool. Within preschools, private preschool goers tend to be marginally 
older than public preschool goers. Girls, muslims, scheduled caste, and scheduled tribe 
are less likely to have attended a private preschool. Children from scheduled caste and 
scheduled tribe are  more likely to attend primary school, while muslims are more likely 
 
11 In Appendix A, Section A.6, I present the results of a multinomial logit on choice of educational participation for a 
more nuanced exercise of understanding how the observable characteristics affect participation. 
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to not be enrolled.  
 
Parent’s education, wealth index, and consumer durable index are associated with 
private preschool attendance. The poorest families are most likely to send their child to 
a public preschool. If both parents are employed outside the household, the child is 
more likely to have attended a preschool, in particular a  public preschool. This might 
be because public preschool are more informal in set up and they tend to be used as free 
crèche facilities in villages. Households having children’s reading material and play 
material are more likely to send the child to some educational institute as against not 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.8 provides the summary statistics on additional variables capturing child and 
parent motivation. Enrolment in preschool is associated with higher likelihood of 
households to engage in home learning activities, such as reading a story to the child 
and helping the child with learning at home. However, if attending a preschool requires 
more home study, a household may be more likely to enage in such activities. While all 
information on these controls come from the Round 1 survey, as seen in Table 2.2, the 
children were already attending an institution in Round 1. Hence, it is likely that 
households have changed their input in response to the school/preschool input. Because 
of this concern, I do not use these variables in my main regressions, but only as 
robustness checks.  
 
Additional questions relating to parent and child motivation were only adminitered to 
children in preschool. Parents who switch their child to a primary school by Round 2 
report lower probability of engaging with preschool staff in Round 1. The proportion of 
parents wanting their child to learn to read and write is highest for children who go to a 
private preschool with primary school. Children who went to a private preschool and 
then a primary school are most likely to report liking going to a preschool. These 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.4. Method  
2.4.1. Value Added Model – theoretical derivation 
The basis of the value-added model, used in recent literature, is a structural cumulative 
effects model developed by Boardman and Murnane (1979). Following Todd and 
Wolpin (2003) and Todd and Wolpin (2007), the general functional form is as follows,  
  
where  is a measure of achievement for child i  at the end of the t-th year of life,  , 
 and  are the family, school and individual based input histories up to age t 
respectively,  is the time invariant individual endowment12, and  is a time varying 
error term.  
 
Assuming the function in (1) is additively separable and non-age varying, we arrive at 
the cumulative effects model or the distributed lag model.  
(2) 
It is important to note that linearity and additive separability are trivial assumptions to 
ease computability and interpretation. This is the most commonly used formulation of 
the cumulative effects model13. One can easily test if the functional form is mis-
specified by introducing polynomials or using logarithmic transformation.  
 
Second, non-age varying assumption implies that the impact of any input on 
achievement varies within the time period of application of the input and realization of 
achievement; however, it does not matter at which age or time period the input is 
applied. For example, it is assumed that the effect of a small class size at the age of 6 on 
achievement score at age 7 is the same as the effect of small class size at the age of 8 on 
the achievement score at age 9. This might seem like an unreasonable assumption, given 
the evidence for greater returns to investing in human capital in the early years (see 
 
12 This can be thought of as genetic endowment or ability which is fixed at conception and does not vary over time. 
This is not to say that the effect of the endowment is fixed with time. The functional form allows ability to have 
different effects over time, that is, it allows for the notion that higher ability children may learn faster.  
13 An exception is Harris (2007) who uses a trans-log functional form. 
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Cunha et al., 2006; Doyle et al., 2009). Although one can easily introduce extra 
interaction terms and allow for age varying intercepts, this is not ideal, due to loss of 
degrees of freedom and issues of multicollinearity.  
 
It is important to note here that the  term in (2) remains untouched by the non-age 
varying assumption. The effect of ability can be interpreted in two ways in equation (2). 
First, ability can be thought of as fixed at conception, but having varying effects at 
different ages of the child, which is what  would capture. Second, ability can be 
thought of as malleable and changing from the initial endowment. Given that ability 
cannot be observed, one cannot estimate the parameter on ability and observationally, 
both interpretations of the function of ability will give the same result. 
 
Estimating equation (2) is difficult as data which tracks the child right from birth till 
current period and has information on inputs at every stage is impossible to come by. 
Also, one can easily see lag terms to be highly correlated with each other, giving little 
meaningful information to researchers and policy makers. If  one is willing to assume 
geometric decay of prior inputs, and that this geometric decay parameter is the same for 
all prior inputs, we have ; ;   where . The 
equation now becomes – 
 
Subtracting  from both sides of equation (3), we have,  
  
 
The process described by geometric decay is well documented in literature – Banerjee et 
al. (2007) report that the 1-year treatment effect of educational intervention on test 
scores fade out by the 3rd year; Currie and Thomas (2000) and Lee et al. (1990) also 
show similar fading out of the Head Start preschool program, at least on achievement 
scores. If the effect of initial ability  on achievement changes at a constant rate, then we 




where  and   
 
Equation (5), is commonly known as the lagged score value added model (VAM). This 
is not the only specification of VAM in common use. The other two versions are the 
highly restrictive contemporaneous VAM which assumes immediate decay of prior 
inputs or , and the gain score specification, which assumes that there is perfect 
persistence or . While the former assumes that inputs in previous years have no 
impact in current year, the latter assumes that inputs in previous years have full (the 
same effect as they would have had in t-1) effect in current year. Hence, lagged score 
VAM is the least restrictive. I use the lagged score VAM as my main specification 
throughout the paper, while also reporting the results from contemporaneous VAM and 
perfect persistence VAM.  
2.4.2. Value Added Model – estimated specification 
This paper uses the lagged VAM as the main specification in the analysis.  
  
where preschool is a dummy variable for having attended only preschool and not yet 
started primary school,  primary school is a dummy variable for having attended only 
primary school with no preschool exposure, and preschool and school is a dummy 
variable for children who have started primary school after attending a preschool. The 
base category is for children who are not enrolled. The regression controls for village 
fixed effects (villagei) to ensure that differences in educational infrastructure 
provisioning at the village level is controlled for. The standard errors are clustered at the 
village level to account for the fact that sampling was not at random; deliberately 
choosing larger villages, and for spatial correlation within villages. I report equation (6) 
without household (Fit) and child (Xit) controls, and equation (6) with all controls. I also 
additionally report the results from contemporaneous VAM (  and perfect 
persistence VAM ). 
The model in (6) is estimated using Dynamic OLS (DOLS). This estimation may be 
vulnerable to bias from two main sources. First, the identification of preschool and 
primary school effects relies on the assumption that the lagged test score is a sufficient 
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proxy for the unobserved ability (  in eq (5)). This assumption may be violated if 
parents use more information than those captured in equation (6) while making a 
decision to send their child to an educational institute. It may also be violated if the 
unobserved ability does not decay at the same rate as the lagged achievement or if it has 
time varying effects. Since one cannot observe inherent ability, this is akin to saying 
that talented children learn faster. Both these cases would lead to an upward bias in our 
β coefficients of interest. Following Singh (2015) who uses DOLS estimation of lagged 
score VAM to study the differential impact of private and public primary school, I 
employ a series of robustness checks to ascertain if indeed there is a potential bias from 
lagged score being a poor proxy of innate ability.  
 
Second, conditioning on lagged test score may introduce a measurement bias, which 
would attenuate the persistence coefficient (λ), and consequently bias the β coefficients 
of interest in an unknown direction. The precise bias on β coefficients will depend on 
the degree of correlation with lagged inputs, which are all now a part of the error term. 
Ideally, one would want to control for IQ or mental ability along with test scores (as 
suggested in Todd & Wolpin, 2003), as this would circumvent the measurement error. 
However, I am unable to do so since there is no data on IQ for my sample. Andrabi et 
al. (2011) discuss this issue in depth and show how correcting only for measurement 
error in their sample results in worse estimates for the variable of interest. 
 
There may be concern around using DOLS estimation with lagged score as the lagged 
test score will be correlated with   . However, as long as , the 
DOLS estimation is asymptotically consistent. Indeed, the literature on VAM has found 
the persistence parameter to be less than 0.5 in most cases (see Andrabi et al., 2011; 
Kane & Staiger, 2008; Rothstein, 2010).   
 
VAMs have been used extensively in the education literature, mostly in the US teacher 
value added empirical work. However, a separate strand studying the effects of different 
management type of schools and its impact is closest in application to this paper here. 
The work on effects of charter schools (for instance, see Hanushek et al., 2007; Sass, 
2006) and the effects of private school (for instance, see Andrabi et al., 2011; Singh, 
2015) have shown that VAMs are indeed a reliable identification tool. 
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Additionally, work by Guarino et al. (2015) on comparing different estimators of VAMs 
have stressed the superiority of DOLS as an efficient and consistent estimator. They 
assess the reliability of different VAMs estimators for recovering teacher effects using 
simulated data with a variety of non-random teacher-student assignment structure. They 
find that DOLS estimator performed robustly across most scenarios; better than other 
estimators, namely, Arellano-Bond panel data estimators, pooled OLS on gain score 
VAM specification, random effects model on gain score VAM, fixed effects model on 
gain score VAM, and average residual approach. They report that ‘the main strength of 
this (referring to DOLS) estimator lies in the fact that, by including prior achievement 
on the right hand side, it controls whether directly or indirectly for grouping and 
assignment mechanisms’ (Guarino et al., 2015, p.30). Hence, by allowing the lagged 
test score and the variable of interest to be correlated, DOLS takes care of the selection 
issue.  
 
Andrabi et al. (2011) while studying the impact of private schools on cognitive 
achievement for Pakistan report that ‘despite ignoring measurement error and 
unobserved heterogeneity, the lagged value-added model estimated by DOLS gives 
similar results for the private school effects as our more data intensive dynamic panel 
methods, although persistence remains overstated. The relative success of the lagged 
VAM can be explained by the countervailing heterogeneity and measurement error 
biases on persistence parameter and because lagged achievement can also act as a 
partial proxy for omitted heterogeneity in learning’ (Andrabi et al., 2011, p.31).  
 
At this stage, I would like to draw a distinction between technology parameter (ceteris-
paribus effect) and the policy effect (total effect) (Todd & Wolpin, 2003). Since VAMs 
are not the same as the cumulative effects structural model (equation (2)), one must 
remember that we are no longer estimating the technology parameter in the lagged score 
VAM. Thus, there is a need for caution as to which variables are included as controls – 
for example, one must not control for the channels through which private preschool 
choice would have an effect on learning because that would be part of the ‘policy 
effect’. As soon as one controls for current family inputs or children’s behavior, which 
might have changed due to the preschool choice, one is no longer calculating the 
average treatment effect, but the technology parameter. I will refrain from estimating 





One of the implications of this distinction, is that much of the criticism around VAM 
applied to teacher performance literature, primarily in the US, is due to researchers 
trying to evaluate teacher value added without controlling for change in the family 
input, resulting from being assigned to a low quality (or high quality) teacher. Since 
most of the papers engaged in calculating teacher value added (technology parameter) 
use school administration data, they have little information on households. In such a 
scenario, estimation involves assuming that household effect is time-invariant. Such an 
assumption would lead to misclassification of teachers. As shown by Guarino et al. 
(2015) and Sass et al. (2014), varying VAM specifications and estimation methods 
typically misclassify teachers, even though they provide reliable estimates of the 
average effect. As such, the scope of this chapter is not to distill the individual 
preschool fixed effects, but to assess the average treatment effect of preschool. Thus, 
most of the criticism around VAM stemming from the application of this model to 
teacher value added is not valid for my exercise in this chapter.  
 
2.5. Results  
2.5.1. Preschool value added  
In Table 2.9,  I present the results of value added by preschools as compared to not 
enrolled, primary school (with no preschool exposure) and both preschool and primary 
school. Not enrolled serves as the base category in these estimations. However, as noted 
in Table 2.3, only 1 percent of the sample are not enrolled, and they are all located in 
Rajasthan. There might be concern over the reliability of the estimates using this 
category. In Appendix A Table A.5, I report the regressions on a sub-sample excluding 
the not enrolled category. The estimates remain significant and qualitatively similar to 
those reported here.  
 
In Table 2.9, Columns 1 and 2 assume instant decay of input and are the results from 
contemporaneous VAM. Columns 3 and 4 assume perfect persistence of past inputs. 
Columns 5 and 6 are my preferred specification of the lagged score VAM. 
Straightaway, we find that our coefficients of interest are biased upwards in 
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contemporaneous VAM and biased downwards in a perfect persistence VAM. Columns 
1, 3, and 5 have no controls. Columns 2, 4 and 6 have household and child level 
controls. The effects of controls are as expected and documented in the literature – girls 
and children belonging to socially disadvantaged groups perform worse on the test; 
older children, children from more educated parents and richer household perform better 
on the test.  
 
Coming to the preferred specification (Column 6), there is a positive and significant 
effect of going to a preschool or a primary school or a preschool with primary school 
vis-à-vis children who are not enrolled anywhere.  Going to a preschool increases the 
test score by 0.44 SD units, going to a primary school increases the test score by 0.53 
SD units, and going to a preschool with primary school increases the test score by 0.67 
SD units. These effects are large, but expected, as the base category are the children 
who have never been enrolled in any educational institute.   
 
The more interesting comparison is children who attended primary school (with no 
exposure to preschool) and children who attended preschool. I find that there is no 
premium on test score of attending a preschool – in fact, these children perform worse 
than the children enrolled in primary school by 0.09 SD unit (significant at 5 percent). 
However, since teaching in primary school is more instructional and formal, and 
children are more familiar with test taking scenarios, it would be unfair to compare 
children who are yet to attend primary school with children who have been attending 
primary school for a while.  
 
As discussed earlier in Section 2.3.3, some of the children who attended preschool also 
start going to primary school by Round 2. To truly gauge if attending a preschool before 
starting primary school has a premium, I compare the group of children with both 
preschool and primary school exposure to children with only primary school exposure. 
Children who attended preschool before starting primary school have a significant (at 1 
percent) premium of 0.14 SD unit over children with only primary school experience. 
Hence, while it seems that preschool children lag behind in achievement tests at first 
glance, they seem to reap the benefits of their preschool experience when they enter 
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primary school14.  
Table 2.9.  Preschool VAM estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Contemporaneous VAM Perfect persistence VAM Lagged score VAM 
Lagged - Standardised score 0 0 1 1 0.276*** 0.225*** 
     (0.019) (0.017) 
Preschool 0.657*** 0.515*** 0.196** 0.174* 0.530*** 0.438*** 
 (0.081) (0.085) (0.093) (0.095) (0.079) (0.083) 
Primary school 0.625*** 0.604*** 0.245** 0.257** 0.520*** 0.526*** 
 (0.085) (0.088) (0.100) (0.101) (0.083) (0.086) 
Preschool and school 0.837*** 0.750*** 0.378*** 0.377*** 0.711*** 0.666*** 
 (0.084) (0.087) (0.097) (0.098) (0.082) (0.086) 
Female  -0.104***  0.004  -0.080*** 
  (0.020)  (0.024)  (0.019) 
Age in months  0.026***  0.002  0.021*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
Years of education - Father  0.014***  0.007**  0.012*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Years of education - Mother  0.024***  0.005  0.020*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Both parents work outside  -0.101***  -0.008  -0.080** 
  (0.037)  (0.044)  (0.036) 
Muslim (Base category: Hindu)  -0.156***  -0.023  -0.126*** 
  (0.047)  (0.062)  (0.047) 
Scheduled caste  -0.199***  -0.020  -0.159*** 
  (0.044)  (0.058)  (0.043) 
Scheduled tribe  -0.184***  0.092  -0.122** 
  (0.060)  (0.072)  (0.057) 
Backward castes  -0.073**  0.074  -0.040 
  (0.037)  (0.046)  (0.035) 
Wealth index  0.039**  0.014  0.034** 
  (0.016)  (0.021)  (0.016) 
Ownership of durables index  0.082***  0.021  0.068*** 
  (0.015)  (0.019)  (0.015) 
HH has children's reading 
material  0.042  -0.042  0.023 
  (0.028)  (0.037)  (0.027) 
HH has toys/games for child  0.042  -0.029  0.026 
  (0.028)  (0.036)  (0.027) 
Constant -0.687*** -2.249*** -0.240*** -0.392 -0.564*** -1.832*** 
 (0.079) (0.239) (0.091) (0.279) (0.077) (0.226) 
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,124 8,124 8,124 8,124 8,124 8,124 
R-squared 0.257 0.313 0.244 0.248 0.312 0.348 
Preschool=School F-stat 0.411 3.987** 0.961 2.652 0.0413 4.215** 
Preschool=Mixed F-stat 22.32*** 44.16*** 22.46*** 26.88*** 25.38*** 44.21*** 
 
14 There may be a concern that since the switch from preschool to primary school happens between Round 1 and 
Round 2, it could be due to an unobservable shock, which would no longer be captured by the controls and the lagged 
score. I re-run this analysis without the mixed (preschool and primary school) sample. The results are reported in 
Appendix A Table A.9. The results are qualitatively similar for the coefficients on preschool and primary school.  
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Contemporaneous VAM Perfect persistence VAM Lagged score VAM 
School=Mixed F-stat 18.38*** 9.707*** 5.311** 4.383** 15.80*** 9.280*** 
All specifications control for village fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. The table also reports the F-stat 
from testing equality of coefficient between preschool and primary school; between preschool and preschool with primary school 
(mixed); and between primary school and mixed. The variables of interest are preschool (attending preschool in Rounds 1 and 2 and 
not yet started primary school), primary school (attending primary schools in Rounds 1 and 2 with no preschool exposure) and 
attending preschool before starting primary school. The base category is not enrolled. The child’s age is in months at the time of 
testing in Round 2. Both parents work outside of home is a dummy variable which is 0 when either one of the parent stays at home. 
The base category for scheduled caste, scheduled tribe and backward castes is general caste. The wealth index comprises of 
household building material, having a toilet, piped water, electricity and using higher grade fuel for cooking. The durables index 
comprises of ownership of TV, fan, fridge, cycle, scooter, phone.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
2.5.2. Private preschool value added  
There is well-documented evidence of the public-private divide in the Indian context 
(see French & Kingdon, 2010; Desai et al., 2009; Chudgar & Quin, 2012). Given the 
rapidly growing private sector in the Indian education landscape and the significant gaps 
in learning due to management type heterogeneity, I delve deeper into the preschool 
effect. Instead of looking at just the preschool variable, I now differentiate the children 
as going to a public or private preschool.  
 
Table 2.10 presents the results of value added by preschool type15. Columns 1 and 2 
assume instant decay of input and are the results from contemporaneous VAM. 
Columns 3 and 4 assume perfect persistence of past inputs. Columns 5 and 6 are my 
preferred specification of the lagged score VAM. I find that the coefficients of interest 
are biased upwards in contemporaneous VAM and biased downwards in a perfect 
persistence VAM. Columns 1, 3, and 5 have no controls. Columns 2, 4 and 6 have 
household and child level controls.  
 
Coming to the preferred specification (Column 6), there is a positive and significant 
effect of going to a private preschool. Children from private preschool have a value-
added premium of 0.62 SD units (significant at 1 percent) when compared to children 
from public preschool. Additionally, they score 0.13 SD units higher (significant at 1 
percent) on the test than children with only primary school exposure.  
 
On the other hand, attending a public preschool barely has a premium on achievement 
even when compared to children who are not enrolled – a insignificant premium of 0.08 
 
15 In Appendix A Table A.6, I report the regressions on a sub-sample excluding the not enrolled category. The 
estimates remain significant and qualitatively similar to those reported here. 
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SD unit. These children from public preschool do significantly worse on test scores 
when compared to their private preschool counterpart as well as the primary school 
category.  
 
When one looks at children with both public preschool and primary school exposure, 
the value-added coefficient is 0.59 SD unit. This is not significantly different from that 
of children with only primary school experience. Hence, the effects of preschool that we 
saw in Section 2.5.1, were entirely driven by children who attend private preschools16.  
 
16 There may be a concern that since the switch from preschool to primary school happens between Round 1 and 
Round 2, it could be due to an unobservable shock, which would no longer be captured by the controls and the lagged 
score. I re-run this analysis without the mixed (preschool and primary school) sample. The results are reported in 
Appendix A Table A.9. The results are qualitatively similar for the coefficients on private preschool, public preschool 





Table 2.10.  Private preschool VAM estimates 





VAM Lagged score VAM 
              
Lagged - Standardised score 0 0 1 1 0.224*** 0.198*** 
     (0.018) (0.017) 
Private preschool 0.942*** 0.790*** 0.339*** 0.338*** 0.806*** 0.700*** 
 (0.079) (0.083) (0.097) (0.098) (0.079) (0.083) 
Public preschool 0.105 0.116 -0.058 -0.053 0.068 0.083 
 (0.079) (0.082) (0.095) (0.096) (0.078) (0.081) 
Primary school 0.674*** 0.645*** 0.261*** 0.272*** 0.581*** 0.571*** 
 (0.083) (0.085) (0.100) (0.101) (0.081) (0.084) 
Private preschool and school 1.157*** 1.032*** 0.373*** 0.379*** 0.981*** 0.903*** 
 (0.090) (0.094) (0.105) (0.106) (0.087) (0.091) 
Public preschool and school 0.669*** 0.638*** 0.385*** 0.399*** 0.606*** 0.591*** 
 (0.082) (0.085) (0.099) (0.100) (0.082) (0.084) 
Female  -0.066***  0.023  -0.048*** 
  (0.019)  (0.024)  (0.019) 
Age in months  0.022***  -0.001  0.017*** 
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
Years of education - Father  0.010***  0.005  0.009*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Years of education - Mother  0.019***  0.002  0.015*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Both parents work outside of home  -0.074**  0.007  -0.058* 
  (0.036)  (0.044)  (0.035) 
Muslim (Base category: Hindu)  -0.096**  0.008  -0.075 
  (0.046)  (0.063)  (0.046) 
Scheduled caste  -0.100**  0.022  -0.076* 
  (0.043)  (0.058)  (0.042) 
Scheduled tribe  -0.110*  0.133*  -0.062 
  (0.057)  (0.072)  (0.055) 
Backward castes  -0.043  0.089*  -0.017 
  (0.035)  (0.046)  (0.034) 
Wealth index  0.010  -0.001  0.008 
  (0.015)  (0.020)  (0.015) 
Ownership of durables index  0.060***  0.009  0.050*** 
  (0.015)  (0.019)  (0.014) 
HH has children's reading material  0.027  -0.046  0.013 
  (0.028)  (0.037)  (0.027) 
HH has toys/games for child  0.017  -0.042  0.005 
  (0.027)  (0.036)  (0.026) 
Constant -0.596*** -1.947*** -0.203** -0.228 -0.508*** -1.606*** 
 (0.074) (0.230) (0.091) (0.276) (0.074) (0.218) 
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,124 8,124 8,124 8,124 8,124 8,124 
R-squared 0.331 0.356 0.255 0.257 0.367 0.382 
Private preschool=School F-stat 32.83*** 10.54*** 2.272 1.517 25.29*** 8.930*** 
Public preschool=School F-stat 105.9*** 97.13*** 29.19*** 30*** 97.32*** 90.52*** 
Private preschool=Public preschool 
F-stat 384.9*** 239.1*** 72.83*** 67.93*** 317.8*** 210.8*** 
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VAM Lagged score VAM 
Private preschool and 
school=School F-stat 62.66*** 40.27*** 2.840* 2.508 47.10*** 31.71*** 
Public preschool and 
school=School F-stat 0.00927 0.0211 4.019** 4.182** 0.250 0.169 
All specifications control for village fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. The table also 
reports the F-stat from testing equality of coefficient between private preschool and primary school; between public  
preschool and primary school; between private and public preschool; between private preschool with primary school 
and primary school only; and between private preschool with primary school and primary school only. The variables 
of interest are private preschool (attending preschool in Rounds 1 and 2 and not yet started primary school), public 
preschool (attending preschool in Rounds 1 and 2 and not yet started primary school), primary school (attending 
primary schools in Rounds 1 and 2 with no preschool exposure), attending  private preschool before starting primary 
school, and attending public preschool before starting primary school. The base category is not enrolled. The child’s 
age is in months at the time of testing in Round 2. Both parents work outside of home is a dummy variable which is 
0 when either one of the parent stays at home. The base category for scheduled caste, scheduled tribe and backward 
castes is general caste. The wealth index comprises of household building material, having a toilet, piped water, 
electricity and using higher grade fuel for cooking. The durables index comprises of ownership of TV, fan, fridge, 
cycle, scooter, phone.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
2.5.3. Preschool quality  
Given that I find such a remarkable difference in test score by the management type of 
preschool, the natural line of inquiry is to understand the nature of these preschools. To 
this end, I use the preschool survey conducted in Round 1. A total of 1159 preschools 
were surveyed across 300 villages in my sample, of which, 76 percent are public 
preschools17. Table 2.11 reports the mean and standard deviation on selected indicators 
by management type, as well as the t-test of difference between these public and private 
preschool characteristics18.  
 
Overall, I find that private preschools have better physical infrastructure. Public 
preschools are more likely to have a kitchen, and this is due to the government 
mandated meal scheme in India, which does not apply to the private education sector. 
Public preschools are also more likely to have a building made of bricks rather that 
mud. This may be because public preschools are seldom housed together with other 
arms of ICDS providing facilities such as child nutrition, child immunisation, child 
health check-up, and nutrition and health education for mothers.  
 
 
17 Here, I note that this data may be biased for several reasons. Not all preschools would have been surveyed, 
depending on whether these were open at the time of the visit and granted access to the investigators to conduct a 
survey. Private preschools may be more inclined to not grant such access; and the ones that did, could very well be 
‘better’ quality. Indeed, substantially fewer private facilities were surveyed. See Appendix A, Section A.3 for details.  
18 Since the preschool data does not have unique identifier to link with the household survey, I am limited in my 
exercise and can only show the average characteristics by management type. I am unable to put these in a child level 
regression to study which aspect of preschool quality matters the most for the child’s test score.  
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Private preschools have significantly lower student-teacher ratio than public preschools. 
The classrooms in public preschools have better display materials – artwork and 
alphabet/number charts. They also are more likely to be equipped with toys and games 
for children. However, a key difference is in the variable where teachers were observed 
to be teaching. It may be the case that private preschools have more formal instruction 
akin to primary schools, while public preschools are more focussed on developing a 
child’s socio-emotional or motor skills through play-based activities. Indeed, the 
National Policy on Education (Government of India, 1986), and the National Early 
Childhood Care and Education Policy (Government of India, 2013) have discouraged 
any formal instruction of the 3R’s and emphasised play-based learning. This could 
explain the difference in the test score between the two management types. It also 
suggests a need for a more complete evaluation exercise using data that captures socio-
emotional skills in the early childhood phase.  
 
This difference in learning styles across the two management types is confirmed when I 
use the household survey. The household survey asked parents a range of questions on 
the activities that happened at the preschools. Again, I find that children in private 
preschools are more likely to engage in formal study with reading and writing activities. 
Children in public preschools are more likely to engage in play-based activities – 
artwork, singing songs, playing with toys or puzzles, and listening to stories. However, 
this may be set to change with the new National Education Policy (Government of 
India, 2020). The policy, while emphasising the use of play-based learning, posits one 
of the aims of preschool education as developing early literacy and numeracy. Children 
in private preschool also report spending more hours at the facility, on average 4.4 
hours as compared to 3.6 hours in public preschools. The lower number of hours in 
public preschools is in violation of the government mandate of 4 hours of educational 
instruction in public preschools19.  
 
19 While not captured by the survey, it is crucial to mention here that the Government of India allows the hiring of 
staff with no experience and no high school diploma as a teacher at public preschool. See https://icds-
wcd.nic.in/icds.aspx. There is a route for these staff to get appropriate training. However, even assuming that this 




Table 2.11. Selected characteristics of preschools by management type 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Public preschool Private Preschool Total t-test (1)-(2) 
Preschool Survey     
Student teacher ratio 14.226 9.437 13.204 4.789*** 
 [8.115] [7.648] [8.251]  
Building made of bricks/mortar 0.930 0.864 0.915 0.066*** 
 [0.255] [0.343] [0.280]  
Has a toilet 0.447 0.733 0.514 -0.286*** 
 [0.497] [0.443] [0.500]  
Has water facility 0.550 0.813 0.612 -0.264*** 
 [0.498] [0.390] [0.488]  
Has boundary wall 0.360 0.718 0.444 -0.358*** 
 [0.480] [0.451] [0.497]  
Has a playground 0.749 0.740 0.747 0.010 
 [0.434] [0.439] [0.435]  
Has a kitchen 0.283 0.059 0.230 0.225*** 
 [0.451] [0.235] [0.421]  
Classroom has children's art display 0.542 0.223 0.467 0.318*** 
 [0.499] [0.417] [0.499]  
Classroom has learning charts 0.888 0.740 0.853 0.148*** 
 [0.315] [0.439] [0.354]  
Classroom has toys/games/puzzles 0.691 0.542 0.656 0.149*** 
 [0.462] [0.499] [0.475]  
Classroom has books 0.868 0.810 0.854 0.058** 
 [0.339] [0.393] [0.353]  
Teacher was seen teaching 0.690 0.777 0.710 -0.087*** 
 [0.463] [0.417] [0.454]  
Teacher was seen playing games  0.528 0.176 0.445 0.352*** 
 [0.499] [0.381] [0.497]  
Teacher was seen using books 0.650 0.667 0.654 -0.017 
 [0.477] [0.472] [0.476]  
N(preschools) 886 273 1159  
Household Survey     
Hours spent at preschool 3.562 4.442 3.959 -0.881*** 
 [1.252] [1.053] [1.246]  
Child gets food 0.620 0.264 0.460 0.356*** 
 [0.485] [0.441] [0.498]  
Child learns to read and write 0.694 0.804 0.744 -0.110*** 
 [0.461] [0.397] [0.437]  
Child plays games 0.537 0.430 0.489 0.107*** 
 [0.499] [0.495] [0.500]  
Child draws and colours 0.176 0.105 0.144 0.072*** 
 [0.381] [0.306] [0.351]  
Child sings songs and poems 0.176 0.142 0.161 0.034*** 
 [0.381] [0.350] [0.368]  
Child plays with toys and puzzles 0.039 0.024 0.032 0.016*** 
 [0.194] [0.152] [0.176]  
Child listens to stories 0.229 0.191 0.212 0.038*** 
 [0.420] [0.393] [0.408]  
N(children) 3991 3272 7263  
This table presents some selected characteristics of public and private preschools. The last column is the 
difference between public and private preschools with t-test. The first set of characteristics comes from a 
preschool survey conducted in Round 1. See Section A.3 for details. The second set of characteristics comes 
from the household survey where parents would have answered these questions. The questions from household 




2.5.4. State heterogeneity in value added 
There can be considerable regional heterogeneity in preschool quality and hence, in the 
learning premium by the different states in India. This is driven by both, the variation in 
public preschool quality, and private preschool quality. Although the public preschools 
are governed by a central policy designed and implemented by the Ministry of Women 
and Child Development, the daily operation of these preschools is devolved at the state 
level. Most states are expected to raise at least 40 percent of the operational cost 
themselves. This can introduce a degree of variation in the quality of public preschools 
across the country.  
 
While this heterogeneity exists even at the primary school level, I am restricted by the 
state-level distribution of the participation categories in my data set, and hence, can only 
explore the differences in preschools. As noted in Table 2.3, all children who are not 
enrolled come from Rajasthan; there are no children in Assam who attend primary 
school (without preschool exposure) and very few children in Assam who have 
switched from preschool to primary school. This is due to the primary school starting 
age being higher in Assam at six years as opposed to five years in the other states. Thus, 
in order to have adequate sample size in all three states, I restrict the analysis sample in 
this section to children who are attending preschool and have not yet started primary 
school. I distinguish these preschool goers by private-public management type, where 
going to a public preschool is the base category.  
 
Table 2.12 presents the results of the lagged score VAM with full set of controls and 
village fixed effects for the sub-sample of children who are enrolled in preschool in 
Round 2 and have not yet started primary school. Column 1 estimates the value added 
of private preschool for the overall sample. Columns 2, 3 and 4 estimate the same 
specification for Rajasthan, Assam and Andhra Pradesh respectively. I find that the 
private preschool premium is highest in Andhra Pradesh, followed by Assam, and, 
lastly, Rajasthan. The findings here suggest that the limited empirical evidence on 
Indian preschools (Singh & Mukherjee, 2017; Singh, 2014) from Andhra Pradesh, need 
to be interpreted with caution as the results from these studies may not hold universally 




Table 2.12.  State level heterogeneity in value added for only preschool sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Overall Rajasthan Assam Andhra Pradesh 
          
Lagged - Standardised score 0.160*** 0.352*** 0.060*** 0.082*** 
 (0.018) (0.029) (0.023) (0.030) 
Private preschool 0.628*** 0.503*** 0.633*** 0.744*** 
(Base category: Public preschool) (0.046) (0.047) (0.093) (0.098) 














Controls added  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,402 1,794 2,350 1,258 
R-squared 0.424 0.481 0.394 0.418 
This table runs the lagged score VAM only on the subsample of children who attend preschool in both Rounds 1 
and 2 and have not yet started primary school. All specifications control for village fixed effects and child and 
household level controls as in Table 2.9. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. The variables of interest 
are private preschool (attending private preschool in Rounds 1 and 2 and not yet started primary school). The base 
category is public preschool. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
2.5.5. Robustness check - Ability bias 
In this section, I revisit the problem of child heterogeneity. As discussed in Section 
2.4.2, if child heterogeneity is left in the error term, it would cause the coefficient of 
interests as well the coefficient on lagged test score to be biased upwards. Child 
heterogeneity would be left in the error term if talented or motivated children learn 
faster, or if lagged test score is not a good proxy for ability. In either case, the lagged 
score VAM is no longer identified. 
 
In the household questionnaire, the parents were asked “Does the child speak about his 
day at the preschool?” and “If yes, how frequently?”. I use the information from these 
two questions to construct dummy variables for whether the child speaks of preschool 
always, sometimes, and never (base category). Another question was asked to the child 
“Do you like going to preschool?”. I have also used this information as a dummy 
variable. Both these could serve as a proxy for a child’s motivation and enthusiasm to 
learn. Since these questions were asked for the preschool sample, I can only conduct a 
check on the validity of my estimates for the subset of preschool goers (89 percent of 
the sample) comprising of those who were in preschool at Round 2, and those who had 




Table 2.13 reports the results of the preferred lagged score VAM specification with full 
set of household and child controls and village fixed effects. Column 1 runs the 
preferred specification on the subsample of preschool goers where the base category is 
going to a public preschool. Column 2 reports the results of the same specification, but 
additionally controls for child motivation variables.  
Table 2.13. VAM estimates robustness check with child motivation variables 
  (1) (2) 
 Current score Current score 
      
Lagged - Standardised score 0.183*** 0.172*** 
 (0.017) (0.016) 
Private preschool 0.623*** 0.619*** 
 (0.043) (0.043) 
Private preschool and school 0.831*** 0.805*** 
 (0.060) (0.060) 
Public preschool and school 0.513*** 0.517*** 
 (0.048) (0.048) 
Child talks about preschool always  0.110*** 
  (0.035) 
Child talks about preschool sometimes  0.126*** 
  (0.029) 
Child likes going to preschool  0.091*** 
  (0.029) 
Sample Preschool  Preschool 
Controls Yes Yes 
Village fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 7,263 7,263 
R-squared 0.383 0.387 
This table runs the lagged score VAM only on the subsample of children who are either attending 
preschool in both Rounds 1 and 2 and have not yet started primary school or have attended 
preschool before starting primary school. All specifications control for village fixed effects and 
child and household level controls as in Table 2.9. Standard errors are clustered at the village 
level. The variables of interest are private preschool (attending private preschool in Rounds 1 and 
2 and not yet started primary school); private preschool with primary school and public preschool 
with primary school. The base category is public preschool only with no primary school. The base 
category for child talks about preschool always/sometimes is child never talks about preschool. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
I find that while talking about preschool activities and liking to go to preschool has a 
significant and positive effect on test score, the coefficient on variables of interest is 
revised downward only marginally20. However, note that the coefficient on lagged test 
score itself moves downwards on adding child motivation variables in Column 2. 
Further, in Appendix A Table A.8, I investigate this bias following Singh (2015). I look 
at the correlation between the lagged test score and the child motivation variables and 
find child motivation variables to be strongly correlated with lagged test score. This 
 
20 The null hypothesis of equality of the coefficient on private preschool and school from the two columns is rejected 
at 1 percent. However, there is no significant difference between the coefficients on private preschool and public 
preschool with school in Columns 1 and 2. 
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suggests that lagged test score does serve as a proxy for child motivation. Thus, despite 
the child motivation variables being significant, the coefficient on the variables of 
interest does not change greatly.  
2.5.6. Robustness check - Parent’s Motivation 
Another source of bias with regards to VAM is when selection into type of educational 
institute is based on more information than those captured by the model. In particular, if 
the lagged test score is not a good proxy for this unobserved decision-making conducted 
in the past, the model would not be identified, and it would suffer from a positive 
selection bias.  
 
I use information from the household questionnaire that could serve as indicators for 
parent’s motivation and aspirations. I have made use of four variables to capture 
parental aspirations – whether parents read stories to the child at least once a week, 
whether they help him/her with learning at least once a week, whether they have spoken 
to a preschool staff about their child’s learning progress at least once in the past three 
months, and whether they would like their child to learn to read and write. While the 
first two questions were administered to all households, the last two were only 
administered to the subset of parents whose children were in preschool in Round 1. 
 
Table 2.14 reports the results of the preferred lagged score VAM specification with full 
set of household and child controls and village fixed effects. Column 1 reports the 
results of the preferred specification, which we have seen previously in Table 2.10. 
Column 2 reports the results of the same specification, but additionally controls for two 
variables capturing parent’s motivation. Column 3 runs the preferred specification on 
the sub-sample of preschool goers where the base category is going to a public 
preschool. Column 4 reports the results of the same specification as in Column 3, but 
additionally controls for all four indicators of parent’s motivations. In Column 5, I run 
the same specification as in Column 3 by only adding indicators on talking to preschool 
staff and parents wanting their child to read and write. I do this because the variables 
‘reads story to the child’ and ‘helps with learning’ could be an adjustment in parental 
inputs in response to the educational institute being attended. For example, if private 
preschools assign homework to children and in response to this, parents have to help the 
child with learning, then this variable is part of the private preschool effect. It becomes 
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a mechanism through which private preschools have a positive impact. Hence, one 
would expect the coefficient on private preschool to adjust downwards, even if there 
was no selection bias.  
Table 2.14. VAM estimates robustness check with parent’s motivation variables  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Current score Current score Current score Current score Current score 
            
Lagged - Standardised score 0.198*** 0.195*** 0.183*** 0.177*** 0.178*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
Private preschool 0.700*** 0.690*** 0.623*** 0.617*** 0.620*** 
 (0.083) (0.083) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
Public preschool 0.083 0.077    
 (0.081) (0.081)    
Primary school 0.571*** 0.569***    
 (0.084) (0.084)    
Private preschool and school 0.903*** 0.889*** 0.831*** 0.813*** 0.817*** 
 (0.091) (0.091) (0.060) (0.061) (0.060) 
Public preschool and school 0.591*** 0.586*** 0.513*** 0.515*** 0.515*** 
 (0.084) (0.085) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) 
Reads story to child  0.049  0.048  
  (0.031)  (0.032)  
Helps with learning tasks  0.059**  0.043  
  (0.027)  (0.029)  
Talk to staff about child's 
learning progress    0.035 0.044 
    (0.029) (0.029) 
Wants child to read/write    0.075*** 0.083*** 
    (0.029) (0.028) 
Sample Full Full Preschool  Preschool Preschool 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,124 8,124 7,263 7,263 7,263 
R-squared 0.382 0.383 0.383 0.385 0.384 
This table runs the lagged score VAM only on the full sample (Columns 1 and 2) and on the subsample of children 
who are either attending preschool in both Rounds 1 and 2 and have not yet started primary school or have attended 
preschool before starting primary school (Columns 3, 4 and 5). All specifications control for village fixed effects 
and child and household level controls as in Table 2.9. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. The 
variables of interest are private preschool (attending private preschool in Rounds 1 and 2 and not yet started primary 
school); public preschool only with no primary school, private preschool with primary school, public preschool with 
primary school, and primary school with no preschool exposure. The base category for Columns 1 and 2 is not 
enrolled. The base category for Columns 3, 4 and 5 is public preschool only with no primary school. Reads story to 
the child is a dummy variable which takes the value of 0 if no-one in the household reads story to the child at least 
once a week. Helps with learning tasks takes the value of 0 if no one in the household helps the child with 
homework at least once a week. Talks to staff about child’s learning progress takes the value of 0 if the parent has 
not spoken to the staff in the past 3 months.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
For the full sample (in Column 2), while ‘helps with learning tasks’ has a positive and 
significant impact, the change in the coefficients of interest is marginal21. Next when I 
look at the subsample of preschool goers only (in Column 4), parents wanting their 
child to read/write is positive and significant. However, the coefficient on variables of 
 
21 The null hypothesis of equality of the coefficient on private preschool and private preschool with school in 
Columns 1 and 2 is rejected at 5 percent. However, there is no significant difference between the coefficients on 
public preschool, primary school, and public preschool with school in Columns 1 and 2.  
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interest, once again, shows only a marginal change22.  Moving to Column 5, where I do 
not control for variables that could be assumed to be parental inputs in response to 
attending a type of educational institute, I find that parents wanting their child to 
read/write to be positive and significant. The coefficients on variable of interest are not 
significantly different from those in Column 3. This indicates that the lagged test score 
is a sufficient proxy for past inputs including the parent’s decision-making process 
regarding their child’s enrolment (also see Appendix A Table A.8, for the significant 
correlation between the parent’s motivation and lagged test score).  
2.5.7. Robustness check – Excluding zeroes on test score 
As seen in Table 2.6, 12 percent of the sample scored zero on the test in Round 1. This 
proportion reduces to 3 percent in Round 2. A concern arising from this change in the 
distribution at the lower end, is that I may be overestimating the value added of 
preschools. The change could have been because the children were older and more 
familiar with the test or less nervous at Round 2. In this section, I re-run the preferred 
lagged score VAM with controls and village fixed effects on a sub-sample of children 
who did not score zero in Round 1. Table 2.15 reports the results of this exercise23.  
 
Column 1 reports the results as seen in Column 6 of Table 2.9 for the full sample. 
Column 2 reports the results of the same specification but excludes children who scored 
zero on the test in Round 1. Column 3 reports the results as seen in Column 6 of Table 
2.10 for the full sample differentiating preschools by management type. Column 4 
reports the results of the same specification but excludes the children who scored zero 
on the test in Round 1.  
 
While the coefficient on variables of interest moves downwards (except that on 
preschool), the results remain significant and qualitatively similar. Thus, the main 
results are not an artefact of the test or testing environment but driven by the 
 
22 The null hypothesis of equality of the coefficient on private preschool in Columns 3 and 4 is rejected at 5 percent. 
The null hypothesis of equality of the coefficient on private preschool with school in Columns 3 and 4 is rejected at 1 
percent. There is no significant difference between the coefficients on public preschool with school in Columns 3 and 
4. 
23 Of the children scoring zero, the majority were not enrolled. Excluding the children who score zero in Round 1, 
also implies excluding 29 children from the base category of not enrolled. This means that the estimates are now 
based on 71 children in the not enrolled base category. Given this very small sample size, I re-run Table 2.15 
excluding children who are not enrolled and using primary school (with no preschool exposure) as the base category 
in Appendix A Table A.11. The results are similar to those discussed here.  
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participation in preschool or primary school. 
Table 2.15. VAM estimates excluding children scoring zero in Round 1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Current Score Current Score Current Score Current Score 
          
Lagged - Standardised score 0.225*** 0.240*** 0.198*** 0.209*** 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) 
Preschool 0.438*** 0.441***   
 (0.083) (0.094)   
Primary school 0.526*** 0.507*** 0.571*** 0.553*** 
 (0.086) (0.100) (0.084) (0.097) 
Preschool and school 0.666*** 0.656***   
 (0.086) (0.096)   
Private preschool   0.700*** 0.694*** 
   (0.083) (0.094) 
Public preschool   0.083 0.076 
   (0.081) (0.095) 
Private preschool and 
school   0.903*** 0.883*** 
   (0.091) (0.102) 
Public preschool and school   0.591*** 0.575*** 
   (0.084) (0.095) 








Controls Added Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,124 7,162 8,124 7,162 
R-squared 0.348 0.348 0.382 0.383 
This table presents the results of Table 2.9 (Column 1) and Table 2.10 (Column 3) for the full 
sample of children. In Columns 2 and 4, it re-runs the same specifications for the sub-sample of 
children excluding children who scored 0 on the tests in Round 1. All specifications control for 
village fixed effects and child and household level controls as in Table 2. 9. Standard errors are 
clustered at the village level. The variables of interest are private preschool (attending preschool in 
Rounds 1 and 2 and not yet started primary school), public preschool (attending preschool in 
Rounds 1 and 2 and not yet started primary school), primary school (attending primary school in 
Rounds 1 and 2 with no preschool exposure), attending  private preschool before starting primary 
school, and attending public preschool before starting primary school. The base category is not 




In this chapter, I investigated the extent of value added of preschool attendance using 
data from three geographically and culturally distinct states in India. I find that children 
who attend preschool before starting primary school have a significant premium of 0.14 
SD units in cognitive test scores as compared to children who attend primary school 
without any preschool exposure. On further investigation into the management type of 
the preschool, I find that this result is driven by those who attended private preschool. 
Children who attend public preschool before starting primary school are no better off 
than those who start primary school directly. I conduct a series of robustness checks to 
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asses if lagged score VAM are sufficient proxies for child’s and parent’s motivation; if 
the results are an artefact of the test itself or testing environment, and find the results 
remain qualitatively similar in magnitude and significant.  
 
I provide a descriptive study of the preschool quality by management type to understand 
the private preschool premium. Private preschools have lower student-teacher ratio, 
longer hours of operation and a focus on formal instructional style of teaching. On the 
other hand, public preschools conduct more play-based activities. While this may 
explain the difference in test scores, it stresses the importance of undertaking a more 
comprehensive evaluation of preschools in India.  
 
The test used in this paper has a narrow focus on cognitive skills, early literacy and 
numeracy. However, empirical evidence shows that one of the main benefits of early 
childhood education lies in nurturing of a child’s non-cognitive or socio-emotional 
skills (see Barnett, 1995, 2011, for a review). In this light, there is need to supplement 
the findings of this paper with outcome measures on non-cognitive skills. The play-
based activities used in public preschools may nurture soft-skills, and it would be 
incorrect to conclude that they have no effect on child development based only on the 
results of this chapter.  
 
However, this chapter contributes to the current literature on the private-public learning 
gap in India, which has so far neglected the effect of preschools on primary school 
performance. Additionally, the limited empirical evidence which exists on preschools in 
India is based on data from Andhra Pradesh. I find that the private preschool premium 
displays considerable state level heterogeneity with Andhra Pradesh adding the highest 
private preschool premium on test score and Rajasthan adding the least. Not only is the 
preschool funding guideline in India skewed to benefit economically underdeveloped 
regions, most states are expected to raise at least 40 percent of the operational costs 
themselves. This would imply a variation in public preschool quality depending the 
state’s revenue generating capacity. States may also exhibit a variation in attitudes and 
norms around educational attainment which would in turn be another source of variation 
in the quality of educational institutions. As such, one needs to adopt caution to not 
interpret results from a single region in India to hold true for the entire country. More 




This study also contributes to the literature on evaluation of universal preschool 
provision. This literature is sparse, even in developed countries and the results continue 
to be mixed.  While some studies find that universal preschool education is associated 
with improved literacy and numeracy skills at primary school entry age (for US, see 
Loeb et al., 2007; Fitzpatrick, 2008; for UK, see Melhuish et al., 2008; for Argentina, 
see Berlinski et al., 2009), others find that these positive effects dissipate as early as the 
end of first grade (for US, see Magnuson et al., 2007; for Quebec, see Baker et 
al.,2008).    
 
The results of this paper are particularly relevant in the backdrop of a rapidly changing 
education policy in India. The new National Education Policy (Government of India, 
2020) sees an important shift towards early years and stresses the need to improve 
foundational literacy and numeracy skills as early as in the preschool years. Given the 
findings of this paper, public preschools would need considerable overhaul to be able to 
deliver on closing the learning gaps.  
 
The policy acknowledges that with lack of preschool exposure, a large proportion of 
children fall behind in learning levels, within a few weeks of starting Grade 1 (National 
Education Policy, Government of India, 2020, para 2.5), a concern that is reiterated in 
the findings of this chapter. However, the policy fails to recognise that this gap in 
learning at school starting age is not as much due to lack of preschool exposure as it is 
due to lack of ‘quality’ preschool exposure. 89 percent of the sample in this chapter 
attend some form of preschool. Hence, the bigger focus for policy is to improve the 
quality of public preschools in India. Further, the varying levels at which children start 
primary school based on their preschool experience, highlights the need for educators to 
develop innovative pedagogical tools that target children with lower levels of learning. 
‘Teaching at the Right Level’ is one such pedagogical innovation developed by Pratham 
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Family is the primary institution in society within which social and economic activities 
are carried out. As Mani (2011) puts it, family is a universal and enduring institution 
that forms the basis of economic interactions – from allocating time to work, human 
capital investment to issues of marriage, consumption and child rearing. The extended 
family household27 structure, is where multiple adults live together, other than spouses 
and their unmarried children. An easier way to define an extended household is to say 
any structure other than a nuclear household. The nuclear household comprising of the 
spouse and the unmarried children, has been the basis of all economic intra-household 
models. Elsewhere in sociology and anthropology, researchers have further categorized 
family structures (see Khatri, 1975; D'Cruz & Bharat, 2001; Niranjan et al., 2005), but 
as a first attempt to bring non-nuclear household structure into the purview of 
economics, we implement a simplistic distinction between nuclear and extended (non-
nuclear) households. The institution of the extended households in this context is 
closely connected to the social norm of patrilocality, which prescribes cohabitation of 
young married couples with the husband’s parents.  
 
The extended household is common in developing countries, especially in South Asia and 
Sub-Saharan Africa. An estimated 50 percent of children in India live in families which 
include adults other than their parents (calculated using data from the 2011 Indian Human 
Development Study). The benefits of an extended household structure are, in general 
terms, akin to the benefits of marriage. Gains include cost-sharing of household public 
goods such as residence, meals, and children, economies of scale and specialization in 
the production process, and risk-sharing (Becker, 1974; Bergstorm, 1997; LaFave & 
Thomas, 2017; Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1985). However, larger households might also 
suffer from significantly more free-riding, as more adults are in charge of production 
and public goods provision (see Baland et al., 2016; Jakiela & Ozier, 2015, on the effect 
of a sharing tax and Cox & Fafchamps, 2007, for an overview on extended families and 
kinship networks more generally). In addition, the presence of many adults might 
 
27 We define a household as members who eat together on a daily basis from the same kitchen. This is the most 
commonly used definition of a household, also referred to as the pot in developing countries’ research.  
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introduce additional conflicting preferences, which might further encourage cheating 
and free riding tendencies.28  
 
The fact that most individuals voluntarily enter into a marital contract, or join another 
household, does not imply that the relationship between spouses is co-operative and 
efficient. However, economic theoretical intra-household models either imply efficiency 
(the unitary approach) or assume efficiency in the decision-making process (the 
collective approach), that is, married partners will always take advantage of 
opportunities that make both better off. The empirical literature on intra-household has 
found mixed results for this efficiency assumption.  
 
However, the purpose of this chapter is not to settle the debate of (in)efficiency in intra-
household decision making, but to bring to the forefront a discussion on what 
constitutes a household and how that might affect the dynamics within the household. 
We use a novel dataset collected in 2014 in rural Uttar Pradesh, India that combines 
survey data with lab-in-the-field intra-household experiments. The experiment was set 
up to measure individual household members’ willingness to forego personal monetary 
rewards for larger, collective monetary rewards. We find significant differences in 
contribution rates depending on the relationship of the game participants. A key finding 
is that participants linked through in-law relationships contribute less to the common 
resource pool (akin to a household public good) than members related by blood. We 
also find a significant difference in the contribution made to the common account by 
couples residing in nuclear versus extended families. We complement these findings 
with insights from survey and qualitative data. 
 
Our motivation for undertaking this descriptive study can be nicely summarized in the 
words of Cox and Fafchamps (2007) – ‘Too often, economic models are gender blind, 
populated with generic parents and children and “spouses 1 and 2”, rather than 
husbands, wives, fathers, mothers, sons and daughters. This modelling choice is in part 
a legacy of the nature of economics, which has little to say about gender in and of itself 
 
28 It should be noted that the long-term nature of the extended family household, as well as altruism between family 
members, might counter some of these pressures. In addition, enforcement through violence and lack of privacy 
might turn any household into a “unitary” household, that is, a family where all production and consumption 
decisions are made according to the preferences of the head or “dictator” in the family, de facto achieving efficiency. 
For a recent nuanced account on the use of violence see Lentz (2018).  
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– such as the nature of motherhood versus fatherhood’. Cox and Fafchamps (2007) 
summarising the extensive literature on the role of kinship (friends and relatives) in risk 
sharing and inter-household transfers, highlight that a rich analysis of ‘controls’ is 
indispensable to understanding intra-household decision making process. We hope to be 
able to shed light on the power balance in the decision-making process and the 
efficiency implications by unpacking the generic ‘controls’ in economic models.  
 
Second, Browning et al. (2014) while expanding on the co-operative bargaining 
framework note that the assumption of efficiency might be violated ‘when existing 
social norms impose patterns of behavior that may conflict with efficiency’ (p. 122). We 
show how one such social norm of patrilocality, relevant in developing countries, 
undermines efficiency. In developing countries, such as India, it is a common practice 
for the son of the household to continue to live with his parents even after marriage. 
This often creates tension between the daughter-in-law (wife) and the mother-in-law 
(mother) over the control of power not just over the son (and husband) but also power 
over decision making with the household. 
 
Third, Porter and Adams (2016) argued that there is a need to study sharing rules within 
the family as it has consequences for the design of intra- and inter-generational 
redistributive programs. This is particularly true for developing countries, where time 
and again empirical economic literature has supported targeted transfers to the ‘woman’ 
in the household with the aim of promoting gender equality (see Duflo, 2012). 
However, the ambiguous identity of this ‘woman’ in relationship to the other household 
members, implies that gender targeted transfers might fail to achieve their desired 
outcome. The generic ‘woman’ selected for the transfer may not play a primary role in 
the allocation of the resources within the household. Through this study, we hope to 
shed light on which ‘woman’ in the household is primary. 
 
3.2. Related Literature 
 
Unitary models predict efficiency as a result of common set of preferences or the 
existence of an altruistic head (Samuelson, 1956; Becker, 1991). In the collective 
model, the household maximizes a weighted average of individual utilities, the weights 
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capturing the balance of power within the household. Both these models are based on 
co-operation and assume efficiency. Prima facie, this efficiency assumption may seem 
natural as married partners who are aware of each other’s preferences can act co-
operatively, resulting in decisions that make both better off. Alternatively, due to co-
residence and repeated interactions, these married partners would achieve efficiency 
(similar to ‘folk theorem’ from game theory). 
 
However, empirical evidence on intra-household efficiency has been mixed. Udry 
(1996) studies agricultural yields on the plots of men and women within the same 
household in Burkina Faso and finds that the inputs are not allocated efficiently within 
the household, resulting in production losses (see also Duflo & Udry, 2004). Dercon and 
Krishnan (2000) reject risk-sharing within the households in rural Ethiopia. 
 
On the other hand, Bobonis (2009) finds evidence in favour of Pareto Optimality using 
data from Opportunidades program in Mexico. Browning and Chiappori (1998) are 
unable to rule out efficient households using Canadian household data. 
 
In contrast, the case seems to be settled in a growing experimental literature which 
studies intra-household decision making between spouses. They consistently report 
failure to maximize surplus for the household, and hence inefficiency (Ashraf, 2009; 
Iversen et al., 2011; Mani, 2011; Munro et al., 2014; Cochard et al., 2016; Kebede et al., 
2013). 
 
Sizeable empirical and experimental literature has focused on spouses. Despite its 
importance, there is relatively little literature in economics on the topic of extended 
households. Most existing literature focuses on the implications for agricultural 
productivity of African extended households. Guirkinger et al. (2015)—building on 
Udry (1996)—document that land yields are larger on plots where an individual has 
control over inputs and the use of resources, compared to extended household plots in 
Mali. But Kazianga and Wahhaj (2013) find the opposite results in Burkina Faso, a 
difference that Guirkinger et al. (2015) attribute to the relatively large and complex 
households in their sample.  
 
Experimental evidence which studies non-spousal relationships is also rare and limited. 
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Peters et al. (2004) and Porter and Adams (2016) focus on inter-generational 
cooperation between parents and children in Ithaca city and Oxford respectively. The 
former study finds that parents are less likely to free ride than children, and that there is 
more altruism between parents and children than between parents and strangers. 
However, the surplus is never maximized and hence, inefficiency exists. The latter 
study also found that children are more likely to give when paired with parents rather 
than strangers. However, there is no experimental literature that focusses on extended 
households29.  
 
There is another strand of literature related to our research, which focusses on woman’s 
‘empowerment’ and its erosion due to the social norm of patrilocality in South Asia. 
Using the large sample of the India Human Development Survey, Dhanaraj and 
Mahambare (2019), show that norms around decision making of daughters-in-law in 
extended households prevent these women from taking up employment opportunities. 
They suggest that limited autonomy of young married women within extended 
households, characterized by, among other things, the practice of purdah, or generally 
low mobility, to be the primary explanation. Similarly, Saikia and Singh (2009) find 
that women in extended households are less likely to utilize maternal health services. 
Harris-Fry et al. (2017) systematically review the literature on food allocation in South 
Asian families and link social hierarchies and patrilocality with unequal status and 
access to food. Thus, there is evidence that belonging to an extended household is 
correlated with inefficient outcomes, particularly for the younger married woman. 
 
3.3. Data  
 
The study is based in the state of Uttar Pradesh, one the biggest Indian states in terms of 
land area and population, and makes use of the baseline data of the TARA Akshar 
Evaluation Project (Wang, Maertens, Ksoll, & Deshpande, 2018). TARA Akshar is a 
computer-based female adult literacy programme implemented by a Delhi based NGO, 
Development Alternatives (DA). The Evaluation Project (Wang et al., 2018) was 
 
29 There is also a growing, literature on polygynous households in Western Africa. See Akresh et al. (2011), Rossi 
(2019), Munro et al. (2019), and Barr et al. (2018). Dynamics in polygynous households are necessarily quite 




designed as a Randomised Control Trial (RCT) to study the impact of a female adult 
literacy program (Tara Akshar) in the state of Uttar Pradesh, India. Note that as this 
chapter uses the baseline collected for the evaluation of the adult female literacy 
program, this naturally implies a degree of selectivity for the sample. However, the 
results remain relevant for substantial population as female illiteracy is common in the 
area. Using data from the 2011 Census of India, we compute illiteracy rate of 55 percent 
for women in Uttar Pradesh and 47 percent for women in India, overall30.  
 
This chapter focusses on the public goods experiment implemented in five villages in 
April-May 201431, before the implementation of the adult female literacy programme. 
In the nuclear households, only one game was played, that is, between the selected 
illiterate woman and her husband (spousal game). In the extended households, we 
selected one additional married adult male and one additional married adult female at 
random from among the present members. Thus, in extended households up to six 
games could be played: spousal, woman and other male, woman and other female, 
husband (of the ‘woman’) and other male, husband and other female, and the other male 
and female.  
 
Our analysis centers on efficiency. We define efficiency in the sense of Pareto 
Efficiency: a resource allocation in which it is not possible to make one individual 
better off without making another one worse off.  In the public goods experiment, we 
measure the individual household members’ willingness to forego personal monetary 
rewards for larger, collective monetary rewards. This is a test of a key implication of 
Pareto Efficiency, because an efficient household will co-ordinate to use the greater 
collective reward to compensate the individual for forgoing personal monetary rewards. 
While other measures of efficiency are possible, this experiment is a common tool 
among economists. A more elaborate discussion of the measurement of efficiency has 
been dealt with in Section 3.3.1.  
 
The experimental data is supplemented with survey data (also collected as part of the 
 
30 Calculated from Table DDW-0000C-O8, and SC-09-00-008-2011-DDW.XLS, Census of India, 2011. Restricted to 
all persons above the age of 18 years. Literacy is defined as being able to read and write.  
31 Since the experiment involved monetary payouts, it was not possible to implement the experiment in the other 
seven of the 12 villages due to ongoing elections.  
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baseline survey). In particular, we will make use of the decision-making process within 
the household as captured by the woman’s questionnaire. The woman was asked ‘who 
in the household has the most say?’ and the domains covered were - what to cook on a 
daily basis, what and how much to purchase at the local shop, what and how much to 
purchase at the market outside the village, what to do when your child falls ill, your 
child’s enrolment in school, your child’s attendance at school. The woman could name 
up to three household members, including herself, who have decision making power 
over these domains. The order in which the household members were named was 
inconsequential.  
 
Additionally, we complement our quantitative analysis with insight from a short 
qualitative study conducted in December 2016. We revisited two villages to conduct a 
series of qualitative semi-structured interviews. The goal of the interviews was to gain a 
better understanding of the dynamics of the relations and decisions within the 
household. We interviewed three nuclear households and five extended households. 
Among the extended households, respondents included both daughters-in-law and 
mothers-in-law. The interviews were semi-structured, following a set of open questions 
guiding the interview, but allowing the respondent to talk freely and at length about 
each topic. We covered perceptions, advantages, and disadvantages of extended versus 
nuclear households, division of labor and output, relationships, and decision making 
within the household. 
3.3.1. Public Goods Experiment 
As part of the Evaluation Project (Wang et al., 2018), a public goods experiment was 
employed to measure intra-household efficiency. Many variations of the public goods  
experiment has been used in experimental economics as a tool to measure co-operation 
between spouses and intra-household efficiency as well as to test different theories of 
intra-household efficiency (Ashraf, 2009; Castilla & Walker, 2013; Mani, 2011; Munro 
et al., 2014; Cochard et al., 2016; Iversen et al., 2011; Kebede et al., 2013). As Munro 
(2015) points out that monetary incentivized intra-household experiments have taken 
place in over 20 different countries including Bangladesh (1), Benin (1), Brazil (2), P.R. 
China (3), Colombia (1), Ethiopia (2), France (5), Germany (2), Ghana (1), India (5), 
Japan (1), Kenya (3), Nigeria (1), Malawi (1), Mongolia (1), Peru (2), Turkey (1), 




In the baseline, up to six experiments per household could be played - a spousal 
(selected illiterate woman-her husband) experiment, the woman and another male 
member, the woman and another female member, the husband (from the spousal 
experiment) and another female member, the husband and another male member, the 
other male and other female. The male and female member (other than the selected 
illiterate woman and her husband) were selected randomly from the household roster’s 
list of adult married members. 
 
In the basic version of the experiment with spouses, the woman and her husband were 
invited to a central location in the village (where their privacy could be ensured while 
playing the experiment). If the husband was not available, the enumerators returned the 
following day and re-issued the invitation. If the husband was still not available on the 
next day, the enumerators did not proceed with the experiment. Once the spouses were 
present, they were split into two different rooms where the experiment was explained 
simultaneously. They were first showed ten tokens and two boxes. One box was 
coloured blue and the other was coloured yellow, the colours chosen as they lack any 
religious or other meaning. Each one of them would receive ten tokens and would be 
asked to divide the ten tokens over the two boxes. The tokens in the blue box were 
worth more than the tokens in the yellow box: The tokens in the blue box are converted 
at a rate of four Rupees (10 US cents), while the tokens in the yellow box are converted 
at a rate of three Rupees (7.5 US cents).  In addition, the use of these funds differ.  The 
participant her(him)self could decide on the use of the funds from the tokens in the 
yellow box. The enumerators gave a few examples of such use: clothing, food, savings 
and emphasized that it was the participant ‘you’ who could decide on the use of the 
funds. The funds from the tokens in the blue box, on the other hand, would be decided 
upon by both experiment participants, in this case, the spouses.  
 
The participants were then handed the ten tokens and invited to make the decision as to 
how many tokens should be placed into each box. It was made clear that the decision 
the participant made would not be observed or shared with the other participant. A 
random amount of 42 Rupees (68 US cents) was contributed by the enumerators to the 
(common) blue box, so that the participant could not figure out how much the other had 
contributed to the blue box. Once the decisions were made, one of the enumerators left 
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the location with the four boxes and counted the total amount of tokens. The enumerator 
returned to the location, paid out the participants for the funds from the (individual) 
yellow boxes in private, brought the two participants together and then paid out the 
funds from the (common) blue box, plus the random amount of 42 Rupees32. 
 
In the larger households (consisting of adult members other than the spouses and their 
child), this experiment was repeated with a randomly selected adult male and a 
randomly selected adult female. The same protocols were followed as described above. 
 
In this experiment set up, there are higher returns from contribution to the common 
account (four times the amount as opposed to three times for contribution to the private 
account). This ensures that full contribution to the common account by all participants 
is the socially optimal or Pareto Efficient solution. However, not contributing to the 
common account when others do, benefits the free rider. Thus, contribution to the 
common account becomes a measure of the extent of co-operation or intra-household 
efficiency.  
 
Theoretically, we can use a linear voluntary contribution model used in public goods 
literature to represent the experiment played between N players.  
 
 
Where  denotes the payoff to player i, qi denotes the contribution of player i to the 
common account, and  is the private payoff of public good also known as Marginal Per 
Capita Return (MCPR) in the public goods literature.  
 
The dominant strategy here for each player acting independently is to contribute nothing 
to the common account - 
 (1) 
 
32 The decision to keep contributions private is common in experimental literature. It is motivated for ethical reasons 
where studies such as Schuler et al. (1998) and Angelucci (2008) have found an increase in domestic violence related 
to cash flow to the woman in the household. 
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In order for this to be a Pareto Efficient (socially optimum) solution, we require that the 







Combining equations (1) and (2), we have a prisoner’s dilemma problem where 
. 
 
Specific to our experiment, qi is the proportion of the 10 tokens that the player 
contributes to the common account, so . Since each three Rupees token taken 
out of the private account and placed in the common account is paid off at four Rupees 
and then divided equally among the two players (N=2), the private payoff of 
contribution to the common account is  . For the experiment in this data 
set, we have a prisoner’s dilemma problem as   lies between 1/2 and 1. 
 
Note that the two individuals could together earn up to 80 Rupees, equivalent to two 
USD or twice the daily wage at the time, if they contributed everything to the common 
account, whereas they would only receive 30 Rupees each or 60 Rupees in total if they 
contributed all to the private account. Hence, contributing all tokens to the common 




While free riding would be a dominant strategy for each individual, contribution to the 
common account is driven by altruism, trust, social norms, alignment of preferences, 
reciprocity33, and social relations. This chapter explores some of these factors – the 
social norm of patrilocality and efficiency between spouses; how an individual changes 
behaviour as a function of the relationship (within the family) with the other individual 
in the experiment; the influence of the distribution of decision-making power on 
efficiency. 
 
A common criticism levelled against lab-in-the-field experiments is whether they mimic 
real life decisions sufficiently. The experiment implemented in this study is designed to 
uncover a particular dimension of inefficiency within households: concealing personal 
resources instead of contributing them to the household as a whole, with potentially 
larger shared benefits. There are other forms of efficiency that this study cannot 
comment on, for instance, production efficiency (see Guirkinger et al., 2015; Kazianga 
& Wahhaj, 2013). 
 
Another possible concern for this measurement of efficiency is that the experiment was 
a one-off play. The participant’s best response in this experiment will be based on the 
knowledge about the behaviour of others which a participant learns through repeated 
play of the experiment (Arifovic & Ledyard, 2012). Since the experiment is played with 
individuals who have a base of common knowledge and experience through living 
together; and as far as the decision-making in this experiment mimics real life intra-
household decision making (evidenced through the widespread use in literature stated 
earlier) this is not a problem. 
3.3.2. Sample 
There were 393 households across the five villages of the baseline sample with at least 
one adult illiterate female. However, we were able to play the public goods experiment 
with 266 women and their households (68% of the baseline sample). Table 3.1 shows 
 
33 The idea of reciprocity is one where participants are willing to contribute when others contribute. In Appendix B 
Table B.6, we look at the correlation between the contribution to the common account by participant 1 and participant 
2. Overall, we find these contributions to be positively correlated suggesting reciprocity. However, these correlations 
are stronger and significant in experiments excluding the spousal experiment. 
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the characteristics of the overall sample (Column 1), the sample omitted from the 
experiment (Column 2) and the experiment sample used in this chapter (Column 3). The 
last column reports the t-test of difference in the characteristics between the omitted and 
experiment sample.  
 
While 61 percent of the households in the baseline sample are extended, the sample 
subset used for the analyses in the chapter has a higher proportion of extended families 
at 77 percent. This is because in nuclear households, if the selected illiterate woman was 
widowed or her husband is a migrant labour, the spousal experiment (the only possible 
experiment in nuclear households) could not be played. However, in extended 
households, other experiments, such as those with a randomly selected adult married 
male or female were still possible.  
 
The only other significant difference between the experiment sample and the omitted 
sample is in the household size. Given that 63 percent of the omitted sample belong to 
nuclear households, it is expected that this sample would have a smaller household size, 




Table 3.1. Characteristics of omitted and experiment sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Baseline sample Omitted Sample 
Experiment 
Sample t-test 
Nuclear household 0.387 0.634 0.233 0.401*** 
 [0.488] [0.483] [0.439]  
Selected woman's current age 39.237 38.684 38.72 -0.036 
 [9.918] [9.397] [10.175]  
Selected woman's husband's age 42.003 41.522 41.75 -0.228 
 [9.970] [9.715] [9.982]  
Number of years married 24.232 23.907 23.44 -0.467 
 [10.913] [10.450] [11.24]  
Husband's education in years 6.209 6.237 6.254 -0.017 
 [4.723] [4.717] [4.732]  
Backward caste 0.363 0.336 0.365 -0.029 
 [0.481] [0.474] [0.482]  
Scheduled Caste 0.490 0.500 0.491 0.009 
 [0.501] [0.502] [0.501]  
PPIscore 25.368 25.455 25.12 0.335 
 [10.581] [10.369] [10.811]  
Number of household members 7.656 6.410 8.649 -2.239*** 
 [3.836] [3.103] [4.391]  
Number of adult male household 
members 2.224 1.746 2.471 -0.725*** 
 [1.380] [1.168] [1.418]  
Number of adult female household 
members 2.099 1.657 2.328 -0.671*** 
 [1.135] [0.935] [1.163]  
Number of migrant members 1.285 1.201 1.328 -0.127 
 [1.771] [1.481] [1.906]  
Number of adult male migrant members 0.957 0.881 0.996 -0.116 
 [1.033] [0.823] [1.126]  
Number of adult female migrant members 0.109 0.082 0.124 -0.041 
 [0.372] [0.302] [0.404]  
Sample size 393 127 266   
This table presents the mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of the full baseline sample, the omitted sample 
for households where no public goods experiment could be conducted, and the experiment sample for households 
where at least one experiment was conducted. Column 4 presents the difference between omitted and experiment 
sample and reports the results of the t-test of difference. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. PPI score is Progress out 
of Poverty Index ranging from 0 to 100. Base category for Backward Caste and Scheduled Caste is General 
category. Number of household members includes migrant labour in the household. Migrant member in the survey 
was defined as any member who has been away from the household for at least 6 months but intends to return. It 
may not capture shorter-term migration. 
 
Table B.1 and Table B.2 in Appendix B provide the characteristics of the experiment 
and omitted sample by nuclear and extended structure. We find that our experiment 
sample is similar to the omitted sample of extended households. However, in nuclear 
households, the omitted sample has a higher level of husband’s education than those 
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present in our experiment sample. This would explain the husband’s migration, and 
hence, our inability to play the spousal experiment in nuclear households. 
 
Table 3.2 lists all the experiments that were played in the extended and nuclear 
households. We note here that despite having 204 extended households who played at 
least one public goods experiment, the number of experiments played for each type 
varies.  
Table 3.2. Number of experiments implemented by household structure 
 Extended Nuclear 
Spousal (selected illiterate woman and her husband) 111 62 
Woman and another male 86  
Woman and another female 124  
Husband and another male 38  
Husband and another female 52  
The other male and female 63  
Total number of games played 474 62 
This table presents the number of experiments played by experiment type (row variable) and 
household structure (column variable). A total of 536 experiments were conducted.  
 
The most common reason for not having played the spousal public goods experiment 
was due to the husband being a migrant labour34. We discuss the bias due to migration 
in the results related to spousal experiment in Section 3.4.2. 
 
For the non-spousal experiments, there could be two reasons for not having played 
them. First, the extended household may not have any other eligible male or female 
member to select from. For instance, an extended household consisting of the selected 
woman, her husband and mother-in-law, would not play the experiments – ‘Woman and 
another male’, ‘Husband and another male’, and ‘The other male and female’.  We 
control for the bias stemming from household composition by including household 
fixed effects in our analysis of the experiments played within the extended households.  
 
Second, the non-spousal experiments may not have been played for reasons of 
migration.  
 
34 We infer that 57% of the spousal experiments that were not implemented was due to the husband being a migrant 




Relative proximity of the study area to major cities such as Varanasi, Allahabad, and 
Delhi, combined with low living standards resulted in a high migration rate, especially 
among the men. In so far as the household member had been away for at least six 
months prior to the survey but intended to return, the household member would be 
classified as migrant labour. However, this limits our ability to infer other patterns of 
migration, such as seasonal migration. Based on this limited measurement of migration, 
on average, we infer that 30% of the non-spousal experiments that should have been 
played within extended households could not be implemented due to long-term (more 
than six months) migrant labour.35 We will return to the implication of temporal 
migration for our results within extended households in Section 3.4.3. 
 
3.4. Results 
3.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.3 presents the mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of selected variables 
by household structure. The final column also reports the p-value of the test of 
difference in the means between nuclear and extended households36.  
 
35 See Appendix B Table B.4 for details.  
36 Appendix B Table B.5 reports the descriptive statistics for the full sample (experiment and omitted) by nuclear and 




Table 3.3. Descriptive statistics of experiment sample by household structure 
 Total Extended Nuclear p-value 
Wife’s current age 38.72 38.71 38.76 0.969 
 (10.175) (10.616) (8.768)  
Husband’s current age 41.75 41.68 41.95 0.850 
 (9.982) (10.360) (8.874)  
Number of years married 23.44 23.47 23.33 0.920 
 (11.24) (11.94) (8.902)  
Husband's education in years 6.254 6.83 4.60 0.001 
 (4.732) (4.689) (4.492)  
Backward Caste 0.365 0.38 0.31 0.302 
 (0.482) (0.487) (0.467)  
Scheduled Caste 0.491 0.44 0.64 0.004 
 (0.501) (0.498) (0.483)  
PPI score 25.12 24.98 25.55 0.699 
 (10.81) (10.95) (10.43)  
Number of household members 8.649 9.838 5.030 0.000 
 (4.391) (4.352) (1.714)  
Observations 266 204 62  
This table presents the mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of the full experiment sample where at least one 
experiment was conducted, the extended households in the experiment sample and the nuclear households in the 
experiment sample. The last column reports the p-value of the t-test of difference in means between extended and 
nuclear households. PPI score is Progress out of Poverty Index ranging from 0 to 100. Base category for Backward 
Caste and Scheduled Caste is General category. Number of household members includes migrant labour in the 
household. Migrant member in the survey was defined as any member who has been away from the household for at 
least 6 months but intends to return. It may not capture shorter-term migration. 
 
The average age of the woman is 39 years, whereas that of the husband is 42 years. The 
average length of marriage is 23 years. There is no significant difference in the length of 
marriage by household structure. Although all women in our sample were uneducated 
(as we selected only illiterate women who were eligible for an adult literacy program), 
the average level of education attained by husbands is six years. Husbands in an extended 
household have two extra years of education, on average, compared with those in a 
nuclear household37. Caste classification shows that almost all households belong to the 
lower castes (rather than the General category), although nuclear households are more 
likely to belong to Scheduled Caste. In order to establish a comparable metric for the living 
standard of each household, we computed a Progress out of Poverty Index (PPI) ranging 
from 1 to 100. In 2009, a PPI score of 20-24 corresponded to a 75 percent chance of being 
under the poverty line38 (Schreiner, 2008). The average PPI score is 25 for our sample. 
The extended household, on average, has 10 members, whereas the nuclear household 
has, on average, has five members.  
 
37 As noted earlier in Section 3.3.2, husbands with higher education level in nuclear households are more likely to 
migrate and hence the average education level of husbands in our experiment nuclear household sample is low. 




Table 3.4 presents the average contribution to the common account by household 
structure, and relationship39. Panel A presents information on contributions of wives 
and husbands in the spousal experiment, by nuclear and extended households. Panel B 
presents average contributions across all non-spousal experiments (recall, there were up 
to five other experiments played in an extended household with a randomly selected 
male and female) in the extended household. The contribution is presented in 
percentage terms where 100 percent would denote that all 10 tokens were contributed to 
the common account. Contributions were private knowledge and not shared with the 
other experiment participants. A random amount of 42 Rupees (68 US cents) was added 
to the common account before payout, to ensure unobservability (See Section 3.3.1 for 
details). All games point to Pareto inefficiency since members do not maximise the 
surplus.  
 
The spousal experiment acts as a reference point, as it is the one that has been played in 
many different contexts. Consistent with past studies using a public goods experiment in 
rural India (see, for instance, Castilla, 2015; Mani, 2011; and Munro et al., 2014), we 
find that both participants contribute their full endowment to the common account in 
only 2 to 3 percent of the experiments. However, consider the percentage of individuals 
contributing everything to the common account – for instance, in a nuclear household 
11 percent of the wives and 19 percent of the husbands contribute everything. This 
discrepancy with the experiment-level and individual-level contributions suggests low 
degree of correlation between players’ contributions40.  
 
In very few experiments (1 to 3 percent) both spouses contributing nothing at all to the 
common account. These statistics are similar when looking at the non-spousal 
experiments in Panel B. 
 
39 See Appendix B Figure B.1and 0 for the histogram of contribution to the common account by each experiment 
type.  




Table 3.4. Average contribution by experiment type and household structure 
  Extended Nuclear t-test  
Panel A: Spousal experiment    
Wife’s contribution 47% 53% -6.6* 
Husband’s contribution 56% 64% -8.4** 
Total contribution 51% 59% -7.5*** 
% of experiments wife contributes nothing 10% 10%  
% of experiments husband contributes nothing 4.5% 8%  
% of experiments both players contribute nothing 1% 3%  
% of experiments wife contributes everything 4.5% 11%  
% of experiments husband contributes everything 7% 19%  
% of experiments both players contribute everything 2% 3%  
N 111 62  
Panel B: Other experiments    
Total contribution 51% 
 
 
% of experiments both players contribute nothing 2%   




This table presents the average contribution by participants to the common account. It also reports the 
total contribution to the common account from both participants in an experiment, in the row labelled 
“Total.” The contribution is shown in percentage terms, with 100 percent denoting that all 10 tokens 
were contributed to the common account. The averages are shown by experiment type (row) and 
household structure (column).  The last column reports the difference in average contribution by 
household structure and the significance level associated with the t-test of difference. ***p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
The average contribution to the common account in the spousal experiment is 8 
percentage points lower in the extended household compared to the nuclear household 
(this difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level). In monetary terms, this 
translates into an efficiency loss of 1.60 Rupees on average for spouses in extended 
households. This is driven by lower contributions by both wife (6 percentage points 
lower; statistically significant at the 10 percent level) and husband (8 percentage points 
lower; statistically significant at the 5 percent level) in the extended household. Wives 
in both, nuclear and extended households, contribute less than the husbands. This is a 
common finding in experimental literature based in developing countries (see, for 
instance, Inversen et al., 2011; Kebede et al., 2013). Specifically, in the context of our 
study, this may be a result of limited autonomy enjoyed by women in rural Uttar 
Pradesh (Dyson & Moore, 1983; Bloom et al., 2001; Jejeebhoy & Sathar, 2001). 
Chapter 4 studies women’s empowerment in rural Uttar Pradesh, and indeed, finds 
women to have low decision-making power within the household, lower mobility and 
exposure to the outside world, and low levels of financial independence (see Table 4.2)  
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3.4.2. Household structure and Spousal Experiment 
We first look at the correlations between the type of household structure and the level of 
contributions to the spousal experiment41. The exact regression specification is given by 
–  
 
                                           (3) 
where Cs,j is the contribution to the common account by the spouse s - wife or husband 
or both in household j; NUCLEAR is the dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
spouses belong to a nuclear household and 0 if the spouses belong to an extended 
household; Xs,j is a set of individual characteristics such as age and education; HHj is a 
set of household characteristics such as caste, economic status and number of household 
members. 
 
In Table 3.5, we present the results from OLS regression in equation (3), where the 
dependent variables are the total contribution of both spouses to the common account 
(Column 1), the contribution of the wife to the common account (Column 2), and the 
contribution of the husband to the common account (Column 3). Contributions are 
measured in proportion of total feasible contribution, that is, a value of 1 corresponds to 
100 percent and a value 0.1 corresponds to 10 percent. The main independent variable 
of interest is ‘nuclear household’. 
 
41 Appendix B Table B.7 presents the descriptive statistics for only the spousal experiment sample – 173 households 












  (1) (2) (3) 
    
Nuclear household 0.073** 0.063 0.083* 
0 = extended household; 1 = nuclear household (0.036) (0.046) (0.049) 
Wife’s age  -0.061 -0.097* -0.025 
 (0.045) (0.054) (0.070) 
Husband’s age  0.065 0.107* 0.024 
 (0.045) (0.056) (0.067) 
Wife’s age squared 0.001 0.001* 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Husband’s age squared -0.001 -0.001** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Number of years married -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) 
Husband's education 0.001 -0.004 0.006 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Backward Caste 0.044 0.040 0.049 
 (0.049) (0.071) (0.072) 
Scheduled Caste 0.045 0.007 0.084 
 (0.051) (0.069) (0.075) 
PPI score 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Number of household members 0.000 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
Constant 0.229 0.062 0.395 
 (0.261) (0.426) (0.367) 
    
Observations 159 159 159 
R-squared 0.063 0.048 0.057 
This table reports the results of the regression mapping the contribution to the common account in spousal 
experiment. Contributions are measured in proportions. Total contribution is the contribution by both players to 
the common account. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. PPI score is Progress out of Poverty 
Index ranging from 0 to 100. Base category for Backward Caste and Scheduled Caste is General category. 
Number of household members includes migrant labour in the household. Migrant member in the survey was 
defined as any member who has been away from the household for at least 6 months but intends to return. It 
may not capture shorter-term migration. Note that the sample is less than the expected 173 due to missing co-
variate variables. Appendix B Table B.8 presents the descriptive statistics for only the spousal experiment 
regression sample. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
We find that being in a nuclear household is positively and significantly correlated with 
the husband’s contribution as well as with the total contribution in the spousal 
experiment. The total contribution to the common account is approximately 7 
percentage points larger when the spousal experiment is played in a nuclear household 
versus extended households (an effect size of 14 percent), whereas the husband’s 
contribution is 8 percentage points larger (an effect size of 15 percent). The difference 
in the wife’s contribution in extended versus nuclear households is not significantly 
different. This may be due to the strong patriarchal structure and social norms that is 
seldom associated with adverse gender outcomes in Uttar Pradesh – lower female labour 
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force participation, higher fertility, less female say in household decisions and lower 
entitlement to household resources (Dyson & Moore, 1983; Foster & Rosenzweig, 
1996Bloom et al., 2001; Jejeebhoy & Sathar, 2001; Mani, 2011; Munro et al., 2014). 
 
Among the covariates, only age and age squared terms are significantly correlated with 
wife’s contribution. An increase in the wife’s age is correlated with a decrease in the 
wife’s contribution to the common account (at an increasing rate). On the contrary, an 
increase in the husband’s age is correlated with an increase in the wife’s contribution to 
the common account (at an increasing rate).   
 
Since the spousal experiment could only be conducted in households where the husband 
was present (alive and not a migrant labour), these results might be biased. Joseph et al. 
(2018)42 in studying remittances to India from migrant labour in UAE, finds that 
international migrants whose salaries increase over time, remit a constant amount, a 
behaviour that is consistent with hiding of additional resources from the households. 
This finding is closest to the type of (in)efficiency that our field experiment uncovers. 
Combining this with the finding from Morten (2019) using ICRISAT data, that Indian 
households with more than one adult male (more likely to be an extended household) 
are more likely to have migrant labour43, our estimate on nuclear households may be 
biased downwards44.  
 
We note here that these results can be at most interpreted as correlations. In order to 
fully study the causal implication of household structure for household consumption, 
production, and investment decisions, one would require access to long-term panel data 
and a strategy to deal with the endogeneity of choice of household structure.  Foster and 
Rosenzweig (2002), using a national level data set from India (ARIS/REDS), note that 
one-third of the households documented in the early 1970s with more than one male 
heir had split during re-interview in the early 1980s; in many cases this split was linked 
 
42 Joseph et al (2018) studies long-term or permanent migration, while in India short-term migration of up to six 
months is more common (Munshi & Rosenzweig, 2016; Morten, 2019). 
43 In our full baseline sample of 393 households, we indeed find that 43% of the extended and 40% of the nuclear 
households have a migrant husband (not residing in the household for at least six months but intending to return). 
44 We are assuming here that the degree of inefficiency associated with migrant labour is the same (or less inefficient) 
in nuclear vis-à-vis extended households. If migrant labour in nuclear households display more inefficient behaviour 




to the death of a parent.  
 
Although our analysis across household structures is exploratory and cannot be used to 
predict what would happen if the households separated, we believe, however, that the 
estimates we present here are useful and the appropriate estimates to take into account 
when discussing policy implications.  
3.4.3. Experiments within Extended Households 
We now turn our attention to the inner dynamics of the extended household. In Table 
3.6, we analyse how patterns of contributions in the extended household experiments 
change with the relationship between participants. We present the results using 
outcomes of all experiments (recall there were up to six, including the spousal 
experiment) played within the extended household45. The dependent variable is the total 
contribution of both players to the common account (again in proportion). Due to the 
complexity and variety of household structures and potential players, and the limits in 
terms of sample size, we estimate determinants of the contribution to the experiment as 
a function of set of dummy variables - blood relation, gender, generation, and marital 
links. Hence the estimating equation is given by – 
     (4) 
 
where Ci,j is the contribution to the common account by pair i in household j and  is the 
household fixed effects. MALE and DIFFGEND take the value of 1 if both players are 
male and both players are of different gender respectively, with the base category as 
both players being female. BLOOD takes the value of 1 if both players are related by 
blood and 0 if not, that is, for players related by in-law relationship. GENERATION 
takes the value of 1 if both players are of the same generation, such as, siblings or 
spouses, and 0 if not, such as, parents. SPOUSE takes the value of one if both players 
are married to each other and 0 otherwise.  
 
Note that the mother-in-law/daughter-law relationship is captured by the constant—both 
 
45 The experiment literature has found that the participant’s contribution to the common account would decline in 
repeated games (see Ledyard, 1994; Chaudhuri, 2011; for an overview). However, we think this observation might 
not be relevant in our setting because the participants were known to each other and would have interacted in a 
similar decision-making setting that the public goods experiment mimics. As such, we don’t hypothesise that learning 
happens during the playing of this experiment. Indeed, when we control for the order of the experiment, the controls 
for order (or repetition) remain insignificant. See Appendix XX Table XX 
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players female, not related by blood, of different generations and not spouses. Column 
1in Table 3.6 does not control for household fixed effects; Column 2 includes 
household fixed effects. Since each household could have played up to six public goods 
experiments, the fixed effects control for observable and unobservable household 
characteristics that are fixed across experiments played within the household (such as 
size of household, income, caste, religion). Additionally, household fixed effects help us 
control for the various kinds of structures that may exist with-in the extended 
households, such as, extended households with no father-in-law. It also partly controls 
for migration patterns in so far as migration patterns are determined by household 
composition and characteristics.  
 
The results in Table 3.6 indicate that when players are of different gender, the 
contribution to the common account increases by possibly 3 to 5 percentage points as 
compared to an experiment where both players are female (the omitted dummy variable 
category). Blood relatives contribute significantly more to the common account (9 to 10 
percentage points) as compared to in-laws.  






 (1) (2) 
    
Both players male -0.010 -0.048 
(0 = players are not both male; 1 = both players are male) (0.046) (0.041) 
Both players different gender 0.049** 0.034 
(0 = both players not different gender; 1 = both players are different gender) (0.020) (0.022) 
Blood relatives 0.089*** 0.098*** 
(0 = players are not related by blood; 1 = players are related by blood) (0.025) (0.029) 
Same generation -0.021 -0.030 
(0 = players belong to different generations; 1 = players are from same 
generation) (0.025) (0.033) 
Spouses 0.031 0.055 
(0 = players are not married to each other; 1 = players are married to each 
other) (0.027) (0.034) 
Constant 0.462*** 0.469*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) 
   
HH fixed effects No Yes 
Number of experiments 474 474 
R-squared 0.053 0.626 
This table reports the results of the regression mapping the contribution to the common account in all experiments 
(including the spousal experiment) played in the extended households. Contributions are measured in proportions. 
Total contribution is the contribution by both players to the common account. In Column (1), standard errors are 
clustered at the household level. Column (2) employs household fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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To gain a better understanding of the relative efficiency of each relationship within the 
extended household, we report the results of a series of joint hypothesis tests in Table 
3.7. The tests are performed using the OLS results (with household fixed effects) from 
Column 2, Table 3.6. As a reference point, on average, mother-in-law/daughter-in-law 
pairs contribute 47 percent of the total endowment to the common account. Similarly, 
different combinations of these dummy variables capture the other relationships within 
a household – see Column 4.  
Table 3.7. Hypothesis testing of experiments by relationship within extended 
households 
Relationship  Coefficient 
Player 1 Player 2 
Number of 




 (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) (7) 
In-law relations       
Mother-in-law Daughter-in-law 96 b0 base category 
Father-in-law Daughter-in-law 85 b0+b2 More  +3 0.115 
Brother-in-law Sister-in-law 32 b0+b2+b4 More  +0.5 0.905 
Sister-in-law  Sister-in-law 23 b0+b4 Less  -3 0.366 
Blood relations       
Mother Daughter 5 b0+b3 More +10 0.001 
Father Son 35 b0+b1+b3 More +5 0.108 
Father Daughter 47 b0+b2+b3 More +13 0.000 
Mother Son 
Sister Sister 0 b0+b3+b4 More +7 0.149 
Brother Brother 3 
b0+b1+b3+
b4 More +2 0.669 
Brother Sister 1 
b0+b2+b3+
b4 More +10 0.033 
Spousal relationship      
Husband Wife 147 
b0+b2+b4+
b5 More +6 0.010 
This table reports the hypothesis tests of coefficients from the household fixed effects regression in Column (2) of 
Table 3.6. Note that as the father-daughter pair and the mother-son pair share the same specification, no separate 
hypotheses testing can be conducted. There were 5 father-daughter experiments and 42 mother-son experiments. A t-
test comparing the contributions across these two pairs however reveals no statistically significant difference. The 
number of experiments for spouses is higher than 111 reported and used in the spousal experiment section. This is 
because ‘the other male’ and ‘the other female’ could also be related by marriage. 
 
We conduct tests to assess whether contributions in these relationships differ from those 
in the mother-in-law/daughter-in-law relationship. Column 6 reports the mean 
difference in contribution to the common account between the base category and each 
of the other relationships in terms of percentage point difference. Column 7 reports the 
p-value of the hypothesis test comparing each relationship to the base category, that is, 
the mother-in-law/daughter-in-law pair. Column 3 notes the number of experiments 
within each category. We note that some categories have a very small sample size, 
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especially among the blood relations46, and results need to be interpreted with this 
caveat in mind.  
 
Compared to the mother-in-law/daughter-in-law pair, parents and children contribute 
significantly more. Mothers and daughters contribute 10 percentage points more to the 
common account, on average, whereas fathers and sons contribute about 5 percentage 
points more, on average. Fathers paired with daughters and mothers paired with sons 
contribute the highest on average to the common account (60 percent on average, which 
is about 13 percentage points more than the mother-in-law/daughter-in-law pair). 
Spouses also contribute significantly more, by about 6 percentage points, on average. 
The only relationship that contributes less than the mother-in-law/daughter-in-law 
pairing is two sisters-in-law. However, this result is not statistically significant. 
3.4.4. Decision-making within Extended Households 
We further explore the (in)efficiency within extended households by linking our public 
goods experiment with survey data. The (in)efficiency within the extended household is 
not only determined by the relationship to the household member, but also by the 
division of decision-making power within the household.  
 
In the household survey, we asked the respondent to identify up to three key decision 
makers on six different household tasks – what to cook on a daily basis, household daily 
purchases at the local shop, household purchases at shops outside the village, what to do 
when a child is sick, decision related to if a child should be enrolled in school, and 
decisions related to daily attendance at school. We asked for three decision makers to be 
able to identify the household members other than the married couple who play an 
important role.  
 
Using this decision-making data, we distinguish between three cases: (1) both 
individuals (or participants in the experiment) have a say, (2) only one individual has a 
say, and (3) neither of the two individuals has a say. The regression sample for Table 
 
46 The experiment protocol was to select at random an adult married male/female. Given partilocality, it is obvious 
that we have very few games with the daughter of the household as a married daughter would no longer reside at her 
natal household. Second, as Morten (2019) finds that households with more than one adult male are likely to have 
more migrant labour, this may be the reason why we find low number of experiments (only 3) between two brothers.  
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3.8 is all experiments excluding the spousal experiment and hence, by definition, only 
includes extended households. The base category for each decision-making realm is 
neither of the two participants has a say in decision making.  
 
First, across all decision-making domains, one or both participants having a say in 
decision making is negatively correlated with contributions to the common account 
relative to neither player having a say. Second, across all domains of decision making 
except those related to the child’s education, when both participants are decision-
makers, the contribution to the common account falls to a larger extent than when only 
one of the two participants is a decision-maker. This fragmented decision-making 
power and consequent power struggle may be one of the reasons for driving the 
inefficient intra-household behaviour we observe in extended households.  
Table 3.8. Regression results of experiments within extended households on decision-
making power 
Distribution of decision 













  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cooking - one participant -0.036      
(0.024)      
Cooking - both participants -0.065*      
(0.036)      
Purchase at the local shop - 
one participant 
 -0.032     
 (0.024)     
Purchase at the local shop - 
both participants 
 -0.068**     
 (0.032)     
Purchase outside the village 
- one participant 
  -0.038    
  (0.024)    
Purchase outside the village 
- both participants 
  -0.052    
  (0.039)    
Child is sick - one 
participant 
   -0.033   
   (0.022)   
Child is sick - both 
participants 
   -0.061*   
   (0.034)   
Child is enrolled in school - 
one participant 
    -0.034*  
    (0.021)  
Child is enrolled in school - 
both participants 
    -0.010  
    (0.029)  
Child attends school - one 
participant 
     -0.036* 
     (0.020) 
Child attends school - both 
participants 
     -0.026 
     (0.028) 
       
Number of experiments 363 363 363 363 363 363 
R-squared 0.075 0.074 0.073 0.074 0.071 0.072 
This table reports the results of the effect of decision-making power distribution on the total contribution by both 
players to the common account in all experiments (excluding the spousal experiment). Contributions are measured in 
proportion. Controls added are both players are male, both players are female (base category), both players are 
different gender, both players are related by blood, both players are from the same generation (such as two brothers). 
Standard errors are clustered at the household level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.4.5. Results from Qualitative Study 
We interviewed three nuclear households and five extended households using a semi-
structured qualitative interview in December 2016. Appendix B Table B.11 and Table 
B.12 summarise the qualitative sample. Among the extended households, respondents 
included both daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law. All households were involved in a 
diverse set of economic activities. Half of the households interviewed have migrant 
members, and remittances are an important source of income47. 
 
We draw upon these interviews to provide a better understanding of the in-law 
relationships within the extended household. As we interviewed women, the natural 
focus was on the mother-in-law/daughter-in-law relationship. We start with their 
general perceptions on the costs and benefits of extended households. We then proceed 
with a description of the inefficiencies mentioned by the respondents (note that 
respondents did not use the term ‘inefficiency’, rather, we flagged something to be 
inefficient when the respondent described cases of free-riding, moral hazard, cheating, 
and so on). We conclude by linking up these inefficiencies with elements of the 
household decision making process.   
 
Household structure appears to be both transient and complex in our sample as all 
respondents in nuclear households reported having lived in an extended household 
setting in the past48. All except one respondent (interview 2) perceived extended 
households to be overall superior to nuclear households. The perceived benefits of 
extended households include risk sharing, emotional support, specialization (division of 
labour), and household public goods and joint assets. Some examples: 
 
• Respondent 7 noted that if her husband, a migrant, did not send money one 
month, it would not matter, as her mother-in-law ensures that she is taken care 
of. 
 
47 Our list for the qualitative interviews distinguished between migrant and non-migrant households. We randomly 
selected three households from the nuclear family list and five households from the extended family list (but ensuring 
we had at least one migrant household from each type). 
48 In three cases, the productive unit surpasses the consumption unit (interviews 4, 7, and 8), meaning that although 
we define the household in the traditional manner as a group of people who eat at least one meal together each day, in 
three cases the group of people who worked together on the land owned or co-owned is larger than this consumption 
unit. This is not an uncommon situation (see, for instance, Udry 1996, and Beaman & Dillon 2012) and affects the 
functioning of the household, as we discuss below. 
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• Respondent 1, who owns a small store, regretted the loss of gas for cooking 
when shifting to her current nuclear household. 
• Respondent 4 mentioned that she had less work when the extended household 
was even larger and she did not have to cook every day, as this task was done 
by the other women in the household. 
 
However, four out of five respondents in extended households noted inefficiencies, 
whereas none of the nuclear household respondents mentioned any event, activity, or 
behaviour that could be construed as inefficient. Most of these inefficiencies relate to 
labour and effort. All respondents noted a fixed set of daily duties that can include 
cooking, fetching water, gathering firewood, making dung cakes (used as fuel), feeding 
cattle, and taking care of young children and the elderly. Few women noted agricultural 
duties (interviews 4 and 5), including collecting fodder and threshing.  
 
In extended households, all women reported being assigned to a subset of these tasks. 
For example, respondent 7 is in charge of cooking and looking after her own son. Her 
elder sister-in-law visits the field, collects fodder for the animals, and feeds them. Her 
mother-in-law, according to her account, does little and mainly takes care of her father-
in-law, who had been unwell recently. Consistent with the literature (Jeffery & Jeffery, 
1996), the set of tasks an individual is engaged is governed by social norms. None of 
the mothers-in-law interviewed were involved in cooking, for instance, something 
which was left to the youngest daughter-in-law.  
 
Although these social norms may protect the household from excessive free riding, 
meaning the norm ensures that meal preparation—a public good within the household—
will get done, the lack of observability of effort might introduce inefficiencies. For 
example, respondent 7 admitted (to us) to cooking the food slowly so as to avoid 
receiving other tasks. In addition, some household members might (be perceived to?) 
contribute little due to the hierarchical assignment of tasks: All daughters-in-law we 
spoke to referred to their mothers-in-law as being ‘idle’ or ‘somewhat useless’49. 
 
49 The men in the extended households are engaged in agriculture, casual labor, sales jobs, or migration. Here too, 
social norms appear to be at play; in all farming households (with the exception of interview 5, where only one male 
was involved in farming), decisions regarding the household land (that is, which crops to cultivate and other input 





Following the decision-making process for particular events can shed light on 
household relations. Agricultural decisions were made by the eldest capable male 
member. When a decision had to be made which concerns another realm, such as 
clothing, education and health, there would usually be no obvious decision maker. 
Instead, we noted alliances with negotiation at the centre. For example, respondent 8, 
when she wishes to purchase something personal, will approach her husband who is 
usually amenable to the request and will either purchase the item himself or approach 
his elder brother for funding. When respondent 7 wanted to attend the literacy program 
she approached her sister-in-law, who in turn approached her mother-in-law, who then 
together with the sister-in-law, made the decision and informed the father-in-law.   
 
This last example illustrates the complex position of junior women in extended 
households. In effect, all junior women interviewed noted having ‘little’ to ‘no’ decision 
making power, but when pressed for examples, except for the daughter-in-law of 
respondent 6, all described forging alliances when need be, and perhaps they are not as 
powerless as they claim themselves to be50. In contrast, women in nuclear households 
note having considerable say. This is especially the case when the husband is a migrant 
worker and the day-to-day decisions are left to his spouse. In this case, the respondents 
all noted making the decisions themselves as to what to cook, how much to cook, and 
what to spend on clothing, medicine, and small educational items. The migrant husband 
would be asked to give his approval, though, when it comes to less frequent decisions, 
such as visits to the natal family, attending adult educational classes, and school 
enrolment. Even though such permission would be necessary, all women in the nuclear 
households that we interviewed noted that they usually come to a consensus with their 
husband through discussion, and the initial request would be approved in most cases.  
 
 
men work on the land to a certain extent. In all families, the harvest is shared equally between the households who 
work on the land. In the cases where the production unit exceeded the consumption unit, this gave rise to free-riding. 
For instance, respondent 8 noted that although everyone receives an equal share from the harvest, her youngest 
brother-in-law contributes little to the activities and is mostly preoccupied with his carpet weaving activity, the 
returns of which are only used by himself and his nuclear unit. 
50 These inconsistencies in an individual’s narrative were not uncommon, and we attribute them to the complexity of 
the family relations where an individual tries to reconcile many contradictory aspects of her reality, but also to the 
limitations of our method. A carefully executed ethnographic approach, as in Caldwell et al. (1984), Jeffery and 




It is this lack of decision-making power of junior women, together with discrepancies in 
preferences and goals and the opportunity to hide one’s efforts, which can lead to the 
inefficiencies the women mentioned. Unable to assert one’s preferences or achieve 
one’s goals, junior women in extended households resort to behaviours that improve 
their personal well-being but might reduce the household’s collective welfare. These 
behaviours can include slacking off on assigned tasks, avoiding tasks altogether, or 
hiding income or resources. For instance, respondent 7, who has a migrant husband, 
noted that she hides around 20 percent of the remittance her husband sends her from her 
mother-in-law. Our public goods experiment effectively mimics this situation of funds 
that arrive in the household, and asks the players to make a decision as to what to do 
with these ‘remittances’. 
 
To conclude this section, we note that all women recognized that decision making 
power was subject to change. This is consistent with the literature (Jeffery and Jeffery, 
1996; Uberoi, 1994). The relationship between the various extended family household 
members is complex and changes over time when life events take place. For instance, a 
younger daughter-in-law might have very little say when she joins the household, 
relative to the unmarried daughters living in the household; however, her position might 
change after the birth of a son or daughter. The mother-in-law’s power can change after 
her husband dies. It is in these periods of change that households see new bargaining 





Using a series of public goods experiments conducted with adults in extended and 
nuclear households in India, we investigate efficiency in within household decision 
making. We focus on Pareto Efficiency of an allocation in which it is not possible to 
make one individual better off without making another individual worse off. The 
experiment implemented in this study is designed to uncover inefficiency which arises 
due to concealing personal resources instead of contributing them to the household as a 
whole, with potentially larger shared benefits. We find three interrelated sets of results. 
First, we find that households are inefficient across household structures, whether it be a 
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nuclear or an extended household. Indeed, all but 2 percent of pairs failed to maximize 
the surplus in the public goods experiment. In terms of magnitude of inefficiency, on 
average, the money earned is about 10 Rupees less than what could have been earned 
has household pairs exhibited efficient behaviour. Second, we provide descriptive 
evidence that spouses are less efficient in extended households than in nuclear 
households. Comparing extended households with nuclear households, it should be 
noted that the difference in magnitude between the two types of structures, while 
statistically significant and substantial in relative terms, is not that large in absolute 
terms. In effect, the difference of 7 percentage points between nuclear and extended 
spousal pairs (after controlling for observable characteristics) is equivalent to an 
efficiency loss of only 1.40 Rupees. Third, using household fixed effects for 
experiments conducted in extended households, we find that relationships within the 
extended households are not all equally inefficient, with the mother-in-law and 
daughter-in-law relationship being particularly inefficient. Survey and qualitative 
evidence further point at an unequal distribution of power between generations and 
genders as an underlying factor in these results.  
 
Despite our sample being restricted to illiterate women, our findings from the spousal 
experiment are consistent with those from experimental literature in rural India (see, for 
instance, Castilla, 2015; Mani, 2011; and Munro et al., 2014). Additionally, our findings 
are consistent with the survey literature on limited autonomy of married women in rural 
Uttar Pradesh (Dyson & Moore, 1983; Bloom et al., 2001; Jejeebhoy & Sathar, 2001) 
 
These findings fill important gaps in the literature, as the economics literature, albeit 
with some notable exceptions (see, Section 3.2), has largely struggled to understand 
complex households, even though they are a central part of many non-Western societies. 
Just as the study of within-household decision making in nuclear households has led to 
a better understanding of the allocation of resources within households and more 
appropriately designed policies, it is equally important to understand decision making in 
extended households. 
 
The most direct policy implication of our findings on patterns of inefficiency within 
extended households is for policies that target specific recipients within a household, 
such as cash-transfer programmes in the context of societies with extended households. 
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Duflo (2012) notes the importance of targeting transfers to the ‘woman’ in the 
household, with the aim of promoting gender equality as well as improving other 
desirable outcomes such as health and education. However, in the context of an 
extended family household, the identity of this ‘woman’ is ambiguous, so that simply 
targeting transfers on the basis of gender might fail to achieve desired outcomes. In 
general, our combined survey, qualitative and experimental results point at the overall 
lack of decision making power among certain junior women (daughter-in-law) of the 
household, implying that, if government programmes maintain the household head as 
the beneficiary, these members are unlikely to have much say in whether and how the 
benefits of these programmes may be used. This point is also argued by Porter and 
Adams (2016), who note the need to study sharing rules within households, as this has 
consequences for the design of intra- and inter-generational redistributive programs. 
Thus, what might work in nuclear households might not be straightforward in extended 
households with fragmented and inequitable distribution of decision-making power. 
Bertrand et al. (2003) find that a South African pension program reduced the labour 
supply of prime age individuals in extended households, especially when the pensioner 
was a woman, suggesting that resources are pooled to some extent in this context. In the 
Indian context, given the conflictual nature of the mother-in-law/daughter-in-law 
relationship, as recognised in this study, it is not clear to what extent transfers targeted 
to the female head of household would lead to improvements in the situation of the 
daughter(s)-in-law in that extended household. Thus, particular attention needs to be 
paid to designing cash transfer programs in extended households.  
 
A common criticism levelled against lab-in-the-field experiments is questioning 
whether they mimic real life decisions. The public goods experiment we implement is 
designed to uncover a particular dimension of inefficiency within households: 
concealing personal resources instead of contributing them to the household as a whole, 
with potentially larger shared benefits. We draw on the qualitative interviews to argue 
that household members in extended households do hide resources in processes that our 
experiment mimics. For example, as in the experiment, the wife of a migrant husband 
decides to hide a share of the remittances from her family-in-law. However, the 
qualitative work also uncovered additional patterns and dimensions of inefficient 
behaviour that other experiments could better mimic, such as production inefficiencies 
(slacking off and other forms of free riding). Developing experiments or other empirical 
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methods, perhaps building on Udry (1996), to unpack these other dimensions of 
inefficiency within the extended households and to relate them to observed behaviour, is 
one fruitful avenue for future research.    
 
We conclude with a note on household formation and household structure. Although we 
find both higher inefficiency the in-laws within extended households, and higher 
inefficiency between spouses in extended households relative to nuclear households, 
this does not mean that household members would be better off if they split into nuclear 
households. This would be true even if the correlations we present were causal 
relationships, given that there are economies of scale and specialization gains in 
production that favour larger households. However, in order to fully study the causal 
implication of household structure for household consumption, production, and 
investment decisions, one would require access to long-term panel data and a strategy to 
deal with the endogeneity of choice of household structure.  As Jeffery and Jeffery 
(1996) note, and as we confirmed in our qualitative interviews, households change. A 
young couple may start off their married life in an extended household but split off later 
and form a nuclear household as their family continues to grow. Further inspiration for 
plausible identification methods can be drawn from the numerous studies in the other 
social sciences, both demographic accounts as well as detailed ethnographic studies 




4. Female Adult Literacy Programme and 






According to UNESCO (2020), there are 773 million illiterate adults (over 15 years of 
age) in the world, of which 63 percent were women. Nearly half of these live in South 
Asia, where illiteracy is still largely a female phenomenon. India, the country in which 
this study is set, accounts for a third of the world’s illiterate population at 252 million 
illiterate adults (UNESCO, 2020). The Indian Census (2011) puts the adult (18 years 
and above) female illiteracy rate at 43 percent versus 22 percent for men. It is worse for 
rural areas where over half the adult female population remain illiterate.  
Given the size of the illiterate population, achieving literacy remains central to 
international community efforts. The Education for All goals included ‘achieving a 50 
percent improvement in levels of adult literacy by 2015, especially for women, and 
equitable access to basic and continuing education for all adults’. This global goal 
received a refreshed impetus in the Sustainable Development Goals which pledges to 
eliminate adult illiteracy by 2030, while ensuring the elimination of gender disparity in 
education.  
In the light of this call to eliminate illiteracy levels internationally, the provision of adult 
literacy programmes is common. However, most large-scale adult literacy programmes 
rarely met their learning targets (for a full review see Abadzi, 2003) mainly due to low 
enrolment rates, and a loss of acquired literacy skills in the long run. Abadzi (2003) 
notes that the World Bank financed almost no adult literacy in the 1980s and continued 
a cautious approach in the 1990s. This begs the question whether adult literacy 
programmes are the right tool to achieve ‘education for all’. Notwithstanding the 
literacy goal, adult literacy programmes may also be tools for achieving other socio-
economic outcomes. This is particularly true for developing countries where there is 
some empirical evidence of impacts of adult literacy programmes on other welfare 
measures (for instance, see Blunch, 2013; Blunch & Portner, 2011; Banerjee et al., 
2017). Hence, countries continue to invest in universal adult literacy campaigns. The 
Government of India launched the Sakshar Bharat adult literacy campaign in 2009 with 
an additional focus on closing the gender gap in literacy. By focusing on women, these 
campaigns aim to promote female empowerment.  
90 
 
However, there is a paucity of evidence on adult literacy programmes beyond the 
intended effect of achieving functional literacy and numeracy. Even the evidence that 
does exist on the impact of adult literacy programmes on literacy itself, is fraught with 
selection bias. This study is one of the few adult literacy programme evaluations that 
employs a Randomised Control Trial (RCT) to rigorously estimate the impact of the 
programme on female empowerment. The chapter studies the 8-month long TARA 
Akshar Plus (TA+) programme delivered by Development Alternatives in rural Uttar 
Pradesh. Uttar Pradesh not only presents the worst female literacy rate in India (Indian 
Census, 2011), but is also noted for low levels of female empowerment (Dyson & 
Moore, 1983; Bloom et al., 2001; Jejeebhoy & Sathar, 2001; Jayachandran, 2015). 
Deshpande et al. (2017) documents the positive effects of the TA+ programme in Uttar 
Pradesh on women’s literacy and numeracy. But the question remains if this improved 
literacy can translate into greater female autonomy over decision making, greater 
freedom of movement and access to financial resources.  
It has been assumed by policy makers that adult literacy programmes, especially those 
for women, may be a cost-effective way to encourage female empowerment. However, 
little is known if this is true and relatedly the mechanisms through which empowerment 
is brought about. Drawing on the literature on formal education, better educated women 
have increased labour market participation and consequent increase in women’s 
contribution to the household income (Rahman & Rao, 2005; MacPhail & Dong, 2007; 
Hashemi et al., 1996). This is likely to increase the woman’s bargaining power (Almas 
et al., 2018) and position as a decision maker within the household. However, other 
studies have found maternal education to be a significant predictor of decisions 
regarding children’s education and health investment through the channel of increased 
knowledge and empowerment (Thomas et al., 1991; Glewwe, 1999; Andrabi et al., 
2012; Aslam & Kingdon, 2012). In fact, in their Pakistan study, Andrabi et al. (2012) 
found that mother’s education did not increase bargaining power within the household, 
but still increased her investment in children’s education. This is particularly relevant 
for this chapter which is based in rural Uttar Pradesh with similar patriarchal structure 
and adverse gender norms. Given the gender-related cultural norms resulting in the 
lower female labour force participation in this region (Dyson & Moore, 1983; Foster & 
Rosenzweig, 1996), I hypothesise that in so far as literacy skills enable women to 
acquire knowledge on household decisions, it would shift the woman’s role in intra-
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household decision making, without necessarily changing her bargaining power.  
Most literacy programmes targeted at women already encourage attaining such 
knowledge by including discussion on a wide variety of welfare topics related to 
children’s education and health, maternal health, hygiene practices (for example, TA+ 
Programme discussed in Deshpande et al., 2017 and in this Chapter, the Ghanaian 
National Functional Literacy Programme discussed in Blunch, 2013; Blunch & Portner, 
2011). This increased knowledge together with the newly acquired literacy and 
numeracy skills may boost the woman’s confidence (as documented in qualitative 
studies of literacy programmes, for instance, Egbo, 2000; Archer & Cottingham, 1997; 
Stromquist, 1997). Additionally, going to literacy classes regularly unaccompanied by 
household members would improve self-efficacy among these women, making it more 
likely for these women to be able to leave the house for other tasks (such as, visiting the 
market, natal family, local fair, cinema).  
The literacy classes in themselves present an opportunity for women to talk to other 
women and create peer networks that may not have existed. An increase in the woman’s 
peer networks is shown to enable women overcome mobility constraints in developing 
countries (Kandpal & Baylis, 2019; Anukriti et al., 2020). Relatedly, social networks 
have also been key to other aspects of women’s empowerment, such as adoption of 
reproductive health technology (Kohler & Buhler, 2001; Kohler et al., 2000) and 
increase in financial independence (Field et al., 2016; Banerjee et al., 2013). Increase in 
confidence, self-efficacy, and peer networks are all possible mechanisms through which 
literacy programmes may also drive a shift towards greater control of financial 
resources among women, such as opening a bank account. Additionally, opening a 
personal bank account is a direct function of literacy and numeracy skills, enabling 
women to read, complete and sign bank forms. 
In this chapter, I find that the TA+ programme had significant positive impacts on 
aspects of female empowerment, despite the deeply rooted gender-based cultural norms 
of rural Uttar Pradesh. The literacy programme increased the overall freedom of 
movement index by 13 percent, by substantially increasing the likelihood of women 
going to local shops and going to call their natal family without requiring permission. 
Moreover, the programme increased the probability of the women opening a bank 
account by 13 percent. I do not find any impacts of the programme on the women’s 
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decision making power within the household. While it is unlikely that an 8-month long 
literacy programme would increase the woman’s bargaining decision making power 
through employment and increased income, literate women are known to be efficient 
consumers of knowledge (Thomas et al., 1991; Andrabi et al., 2012). This increase in 
knowledge has been documented to improve the woman’s role in household decision 
making. However, the null effects I find in this study, may be due to lack of exposure to 
such sources of information (such as, newspapers and television) in rural Uttar Pradesh 
(Thomas et al., 1991). 
Female empowerment has increasingly become a policy goal as reflected in United 
Nations’ Sustainable Development Goal No. 5, which stipulates the importance of 
achieving gender equality. This concern was reiterated by the World Bank (2012) 
pushing for gender equality in employment, income, assets and agency. The importance 
of achieving female empowerment is magnified by the evidence that this leads to other 
development goals, such as higher investment in household public goods, children’s 
education and nutrition, and changing gender beliefs and aspirations (see, among others, 
Ashraf et al., 2010; Beamen et al., 2012; Beamen et al., 2009; Duflo, 2012; Duflo, 
2003).  
If these effects could be studied and established, adult literacy programmes could 
receive new impetus as an important cost-effective tool contributing to the social and 
economic development of countries with low human capital. Overall, the body of 
rigorous evidence on adult literacy programmes remains small and needs to be 
strengthened. 
4.2. Related Literature  
There is a vast literature in developing countries which reports the positive effects of 
formal education on female empowerment such as women’s decision-making ability 
within the household, women’s freedom of movement and control of resources (for a 
full review, see Pande et al., 2005). Closely related to formal education is access to 
employment opportunities. For instance, better educated woman earning higher wages 
than their husbands have greater freedom of movement and a say in household decision 
making (Rahman & Rao, 2004). Another study in China finds that irrespective of the 
wage gap between spouses, an employed woman enjoys a higher household status than 
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unemployed woman (MacPhail & Dong, 2007). Similarly, Boateng et al. (2014) finds 
that educated and employed women in Ghana are more likely to have an opinion on all 
aspects of household decision-making. This higher status of an employed woman within 
the household may come by way of the greater economic value that an employed 
woman represents. Hashemi et al (1996) show that participation in a microcredit 
programme in Bangladesh increases the women’s economic contribution to the 
household, thereby leading to female empowerment within the household and 
community.  
These studies suggest that formal education is associated with female empowerment by 
way of the woman having access to employment opportunities and economic resources. 
Drawing on intra-household model bargaining model, access to income would influence 
the ‘sharing rule’ thereby influencing the woman’s role in intra-household decision 
making. However, it would be erroneous to assume that adult literacy programmes 
would translate into female empowerment through a similar mechanism. Literacy 
programmes narrowly focus on developing functional reading and writing skills and are 
of too short a duration to allow women to enter the workforce. Add to this the context of 
this study – deeply rooted patriarchal structure with patrilocality (Dyson & Moore, 
1983; Anukriti et al., 2020) and gender related social norms on labour force 
participation (Foster & Rosenzweig, 1996). It is unsurprising that even formal education 
has found dismal effects on woman’s bargaining and decision making power in the 
context of Uttar Pradesh (Bloom et al., 2001; Jejeebhoy & Sathar, 2001; Jayachandran, 
2015).  
However, another strand of formal education literature studying the effects on children’s 
health and educational investments, has proposed an increase in access to information to 
be key to woman’s role as a decision maker within the household. Glewwe (1999) find 
mother’s knowledge of health acquired using the literacy and numeracy skills taught at 
school to be an important predictor of investment in child health. Relatedly, Thomas et 
al. (1991) finds that almost all the impact of maternal schooling on child height can be 
explained through mother’s access to information through newspaper, radio, and 
television in urban Brazil. Thus, in so far as the adult literacy programmes increase 
women’s knowledge and access to information, this can increase the woman’s role in 
intra-household decision making without necessarily shifting the bargaining power (as 
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seen in Andrabi et al., 2012 study in Pakistan).  
While increase in knowledge may be one of the channels through which female 
empowerment is realised over decision making, it is less clear that this could have 
effects on other aspects of empowerment, such as mobility and control of financial 
resources. An indirect effect of literacy on female empowerment may be through the 
channel of peers or social networks. Women, particularly in rural Uttar Pradesh as in 
other developing countries, seldom have access to social networks of friends, peers, or 
relatives (Kandpal & Baylis, 2019; Anukriti et al., 2020). In attending literacy classes, 
the women can create a network of peers outside of their household which may reduce 
mobility constraints. Anukriti et al. (2020) in the Uttar Pradesh sample finds that having 
an additional outside peer almost doubles the likelihood of a woman able to freely visit 
a family planning clinic. They discuss the role of peer support through companionship 
in helping the women to overcome mobility constraints imposed by the family. Kandpal 
and Baylis (2019) study the impact of peer effects on social norm driven behaviour and 
find positive impacts on the likelihood of the married women’s ability to leave the 
house without permission.  
Yet another channel of female empowerment is the increase in woman’s own self-
efficacy, confidence, and aspiration as result of becoming literate. A small body of 
qualitative research documents evidence that illiteracy has a negative impact on 
women’s self-esteem, while literate women report being more confident (see Egbo, 
2000 in Nigeria; Archer & Cottingham, 1997 in Bangladesh; Stromquist, 1997 in 
Brazil).  
Such evidence assessing the impact of adult literacy programmes on socio-economic 
outcomes, and the associated pathways, is hard to come by in quantitative research. 
There are a few exceptions. Blunch and Pörtner (2011) report substantial, significant, 
and positive effects of an adult literacy programme in Ghana on the standard of living, 
as measured by household consumption expenditure. Blunch (2013) studying the same 
adult literacy programme in Ghana concludes that mother’s participation in the 
programme had a substantial impact on reducing child mortality. However, the 
Ghanaian literacy programme is one of the few long-term programmes running for 21 




These few studies still have nothing to say about the agency of the literate woman 
herself. They additionally suffer from selection bias as they rely on ex-post comparisons 
with non-participants. Even studies of the effect of adult literacy programmes on the 
literacy outcome itself (Carron, 1990; Ortega & Rodríguez, 2008) suffer from similar 
problems. This chapter is one of the few evaluations of adult literacy programmes to 
provide causal estimates. A few exceptions are the literacy programme evaluations 
using an RCT by Aker et al. (2012) in Niger, and Deshpande et al. (2017) in India.  
Only two studies of literacy programmes report on the impact on female empowerment. 
First, Banerji et al. (2017) employ a randomised controlled trial in Bihar and Rajasthan, 
assigning households to either adult literacy classes for mothers, training for mothers to 
enhance their children’s learning, or a combination of both treatments. They find that 
the maternal literacy classes had no significant impact on children’s learning levels, but 
a combination of both treatments did. All three treatment arms have a significant impact 
on mothers’ test scores, mothers’ participation in their children’s education, and 
availability of educational assets in the household. Moreover, measuring empowerment 
as a decision index comprised of mothers’ involvement in decisions regarding 
household purchases and child’s schooling decisions, they find no significant impact of 
the literacy programme by itself. However, their insignificant intent-to-treat effects can 
be attributed to the low literacy programme take-up in their sample – self-reported 
records show that only 40 percent of the mothers attended these classes. Second, the 
purpose of this study is to add to the limited evidence on the impacts of adult literacy 
programme on female empowerment as an end in itself; while that of Banerji et al. 
(2017) is ‘searching for (cost-effective) methods to improve levels of learning 
(children’s education) in developing countries’ (p. 303).  
A second closely related paper, Kandpal et al. (2012), evaluates the effect of a different 
female literacy programme in Uttarakhand, India and finds a positive, significant effect 
on women’s empowerment outcomes. Participants are more likely to have access to 
outside employment and are able to leave the house without permission across all 
regression specifications. However, the study is restricted in two respects. First, its 
identification strategy relies on an IV strategy using roll-out of the programme. This 
raises concerns regarding selection on unobservables and if the programme was 
purposely rolled out in some districts because of worse gender equality metrics in those 
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areas. Second, it uses a very narrow set of three measures for women empowerment, 
namely access to employment is measured as having a National Rural Employment 
Guarantee card; mobility is measured as the ability to leave the house without 
permission; and political participation is measured as participation in village council 
meetings.  
This chapter improves on the above-mentioned studies by using an RCT to overcome 
the selection issue like Banerji et al. (2017), but with a greater treatment compliance of 
79 percent of the treatment group women attending the literacy classes. Moreover, the 
study makes use of a wide range female empowerment indicators and indices - decision-
making on different household domains, the ability to leave the house freely for a range 
of tasks, and control of different financial assets.These studies suggest that formal 
education is associated with female empowerment by way of the woman having access 
to employment opportunities and economic resources. However, it would be erroneous 
to assume that adult literacy programmes would translate into female empowerment 
through a similar mechanism. Literacy programmes narrowly focus on developing 
functional reading and writing skills and are of too short a duration to allow women to 
enter the workforce. However, adult literacy programmes might work through the 
channel of bolstering confidence and aspirations which would translate into improving a 
woman’s position in her household and her community. It is difficult to predict the 
impacts of adult literacy programmes due to the limited evidence on the same. A small 
body of qualitative research documents evidence that illiteracy has a negative impact on 
women’s self-esteem, while literate women report being more confident (see Egbo, 
2000 in Nigeria; Archer & Cottingham, 1997 in Bangladesh; Stromquist, 1997 in 
Brazil). 
Such evidence assessing the impact of adult literacy programmes on socio-economic 
outcomes is hard to come by in quantitative research. There are a few exceptions. 
Blunch and Pörtner (2011) report substantial, significant, and positive effects of an adult 
literacy programme in Ghana on the standard of living, as measured by household 
consumption expenditure. Blunch (2013) studying the same adult literacy programme in 
Ghana concludes that mother’s participation in the programme had a substantial impact 
on reducing child mortality. However, the Ghanian literacy programme is one of the 
few long-term programmes running for 21 months and covering 28 different themes 
97 
 
such as nutrition, family planning and farming practices.   
However, these studies rely on ex-post comparisons with non-participants. Even studies 
of the effect of adult literacy programmes on the literacy outcome itself (Carron, 1990; 
Ortega & Rodríguez, 2008)51 suffer from similar problems. This chapter is one of the 
few evaluations of adult literacy programmes to provide causal estimates. 
In a randomised control trial in Niger, Aker et al. (2012) find a significant effect of the 
adult literacy programme on math and reading scores, with an even larger effect for 
individuals assigned to a treatment arm of the literacy programme with a monitoring 
system in place. Second, Deshpande et al. (2017) find a statistically significant impact 
of the adult literacy programme (Tara Akshar+)52 on literacy outcomes in rural Uttar 
Pradesh in India, with the study set up as a randomised control trial. 
Exploring effects on a wider range of socio-economic outcomes other than literacy 
outcomes; and arguably closer to the purpose of this study, there are two papers of 
interest. Banerji et al. (2017) employ a randomised controlled trial in Bihar and 
Rajasthan, assigning households to either adult literacy classes for mothers, training for 
mothers to enhance their children’s learning, or a combination of both treatments. They 
find that the maternal literacy classes had no significant impact on children’s learning 
levels, but a combination of both treatments did. All three treatment arms have a 
significant impact on mothers’ test scores, mothers’ participation in their children’s 
education, and availability of educational assets in the household. Moreover, measuring 
empowerment as a decision index comprised of mothers’ involvement in decisions 
regarding household purchases and child’s schooling decisions, they find no significant 
impact of the literacy programme by itself. However, their insignificant intent-to-treat 
effects can be attributed to the low literacy programme take-up in their sample – self-
reported records show that only 40 percent of the mothers attended these classes. 
Second, the purpose of this study is to add to the limited evidence on the impacts of 
adult literacy programme on female empowerment as an end in itself; while that of 
Banerji et al. (2017) is ‘searching for (cost-effective) methods to improve levels of 
 
51 Carron(1990) finds significant effects of the Kenyan large-scale literacy programme, but report low levels of take 
up and poor coverage. Ortega and Rodriguez (2008) finds small insignificant positive effects of the Venzuelan large 
scale literacy programme.  
 
52 The effect of the same programme is studied in this paper in the same geographical location. However, the sampled 
villages and sample size are different as this chapter makes use of data collected in Phase 2 of the programme.  
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learning (children’s education) in developing countries’ (p. 303). 
A second closely related paper, Kandpal et al. (2012), evaluates the effect of a different 
female literacy programme in Uttarakhand, India and finds a positive, significant effect 
on women’s empowerment outcomes. Participants are more likely to have access to 
outside employment and are able to leave the house without permission across all 
regression specifications. However, the study is restricted in two respects. First, its 
identification strategy relies on an IV strategy using roll-out of the programme. This 
raises concerns regarding selection on unobservables and if the programme was 
purposely rolled out in some districts because of worse gender equality metrics in those 
areas. Second, it uses a very narrow set of three measures for women empowerment, 
namely access to employment is measured as having a National Rural Employment 
Guarantee card; mobility is measured as the ability to leave the house without 
permission; and political participation is measured as participation in village council 
meetings.  
This chapter improves on the above-mentioned studies by using an RCT to overcome 
the selection issue like Banerji et al. (2017), but with a greater treatment compliance of 
79 percent of the treatment group women attending the literacy classes. Moreover, the 
study makes use of a wide range female empowerment indicators and indices - decision-
making on different household domains, the ability to leave the house freely for a range 
of tasks, and control of different financial assets.  
4.3. The Female Adult Literacy Programme 
TARA Akshar Plus (TA+) is a female adult literacy programme implemented by a 
Delhi based NGO, Development Alternatives (DA). This is an 8-month long computer-
based programme that enables illiterate women to read and write in Hindi and to 
achieve basic numeracy skills. The programme includes 56 days of daily instructional 
classes, followed by 6-month long reading club meetings. The programme was created 
by ReadingWise53 and adapted by the TARAhaat team in 2004-2006 for India.  
The programme spans 37 days of reading (Tara Akshar) and 19 days of numeracy (Tara 
Ganit). The 37 days of reading aspect is further divided into 26 days of computer based 
 
53 Details of the ReadingWise initiative can be accessed on their website http://readingwise.com/story/ 
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instruction lasting 100 minutes daily with 20 minutes of revision and doubts 
clarification, 10 days of practice sessions, and finally one exam day where the learners 
are assessed on their ability to recognise Hindi letters, write words, phrases and 
sentences, and apply reading skills. The instructional session themselves are structured 
to incorporate the following activities – 4 minutes of video, 12 minutes of big flash 
cards, 20 minutes of writing, 20 minutes of small flash cards for revision, 10 minutes of 
exercise on computer software, another 20 minutes of writing practice, 10 minutes of 
practice with peers, and finally 4 minutes of a follow up video. 
The numeracy programme lasts 105 minutes for 19 days including a last day reserved 
for assessment. Each session is structured as – 13 minutes of word problems, 10 
minutes of big flash cards, 12 minutes of writing practice, 10 minutes of small flash 
cards for revision, 10 minutes of exercise on computer software, 10 minutes of writing 
numbers, 10 minutes of repetition in group, and 30 minutes of writing practice. The 7th, 
9th, 11th, 13th, 16th, and 18th days of the programme are reserved for tests on counting, 
addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, and multiplication tables respectively.  
After the programme, a reading club called ‘gyan choupali’ is formed which lasts for 6 
months with meetings held two to three times a week. It is led by a paid ‘TA Saheli’ 
who is given a two-day training prior to the beginning of reading clubs. These sessions 
are based on reading and writing books, interactive games, and watching movies.   
The programme was delivered at the hamlet level (subdivision of a village). It was 
delivered at the same time across hamlets and followed the same structure. Each session 
has approximately a class size of 10 women. 
Since its inception, TA+ has been made available to over 200,000 women in the Indian 
states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Jharkhand, Rajasthan, 
Uttarakhand, and Delhi. The program boasts a ‘success rate’ of over 90% in terms of 
achieving functional literacy and numeracy goals54. Deshpande et al. (2017) evaluate 
the TA+ programme using an RCT and find statistically significant impact of the adult 
literacy programme. While this chapter studies the same geographical area as 
Deshpande et al. (2017), the data is not identical.  
 
54 https://taraakshar.org/Result.aspx  
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4.4. Female Empowerment Outcome Measures 
The definition of female empowerment is broad and involves options, choices, control, 
and power (Malhotra & Schuler, 2005). It remains a debated term and has been assigned 
different definitions, often in the backdrop of varying socio-economic contexts (see, for 
an overview of contesting conceptual framework of empowerment, Malhotra & Schuler, 
2005; and Ibrahim & Alkire, 2007). However, most definitions either directly or 
indirectly allude to the notion of ‘agency’ – women consider themselves as not only 
able, but also entitled to make choices (Kabeer, 1999). 
I apply this consensus in conceptualisation of empowerment in this study. I define 
female empowerment as the expansion in women’s ability to make choices (Alsop et al., 
2005; Kabeer, 1999; Narayan-Parker, 2005) through a process where women either gain 
the ability to control resources (Uphoff, 2005) or gain power (Kabeer, 1999) or are able 
to affect decisions regarding important life outcomes (Malhotra & Schuler, 2005).  
The data used in this study has a rich set of variables that help capture empowerment. 
These include a range of ‘most frequently used indicators’ in empirical studies 
(Malhotra & Schuler, 2005).  
First, I use within household decision-making on domestic and child related issues. The 
survey included a range of questions which asked the woman “who in the household has 
the most say?”, and the matters covered were what to cook on a daily basis, what and 
how much to purchase at the local shop, what and how much to purchase at the market 
outside the village, what to do when your child falls ill, your child’s enrolment in 
school, your child’s attendance at school. For each of these decisions, the woman was 
asked to identify up to three key decision makers, including herself. I use this measure 
to construct a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the woman identified herself 
as a key decision maker, and 0 if other household members excluding herself were 
involved in the decision making. 
Second, I capture a measure of mobility through a range of questions, which asked the 
woman if she would need permission to conduct an activity. The activities covered were 
leaving the house, going to the local shop, going to a market outside the village, visiting 
a primary health centre, visiting natal family, making calls to the natal family, going out 
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for entertainment (cinema, fair). These questions only capture if there was a constraint 
on woman’s movement in the form of requirement of permission, and do not capture if 
the woman conducted these activities.  
Finally, I capture control over resources through a range of questions which asked if the 
woman has personal ownership of a mobile phone, if the woman has a personal bank 
account, and if the woman keeps her jewellery with herself (rather than with the 
husband or a parent-in-law).  
Each of the three domains have also been aggregated into indices using the method 
specified in Kling et al. (2007)55. Since questions on decision making include decisions 
involving a school-aged child, and 15 percent of the sampled women have no child (see 
Table 4.2), I also construct an index excluding these decisions. Thus, I have four indices 
that I refer to – ‘Decision’, ‘Decision excluding the child decisions’, ‘Mobility’, and 
‘Control of assets’.  
4.5. Data 
The study is based in the state of Uttar Pradesh, one the biggest Indian states in terms of 
land area and population. However, it has consistently been associated with low levels 
of economic and social development. In particular, the illiteracy rate in the state is the 
worst in India with 55 percent of the adult (18 years and above) women, and 27 percent 
of adult men classified as illiterate56.  
The data used in this chapter was collected as part of a larger Tara Akshar Evaluation 
Project and is available on FigShare (Wang et al., 2018). The Evaluation Project (Wang 
et al., 2018) was set up in two phases – Phase 1 and Phase 2. The main difference 
between the two Phases was that Phase 1 villages already had TA+ presence and Phase 
2 villages were entirely new to the programme. This chapter only utilises the Phase 2 
data.  It comes from 12 villages located in two separate blocks in the district of Sant 
Ravidas Nagar – 7 are located in Gyanpur block and 5 in Abholi block, making the 
setting exclusively rural. Overall, the villages are well connected by bus service and 
 
55 The normalized value of each variable based on control group mean and standard deviation is computed. Then after 
taking an average of the normalized variables, the resulting index is renormalized using the control group mean and 
standard deviation. The final index would have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1 for the control group.  
56 Calculated from Table DDW-0000C-O8, Census of India, 2011. Restricted to all persons above the age of 18 years. 
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tarred roads to the nearest town and railway station (within 5 km and 12 km, 
respectively). All villages have access to electricity, cellular phone coverage, and water 
(though not all of these services might be available throughout the day and to everyone).  
In April-May 2014, DA drew up a list of all adult illiterate women in the 12 villages – a 
total of 1061 women. These women were part of the baseline survey, following which 
173 (16 percent) women were declared ineligible by DA because of their 
education/literacy status. Before the randomisation, the remaining 888 women were 
approached about their willingness to participate in the TA+ programme, of which 725 
expressed interest. Next, within each hamlet57 (village subdivisions), the women were 
randomly assigned to treatment and control groups through a public lottery. Since the 
TA+ programme was delivered at the hamlet level where both treatment and control 
group women co-reside, there was a possibility that a woman from the control group 
could attend the literacy classes at the discretion of the TA+ instructor. However, from 
the design perspective this was sought to be minimised in three ways. First, class size 
was restricted to 10 due to limited learning materials and infrastructure. So, a control 
group woman could only end up attending a class if a treatment group woman from the 
hamlet dropped out of the programme. Second, crossovers were discouraged by 
providing control group women with clear assurance that they would be able to 
participate a year later. Third, literacy classes across all hamlets happened 
simultaneously to discourage control group women from traveling from one class to the 
next in search of a vacant seat in the TA+ programme 
There are 376 women in treatment and 349 women in control groups. The treatment 
group was invited to participate in the TA+ programme in June 2014, while the control 
group received the TA+ programme at a later date, May 2015. A follow up endline 
survey was conducted in March-April 2015. At the endline survey, 672 women of the 
725 could be surveyed (an attrition rate of 7.3%). The timeline of the study has been 
summarised in Figure 4.1 below. 
 




Figure 4.1. Timeline of treatment and data collection 
 
At the baseline survey in April-May 2014, information was collected through a village 
questionnaire, household questionnaire, woman’s questionnaire, cognitive test for 
women, literacy and numeracy tests for the woman and a randomly selected child of the 
woman, rapid literacy testing of other adult household members of the household58, and 
a lab-in-the-field public goods experiment to capture intra-household efficiency. 
Forward Digit Span (FDS) was used as the cognitive test for the woman. FDS is a 
subtest of both of Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) and the Wechsler Memory 
Scale (WMS) with a maximum score of 16. 
The household questionnaire consisted of information on household assets, household 
composition, religion, caste, and educational level of household members. The 
household assets section of the questionnaire was constructed in line with Progress out 
of Poverty Index (renamed as Poverty Probability Index in 2016)59 . The Progress out of 
Poverty (PPI) score ranges from 0 to 100. In 2009, a PPI score of 20-24 corresponded to a 
75 percent chance of being under the poverty line in rural India (Schreiner, 2008). 
The woman’s questionnaire captured information on self-reported participation in the 
literacy programme, woman’s school-aged children, and aspects of empowerment as 
described in Section 4.4. 
At the endline survey conducted in March-April 2015, the survey administered the same 
woman’s questionnaire as in baseline, literacy and numeracy test for the woman and her 
child, and a shorter public goods experiment. The household questionnaire was not 
administered at the endline, except to update the household members’ information.   
 





4.5.1.  Selection  
As mentioned in the previous Section 4.5, 163 women of 888 women eligible for the 
TA+ programme refused to participate in the programme. This raises concern over 
selection of the sample that was eventually randomised. Since the baseline survey was 
administered to all the women, Table 4.1 presents the baseline characteristics of the 163 
women as compared to the 725 women who were selected for randomisation. Column 2 
presents the mean (and standard deviation) for sample selected for randomisation; 
Column 3 presents the mean (and standard deviation) for the sample of women who 
refused to participate; Column 4 presents the results of the t-test of difference in the 





Table 4.1. Baseline characteristics by randomisation ‘selection’ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Total Randomised Refused t-test (2)-(3) 
Nuclear household 0.320 0.330 0.276 0.054 
 [0.467] [0.470] [0.448]  
Backward caste 0.490 0.472 0.571 -0.099** 
 [0.500] [0.500] [0.497]  
Scheduled caste 0.439 0.488 0.221 0.267*** 
 [0.497] [0.500] [0.416]  
Progress out of Poverty Index 23.191 22.690 25.462 -2.773*** 
 [9.963] [9.475] [11.696]  
Number of adult HH members 5.792 5.639 6.472 -0.834** 
 [4.328] [4.220] [4.734]  
Woman's age in years 35.144 35.068 35.485 -0.417 
 [8.516] [8.501] [8.597]  
Woman in paid labour 0.065 0.063 0.074 -0.010 
 [0.247] [0.244] [0.262]  
Forward Digit Span score 6.387 5.603 9.870 -4.268** 
 [22.290] [1.504] [51.901]  
Number of children 4-18 2.449 2.461 2.399 0.062 
 [1.739] [1.706] [1.887]  
Woman has no child 4-18 0.155 0.153 0.166 -0.013 
 [0.362] [0.360] [0.373]  
Baseline value of outcomes     
Decision Index 0.050 0.029 0.144 -0.114 
 [0.997] [0.998] [0.993]  
Decision Index excluding child decisions 0.084 0.065 0.169 -0.103 
 [1.014] [1.010] [1.031]  
Cooking 0.639 0.632 0.669 -0.037 
 [0.481] [0.483] [0.472]  
Purchases at local shop 0.523 0.512 0.571 -0.059 
 [0.500] [0.500] [0.497]  
Purchases outside village 0.476 0.469 0.509 -0.040 
 [0.500] [0.499] [0.501]  
Child's Illness 0.557 0.550 0.589 -0.039 
 [0.497] [0.498] [0.494]  
Child's enrolment 0.528 0.521 0.558 -0.037 
 [0.499] [0.500] [0.498]  
Child's attendance 0.534 0.521 0.589 -0.068 
 [0.499] [0.500] [0.494]  
Mobility Index -0.032 -0.009 -0.137 0.128 
 [0.967] [0.985] [0.879]  
Leave house without permission 0.161 0.166 0.141 0.024 
 [0.368] [0.372] [0.349]  
Go to local shop without permission 0.407 0.421 0.344 0.077* 
 [0.491] [0.494] [0.476]  
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Total Randomised Refused t-test (2)-(3) 
Go to shop outside the village without 
permission 0.205 0.218 0.147 0.071** 
 [0.404] [0.413] [0.355]  
Visit health clinic without permission 0.191 0.193 0.184 0.009 
 [0.394] [0.395] [0.389]  
Visit natal family without permission 0.135 0.141 0.110 0.030 
 [0.342] [0.348] [0.314]  
Call natal family without permission 0.725 0.716 0.767 -0.051 
 [0.447] [0.451] [0.424]  
Go out for entertainment without permission 0.180 0.193 0.123 0.070** 
 [0.385] [0.395] [0.329]  
Control of assets Index 0.001 -0.006 0.031 -0.037 
 [1.018] [1.025] [0.990]  
Owns mobile phone 0.409 0.407 0.417 -0.010 
 [0.492] [0.492] [0.495]  
Own back account 0.400 0.407 0.368 0.039 
 [0.490] [0.492] [0.484]  
Keeps her own jewellery 0.725 0.714 0.773 -0.059 
  [0.447] [0.452] [0.420]   
N 888 725 163  
This table presents the mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of the overall sample approached for the TA+ 
programme, the sample of women who were randomised and the sample who refused to participate. Column 4 
presents the results of the t-test of difference. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Base category for Backward Caste 
and Scheduled Caste is General category. Forward Digit Span Test is a subtest of both of Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale (WAIS) and the Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS) with a maximum score of 16. There are 6 
missing values on the FDS score. Progress out of Poverty Score ranges from 1 to 100 and is a composite index of 
education level of household head, household's main occupation, cooking fuel, ownership of durables such as 
cupboard, vehicle, TV, VCR/DVD/VCD player, sewing machine, thermoware. 
Women who refused participation in the TA+ programme are more likely to belong to 
backward caste, are richer and belong to slightly bigger households. They also scored 
77 percent higher on the cognitive test, Forward Digit Span. Of concern is the 
significant difference in the mobility measure of female empowerment. Women who 
refused to participate are less likely (approximately 7 percentage point difference) to the 
leave the house for shopping or entertainment without permission. This could be the 
reason for the unwillingness to participate in the TA+ programme – the inability to 
secure permission to attend such classes, as it would have required the woman to leave 
the house on a regular basis. For the results presented in this chapter, I control for 
baseline observable characteristics as well the baseline levels of all female 
empowerment measures to account for any selection bias. However, from the point of 
view of large-scale policy or programme implementation, it is worth noting that such 





For the 672 women selected for randomisation and present at the endline survey, I 
present the descriptive statistics by treatment and control group in Table 4.2. Column 1 
presents the mean (and standard deviation) for the total sample. Column 2 presents the 
mean (and standard deviation) for the sub-sample of control women and Column 3 
presents the mean (and standard deviation) for the sub-sample of treatment women. In 
Column 4, I report the t-test of difference between control and treatment groups. 
Appendix B Table C.1 presents the characteristics by control and treatment for the full 
sample of 725 women randomised at baseline – it follows the same trends as those 
reported here.  
Table 4.2. Baseline characteristics by treatment assignment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Total Control Treatment t-test (1)-(2) 
Nuclear Household 0.344 0.352 0.336 0.015 
 [0.475] [0.478] [0.473]  
Backward caste 0.469 0.462 0.475 -0.014 
 [0.499] [0.499] [0.500]  
Scheduled caste 0.491 0.495 0.487 0.008 
 [0.500] [0.501] [0.501]  
Progress out of Poverty Index 22.525 22.572 22.481 0.091 
 [9.409] [9.653] [9.185]  
Number of adult HH members 5.588 5.697 5.484 0.213 
 [4.264] [4.465] [4.068]  
Woman's age in years 35.247 35.125 35.362 -0.237 
 [8.317] [8.022] [8.597]  
Woman in paid labour 0.064 0.061 0.067 -0.006 
 [0.245] [0.240] [0.250]  
Forward Digit Span score 5.615 5.574 5.654 -0.080 
 [1.503] [1.517] [1.490]  
Number of children 4-18 2.510 2.471 2.548 -0.077 
 [1.708] [1.714] [1.705]  
Woman has no child 4-18 0.147 0.159 0.136 0.023 
 [0.355] [0.366] [0.344]  
Baseline value of outcomes     
Decision Index 0.048 0.000 0.094 -0.094 
 [1.000] [1.000] [1.000]  
Decision Index excluding child decisions 0.079 0.000 0.153 -0.153** 
 [1.007] [1.000] [1.010]  
Cooking 0.641 0.612 0.670 -0.058 
 [0.480] [0.488] [0.471]  
Purchases at local shop 0.513 0.477 0.548 -0.071* 
 [0.500] [0.500] [0.498]  
Purchases outside village 0.475 0.437 0.510 -0.073* 
 [0.500] [0.497] [0.501]  
Child's Illness 0.557 0.547 0.565 -0.018 
 [0.497] [0.499] [0.496]  
Child's enrolment 0.530 0.538 0.522 0.016 
 [0.499] [0.499] [0.500]  
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Total Control Treatment t-test (1)-(2) 
Child's attendance 0.536 0.523 0.548 -0.025 
 [0.499] [0.500] [0.498]  
Mobility Index 0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 
 [0.993] [1.000] [0.987]  
Leave house without permission 0.167 0.177 0.157 0.021 
 [0.373] [0.383] [0.364]  
Go to local shop without permission 0.427 0.416 0.438 -0.022 
 [0.495] [0.494] [0.497]  
Go to shop outside the village without permission 0.216 0.220 0.212 0.009 
 [0.412] [0.415] [0.409]  
Visit health clinic without permission 0.202 0.214 0.191 0.023 
 [0.402] [0.411] [0.394]  
Visit natal family without permission 0.143 0.135 0.151 -0.016 
 [0.350] [0.342] [0.358]  
Call natal family without permission 0.714 0.703 0.725 -0.021 
 [0.452] [0.457] [0.447]  
Go out for entertainment without permission 0.195 0.196 0.194 0.002 
 [0.396] [0.397] [0.396]  
Control of assets Index 0.014 0.000 0.026 -0.026 
 [1.016] [1.000] [1.033]  
Owns mobile phone 0.411 0.410 0.412 -0.002 
 [0.492] [0.493] [0.493]  
Own back account 0.414 0.391 0.435 -0.043 
 [0.493] [0.489] [0.496]  
Keeps her own jewellery 0.722 0.731 0.713 0.018 
  [0.448] [0.444] [0.453]  
N 672 327 345  
This table presents the mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of the overall sample randomised and 
surveyed at both baseline and endline, the sample of women who were assigned to control and the sample of 
women who were assigned to treatment. Column 4 presents the difference between control and treatment groups 
and reports the results of the t-test of difference. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Base category for Backward 
Caste and Scheduled Caste is General category. Forward Digit Span Test is a subtest of both of Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale (WAIS) and the Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS) with a maximum score of 16. There are 4 
missing values on the FDS score. Progress out of Poverty Score ranges from 1 to 100 and is a composite index of 
education level of household head, household's main occupation, cooking fuel, ownership of durables such as 
cupboard, vehicle, TV, VCR/DVD/VCD player, sewing machine, thermoware. 
While there is no significant difference in most of the observed characteristics between 
the control and treatment group, the women in the treatment group are more likely to be 
a primary decision maker on activities involving purchases at the local shop or at a shop 
outside the village. 55 percent of the treatment group women report making the decision 
on purchases made at a local shop as compared to 48 percent of the control group 
women. There is a similar 7 percentage point difference in favour of treatment group 
women with regards to decision on purchases made at shops outside the village. Hence, 






4.6.1. Intent-to-treat Effects 
I begin by exploring the average differences in the outcome variables at the endline by 
control and treatment group in Table 4.360. Column 1 presents the mean (and standard 
deviation) for the total sample. Column 2 presents the mean (and standard deviation) for 
the sub-sample of control women and Column 3 presents the mean (and standard 
deviation) for the sub-sample of treatment women. In Column 4, I report the t-test of 
difference between control and treatment groups. 
There is a significant difference in the means of control and treatment group on mobility 
measures and control of assets. In particular, women in the treatment group are more 
likely to go to local shops and call their natal family without requiring permission at the 
endline as compared to the control group women. They are also more likely to have a 
personal bank account.  
 
60 The endline means of all the within-household decision-making indicators are lower (although not significantly) 
than the baseline means for both the treatment and control group. There might be a concern that these survey 
measures of decision-making are noisy and not very effective, as highlighted by Almas et al. (2018). They find no 
effects on within household decision-making of a conditional cash transfer programme when they use survey 
measures, but find significant effects when using experimental measures. They additionally find their survey 




Table 4.3. Endline outcome variables by treatment assignment 
   (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  
 Total Control Treatment t-test 
Endline value of outcomes       (1)-(2) 
Decision Index -0.006 0.000 -0.011 0.011 
 [1.019] [1.000] [1.039]  
Decision Index excluding child decisions -0.010 0.000 -0.019 0.019 
 [1.002] [1.000] [1.005]  
Cooking 0.557 0.566 0.548 0.018 
 [0.497] [0.496] [0.498]  
Purchases at local shop 0.506 0.508 0.504 0.003 
 [0.500] [0.501] [0.501]  
Purchases outside village 0.429 0.431 0.426 0.005 
 [0.495] [0.496] [0.495]  
Child's Illness 0.496 0.498 0.493 0.006 
 [0.500] [0.501] [0.501]  
Child's enrolment 0.385 0.391 0.380 0.012 
 [0.487] [0.489] [0.486]  
Child's attendance 0.458 0.450 0.467 -0.017 
 [0.499] [0.498] [0.500]  
Mobility Index 0.069 0.000 0.134 -0.134* 
 [1.026] [1.000] [1.048]  
Leave house without permission 0.129 0.128 0.130 -0.002 
 [0.336] [0.335] [0.337]  
Go to local shop without permission 0.379 0.333 0.423 -0.090** 
 [0.486] [0.472] [0.495]  
Go to shop outside the village without permission 0.155 0.141 0.168 -0.027 
 [0.362] [0.348] [0.375]  
Visit health clinic without permission 0.177 0.159 0.194 -0.035 
 [0.382] [0.366] [0.396]  
Visit natal family without permission 0.098 0.092 0.104 -0.013 
 [0.298] [0.289] [0.306]  
Call natal family without permission 0.628 0.572 0.681 -0.109*** 
 [0.484] [0.496] [0.467]  
Go out for entertainment without permission 0.104 0.101 0.107 -0.006 
 [0.306] [0.302] [0.310]  
Control of assets Index 0.061 -0.000 0.119 -0.119 
 [0.974] [1.000] [0.947]  
Owns mobile phone 0.432 0.422 0.441 -0.019 
 [0.496] [0.495] [0.497]  
Own back account 0.622 0.575 0.667 -0.092** 
 [0.485] [0.495] [0.472]  
Keeps her own jewellery 0.868 0.865 0.870 -0.004 
 [0.339] [0.342] [0.337]  
N 672 327 345   
This table presents the mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of the overall sample randomised and 
surveyed at both baseline and endline, the sample of women who were assigned to control and the sample of 
women who were assigned to treatment. Column 4 presents the difference between control and treatment groups 
and reports the results of the t-test of difference. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
I further investigate the significant differences in the mean outcomes by treatment 
status, using the following regression -  
                                        (1) 
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Where  denotes the different empowerment measures for woman i at the endline 
(period=1) and at the baseline (period=0),  denotes the randomised treatment 
allocation (=1 for woman assigned to treatment, and =0 for woman assigned to control), 
 denotes the intent-to-treat effect. The vector of control variables  includes the 
characteristics of the woman (age, occupation, FDS cognitive test, number of school-
aged children), and household characteristics (nuclear or extended household structure, 
caste, PPI asset score, number of adult household members). The standard errors are 
clustered at the hamlet level. In Appendix B, I report the intent-to-treat results for 
regression specification without any controls (see Table C.2, Table C.5 and Table C.8), 
only with baseline value of outcome variables as controls (see Table C.3, Table C.6, and 
Table C.9), only with woman and household characteristics as controls (see 0, Table 
C.7, and Table C.10).  
Table 4.4 presents the results of intent-to-treat effects of the TA+ programme on various 
aspects of decision-making. The outcome variables are decision index, decision index 
excluding the decision involving the child, binary variable on if the woman is a primary 
decision maker on matters related to cooking, purchases at the local shop, purchases at 
shops outside the village, child’s illness, child’s enrolment at school, child attending the 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































I find no significant effect of the TA+ programme on any of the decision-making 
indicators. This is unsurprising as previous studies on formal education of women have 
documented null effects on women’s decision making power within the household in 
Uttar Pradesh (Dyson & Moore, 1983; Bloom et al., 2001; Jejeebhoy & Sathar, 2001). 
In the sample studied in this chapter, about only half the women indicated having some 
say in decision making (see Table 4.2 and Table 4.3), implying low levels of decision 
making power both before and after the programme. Given the low female labour force 
participation in rural Uttar Pradesh, attributed in part to the less labour-intensive 
cultivation of wheat (Foster & Rosenzweig, 1996) and in part to gender related social 
norms (Dyson & Moore, 1983; Bloom et al., 2001; Jejeebhoy & Sathar, 2001), it is 
unlikely that the literacy programme created employment and income opportunities for 
these women. Thus, it follows from the prediction of intra-household bargaining models 
that women would not see a shift in their bargaining power and consequent decision 
making roles (Rahman & Rao, 2005; MacPhail & Dong, 2007; Hashemi et al., 1996; 
Almas et al., 2018). However, other studies on investment in children’s health and 
education document a greater role of women in decision making due to an increase in 
women’s access to knowledge (Thomas et al., 1991; Glewwe, 1999; Aslam & Kingdon, 
2012). The access to such sources of knowledge, for instance, newspapers and 
television, may be limited in the context of rural Uttar Pradesh (Thomas et al., 1991). 
Additionally, Dyson and Moore (1983) in explaining the north-south India divergence 
in gender equity, emphasised that the unfavourable position of women in North India 
stemmed from the cultural norm of patrilocality. Married women live with their 
husband’s family in an inferior position to the household power hierarchy (Anukriti et 
al., 2020). Chapter 3 of this thesis finds support for this theory in finding the inefficient 
sharing of household resources between daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law. 
Among the covariates, I find being part of a nuclear household and being an older 
woman to be strongly positively correlated with the decision-making power within the 
household. These correlations may be related to the findings in Chapter 2 – extended 
households exhibit fragmented decision-making power with indication of higher levels 
of inefficiency between a mother-in-law (older woman in the household) and a 
daughter-in-law.  
For certain outcomes, a woman in paid employment is positively correlated with the 
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probability of being a primary decision maker. This is similar to the findings in the 
literature on economic empowerment and gender empowerment – an employed woman 
is more likely to have a greater say in decision making within the household. However, 
only 6 percent of the women in our sample are employed in income generating activities 
(see Table 4.1). 
Table 4.5 presents the results of intent-to-treat effects of the TA+ programme on various 
aspects of freedom of movement. The outcome variables are mobility index, binary 
variable on if the woman can leave the house, shop at the local market, shop at the 
market outside the village, visit a health clinic, visit her natal family, call her natal 
family, and go out for entertainment without requiring permission (See Section 3.3.1 for 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































I find a significant effect of the TA+ programme on the mobility index. Being part of 
treatment group increases the mobility index by 0.126 standard deviations. Investigating 
the individual components of the mobility index, I find that being part of the treatment 
increases the probability of going to the local shops and calling the natal family without 
requiring permission. Women in the treatment group are 7.5 percentage points (an effect 
size of 22 percent) more likely than the control group women to go to the local shops 
without permission. They are also 9.8 (an effect size of 17 percent) percentage point 
more likely than the control group women to be able to call their natal family without 
requiring permission.  
 A direct mechanism driving the positive impacts on freedom of movement is the 
increase in the woman’s confidence and self-esteem due to newly acquired literacy 
skills (Archer & Cottingham, 1997; Stromquist, 1997; Egbo, 2000). Alternatively, 
women overcoming mobility constraints may have less to do with literacy itself, and 
more to do with the act of attending the literacy class. Firstly, literacy classes presented 
these women an opportunity to move freely and unsupervised out of their homes on a 
regular basis, thereby, shifting the woman’s belief of own self-efficacy as well as her 
household members’ belief of the woman’s self-efficacy. Secondly, attending literacy 
classes with other women would have expanded the network of peers which has shown 
to have a positive effect on freedom of movement (Kandpal & Baylis, 2019; Anukriti et 
al., 2020).  
Among the covariates, I continue to find that being part of a nuclear household, an older 
woman, and a woman in paid employment to be positively correlated with the mobility 
indicators. The estimates on a woman involved in income generating activity are higher 
and stronger in the regressions on mobility than the regressions on decision-making. 
This might be because an employed woman has to leave the house on a regular basis 
and is hence less prone to be restricted in her movements. Additionally, I find the 
number of children to be negatively correlated with the mobility indicators. This might 
be due to childcare duties, which may limit the woman’s ability to leave the house. 
Finally, I look at the intent-to-treat effects of the TA+ programme on various aspects of 
control of assets. The outcome variables in Table 4.6 are control of assets index, binary 
variable on if the woman owns a personal mobile phone, has her own bank account, and 
keeps her own jewelry with herself. I find a significant effect of the TA+ programme 
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only on the probability of having a personal bank account. Women in the treatment 
group are 7.3 percentage points (an effect size of 13 percent) more likely than the 
control group women to have a personal bank account. This may be a direct result of 
becoming literate with the newly acquired ability to read, fill out, and sign bank forms 
(see Deshpande et al., 2017 on significant impacts of the TA+ programme on women’s 
reading and numeracy skills). Also related to the previous finding on increased freedom 
of movement, the woman would feel more confident to go to a bank herself 
unaccompanied and without requiring permission of other household members. Another 
hypothesis is found in social networks literature, where an increase in the interaction 
with peers results in an increase in financial independence (Field et al., 2016; Banerjee 
et al., 2013).  
Table 4.6. Intent-to-treat effects on control of assets 










          
Treatment 0.097 0.014 0.073* 0.002 
 (0.076) (0.034) (0.039) (0.022) 
Nuclear household 0.134 0.039 0.014 0.057* 
 (0.087) (0.042) (0.039) (0.032) 
Backward caste 0.012 0.012 -0.052 0.044 
 (0.146) (0.092) (0.087) (0.083) 
Scheduled caste -0.161 -0.088 -0.099 0.037 
 (0.168) (0.092) (0.094) (0.086) 
Progress out of Poverty Index 0.005 0.002 -0.000 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Number of adult HH members -0.011 -0.007* 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) 
Woman's age in years 0.018*** -0.003 0.008*** 0.012*** 
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Woman in paid labour -0.102 0.039 -0.156** -0.004 
 (0.086) (0.046) (0.057) (0.065) 
Forward Digit Span score 0.033 0.024** 0.022 -0.007 
 (0.026) (0.010) (0.014) (0.009) 
Number of children 4-18 0.072** 0.019* 0.022* 0.020* 
 (0.027) (0.010) (0.013) (0.011) 
Outcome at baseline 0.296*** 0.397*** 0.268*** 0.050 
 (0.037) (0.040) (0.032) (0.033) 
Constant -1.010*** 0.188 0.087 0.327** 
 (0.272) (0.150) (0.156) (0.128) 
     
Control group mean at endline 0.001 0.423 0.577 0.864 
Observations 668 668 668 668 
R-squared 0.191 0.201 0.149 0.118 
This table presents the results of regression of control of assets on treatment assignment with individual 
level, household level and value of outcome variable at baseline controls. Standard errors are clustered at 
hamlet level. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Base category for Backward Caste and Scheduled Caste is 
General category. The regression sample is slightly smaller than 672 due to missing values on Forward 




4.6.2. Programme take-up 
The intent-to-treat effects assume that there was perfect compliance to the 
randomisation process. In practice, this is seldom the case. Both the randomisation and 
the delivery of literacy classes were conducted at the hamlet level within the village. 
The proximity of the classes to control group women implied that there were 
possibilities of cross-over from control to treatment. However, class size was restricted 
to 10 due to limited learning materials, implying that usually a control group woman 
could attend a class unnoticed if the assigned treatment group woman dropped out. At 
the endline, all women were asked if they participated in the TA+ programme. Based on 
this self-reported measure in Table 4.7, I find that 20.6 percent of the treatment group 
women reported not having attended the TA+ programme and 18.7 percent of the 
control group women reported having attended the TA+ programme. Since the TA+ 
instructors were not familiar with the names and faces of the treatment group women, 
and given these classes generated curiosity, it is likely for control group women to have 
attended the literacy classes in the initial days unnoticed. This may explain why the 
non-compliers among control group women attended only 47 percent of the classes. The 
56-day instructional component was followed by a six month long reading club which 
was attended by 41 percent and 18 percent of the treatment and control group women, 
respectively.  
Table 4.7. Programme take-up by treatment assignment status 
  (1) (2) 
 Control Treatment 
  N Mean N Mean 
Woman attended TA+ 327 0.187 345 0.794 
  [0.390]  [0.405] 
Days attended (out of 56)  61 0.473 274 0.773 
  [0.357]  [0.277] 
Woman attended reading club  61 0.177 274 0.409 
    [0.385]   [0.493] 
This table reports the average attendance in TA+ programme by the treatment 
assignment status. TA+ has a 56 day instructional component followed with a 
reading group that meets biweekly for six months. The days attended and 
whether a woman attended the reading club is calculated only for women who 
participated in the programme. All measure are self-reported by the woman at 
endline. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
While later in Section 4.6.3, I estimate the treatment effects of the TA+ programme on 
the compliers, it is important to note that the intent-to-treat effects may be more policy 
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relevant. In case an adult literacy programme is rolled out for all the illiterate women in 
the country, policy makers might be interested in knowing the impact of offering the 
programme on the entire population, even if some women might not take it up.  
Relatedly, one would like to know the determinants of program take up. Table 4.8 
reports the regression results of the correlates of women’s participation in the TA+ 
programme61. The following specification is used to estimate Table 4.8 –  
                                                  (2) 
Where Xi is the vector of household and individual characteristics of woman i; y0i is the 
vector of baseline value of empowerment variables. The regression is run separately by 
treatment and control group assignment status. Column 1 reports the determinants of 
program take up among the treatment group women and Column 2 reports the 
determinants of program take up among the control group women.  
 
61 Appendix B, Table C.12 reports the same regressions but with hamlet fixed effects. The results remain the same 




Table 4.8. Correlates of programme take-up 
  (1) (2) 
 
Participation 
within treatment  
Participation 
within control 
      
Nuclear household -0.055 0.081 
 (0.046) (0.056) 
Backward caste 0.398* 0.110* 
 (0.211) (0.061) 
Scheduled caste 0.452** 0.175** 
 (0.195) (0.080) 
Progress out of Poverty Index 0.003 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Number of adult HH members -0.010 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.006) 
Woman's age in years 0.005 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Woman in paid labour -0.193** -0.042 
 (0.091) (0.095) 
Forward Digit Span score 0.004 -0.009 
 (0.017) (0.015) 
Number of children 4-18 0.031** 0.017 
 (0.014) (0.015) 
Decision Index at baseline 0.038 0.008 
 (0.028) (0.022) 
Mobility Index at baseline 0.000 -0.028 
 (0.020) (0.025) 
Control of assets index at baseline -0.003 -0.000 
 (0.027) (0.020) 
Constant 0.122 -0.040 
 (0.288) (0.219)    
Observations 344 324 
R-squared 0.093 0.029 
This table presents the results of regression of program take up within treatment and control groups 
on observables. Standard errors are clustered at hamlet level. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Base 
category for Backward Caste and Scheduled Caste is General category. The regression sample is 
slightly smaller than 672 due to missing values on Forward Digit Span score. 
Among the treatment group women, I find that belonging to lower castes (backward and 
scheduled castes as against general upper caste) and number of children is positively 
associated with program participation. A woman in paid employment is negatively 
correlated with program participation. This could be due to the employed woman being 
unavailable on a regular basis or that an employed woman might consider the benefits 
from a literacy programme to be low. Among the control group women, belonging to 
lower castes is significantly and positively associated with program participation. These 
results suggest that the women from lower castes are more likely to take up the female 
adult literacy programme, making such programmes inclusive of the socially 
121 
 
marginalised groups.  
While I don’t find aspects of empowerment – decision-making power, mobility and 
control of assets to be correlated with programme take up in Table 4.8, it may be 
because the sample finally randomized excluded the 163 women who refused to 
participate in the study. As seen in Table 4.1, these women were less likely to leave the 
house without permission. Hence, although a large-scale female literacy policy may 
lead to the desirable selection into the programme from the socially marginalised caste 
groups in India, it may still miss the least empowered women limited in their ability to 
leave the house freely. 
4.6.3. Local Average Treatment Effects 
Given that there wasn’t perfect compliance to the programme, I use an instrumental 
variable approach to estimate the treatment effect of the TA+ programme on the 
compliers. The first stage regression is given by instrumenting self-reported 
participation on random treatment assignment status -  
                           (3) 
And final estimated instrumental variable (IV) regression is -  
                                         (4) 
The coefficient  captures the local average treatment effect (LATE) of TA+ 
programme among the women who complied with the treatment assignment. The local 
average treatment effect is expected to be higher than the intent-to-treat effects as it is 
the effect of treatment among those women who took it up. The higher the compliance, 
the closer the LATE will be to ITT estimates. Appendix B Table C.13 reports the results 
of IV regressions without any controls, with only baseline value of outcome variable as 
control, and with only woman and household characteristics as controls. 
Table 4.9 presents the effects of the TA+ programme on various aspects of decision 
making among the compliers. The outcome variables are decision index, decision index 
excluding the decision involving the child, binary variable on if the woman is a primary 
decision maker on matters related to cooking, purchases at the local shop, purchases at 
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shops outside the village, child’s illness, child’s enrolment at school, child attending the 
school on a given day. I find no significant effect of the TA+ programme on any of the 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.10 presents the results of the effects of the TA+ programme on various aspects 
of freedom of movement among the compliers. The outcome variables are mobility 
index, binary variable on if the woman can leave the house, shop at the local market, 
shop at the market outside the village, visit a health clinic, visit her natal family, call her 
natal family, and go out for entertainment without requiring permission. I find a 
significant effect on the mobility index, going to the local shops and calling the natal 
family without requiring permission, similar to the intent-to-treat effects. The 
magnitude of the estimates is larger than ITT estimates. Participation in the TA+ 
programme increases the mobility index by 0.21 standard deviations among the 
compliers. Treatment group women participating in the programme are 12.4 percentage 
points more likely than the non-participant control group women to go to the local 
shops without permission. They are also 16.3 percentage points more likely to be able to 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Finally, I look at the effects of the TA+ programme on various aspects of control of 
assets among the compliers. The outcome variables in Table 4.11 are control of assets 
index, binary variable on if the woman owns a personal mobile phone, has her own 
bank account, and keeps her own jewellery with herself. I find a significant effect of 
participation only on the probability of having a personal bank account. Treatment 
group women participating in the programme are 12.1 percentage points more likely 
than the control group non-participants to have a personal bank account.  
Table 4.11. Treatment effect on control of assets for compliers 










          
Participation 0.161 0.024 0.121* 0.004 
 (0.123) (0.055) (0.064) (0.036) 
Nuclear Household 0.132 0.038 0.012 0.057* 
 (0.085) (0.042) (0.038) (0.031) 
Backward caste -0.026 0.007 -0.080 0.043 
 (0.145) (0.093) (0.083) (0.082) 
Scheduled caste -0.210 -0.095 -0.135 0.036 
 (0.170) (0.095) (0.086) (0.086) 
Progress out of Poverty Index 0.004 0.002 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Number of adult HH members -0.010 -0.007* 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) 
Woman's age in years 0.018*** -0.003 0.008*** 0.011*** 
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Woman in paid labour -0.081 0.042 -0.141*** -0.004 
 (0.081) (0.044) (0.053) (0.064) 
Forward Digit Span score 0.033 0.024** 0.022* -0.007 
 (0.024) (0.010) (0.013) (0.009) 
Number of children 4-18 0.068** 0.018* 0.019 0.020* 
 (0.027) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) 
Outcome at baseline 0.296*** 0.398*** 0.265*** 0.050 
 (0.037) (0.039) (0.031) (0.032) 
Constant -0.966*** 0.194 0.118 0.328*** 
 (0.256) (0.147) (0.146) (0.123) 
     
Observations 668 668 668 668 
First stage F-stat 54.48 55.20 54.66 53.34 
This table presents the results of IV regression of control of assets on programme participation with 
individual level, household level and value of outcome variable at baseline controls. Standard errors 
are clustered at hamlet level. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Base category for Backward Caste and 
Scheduled Caste is General category. The regression sample is slightly smaller than 672 due to missing 







At the baseline, 725 women were randomized into treatment and control groups. 
However, only 672 women completed the endline survey. Attrition can be of concern if 
it is correlated with the treatment assignment. I have a low overall attrition rate of 7.3 
percent with the corresponding rates among control and treatment group at 6.3 percent 
and 8.2 percent respectively. This difference in attrition rate by treatment status is not 
significant in itself62. However, attrition might remain correlated with observable 
characteristics or the outcomes. 
In Table 4.12, I present the characteristics and the baseline value of outcome variables 
of the attrition sample. Column 1 reports the mean (and standard deviation) of the 
overall attrition sample, Column 2 reports the mean (standard deviation) of the control 
group attrition sample, and Column 3 reports the mean (and standard deviation) of the 
treatment group attrition sample.  
In the treatment group, the attrition sample is from relatively richer households, 
households with larger number of adult members, and higher test score on the Forward 
Digit Span test. I also find the attrition sample in the treatment group to have higher 
decision-making power on child’s enrolment in school and child’s daily attendance at 
school. They are less likely to be able to go to local shop without permission. Since the 
women who attrit in the treatment group have higher decision-making power than the 
control group women who attrit, I may be underestimating the intent-to-treat effects on 
decision making indicators. Similarly, I may be overestimating the intent-to-treat effects 
on mobility indicators.  
 




Table 4.12. Characteristics of attrited women by treatment assignment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Total Control Treatment t-test (1)-(2) 
Nuclear Household 0.151 0.227 0.097 0.130 
 [0.361] [0.429] [0.301]  
Backward caste 0.509 0.500 0.516 -0.016 
 [0.505] [0.512] [0.508]  
Scheduled caste 0.453 0.500 0.419 0.081 
 [0.503] [0.512] [0.502]  
Progress out of Poverty Index 24.774 21.636 27.000 -5.364* 
 [10.139] [10.247] [9.609]  
Number of adult HH members 6.283 5.273 7.000 -1.727* 
 [3.586] [2.815] [3.933]  
Woman's age in years 32.792 32.091 33.290 -1.199 
 [10.391] [9.631] [11.028]  
Woman in paid labour 0.057 0.045 0.065 -0.019 
 [0.233] [0.213] [0.250]  
Forward Digit Span score 5.442 4.818 5.900 -1.082** 
 [1.526] [1.435] [1.447]  
Number of children 4-18 1.830 1.864 1.806 0.057 
 [1.553] [1.612] [1.537]  
Woman has no child 4-18 0.226 0.273 0.194 0.079 
 [0.423] [0.456] [0.402]  
Baseline value of outcomes     
Decision Index -0.210 -0.409 -0.069 -0.340 
 [0.940] [0.951] [0.921]  
Decision Index excluding child decisions -0.100 -0.159 -0.058 -0.101 
 [1.046] [1.059] [1.053]  
Cooking 0.509 0.500 0.516 -0.016 
 [0.505] [0.512] [0.508]  
Purchases at local shop 0.491 0.455 0.516 -0.062 
 [0.505] [0.510] [0.508]  
Purchases outside village 0.396 0.364 0.419 -0.056 
 [0.494] [0.492] [0.502]  
Child's Illness 0.472 0.364 0.548 -0.185 
 [0.504] [0.492] [0.506]  
Child's enrolment 0.415 0.273 0.516 -0.243* 
 [0.497] [0.456] [0.508]  
Child's attendance 0.340 0.182 0.452 -0.270** 
 [0.478] [0.395] [0.506]  
Mobility Index -0.126 0.019 -0.229 0.248 
 [0.882] [1.063] [0.729]  
Leave house without permission 0.151 0.227 0.097 0.130 
 [0.361] [0.429] [0.301]  
Go to local shop without permission 0.340 0.500 0.226 0.274** 
 [0.478] [0.512] [0.425]  
Go to shop outside the village without 
permission 0.245 0.273 0.226 0.047 
 [0.434] [0.456] [0.425]  
Visit health clinic without permission 0.075 0.091 0.065 0.026 
 [0.267] [0.294] [0.250]  
Visit natal family without permission 0.113 0.182 0.065 0.117 
 [0.320] [0.395] [0.250]  
Call natal family without permission 0.736 0.636 0.806 -0.170 
 [0.445] [0.492] [0.402]  
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Total Control Treatment t-test (2)-(3) 
Go out for entertainment without 
permission 0.170 0.182 0.161 0.021 
 [0.379] [0.395] [0.374]  
Control of assets Index -0.249 -0.288 -0.222 -0.066 
 [1.106] [1.158] [1.086]  
Owns mobile phone 0.358 0.409 0.323 0.087 
 [0.484] [0.503] [0.475]  
Own back account 0.321 0.318 0.323 -0.004 
 [0.471] [0.477] [0.475]  
Keeps her own jewellery 0.623 0.545 0.677 -0.132 
  [0.489] [0.510] [0.475]   
N 53 22 31  
This table presents the mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of the overall attrited sample, the sample 
of women who attrited from control group and the sample of women who were attrited from treatment group. 
Column 4 presents the difference between control and treatment groups and reports the results of the t-test of 
difference. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Base category for Backward Caste and Scheduled Caste is General 
category. 
In order to deal with the differential attrition rates and characteristics between the 
treatment and control groups, I construct bounds on the intent-to-treat estimates using 
the trimming method suggested by Lee (2009)63. I trim the control group sample as this 
was the group that experienced lower attrition, using 2.1 percent (or 7 women) as the 
trimming fraction. The trimming fraction is determined by the difference in attrition 
rates between treatment and control groups. By dropping the lowest 2.1 percent of the 
outcomes of the control group, I estimate the lower bound; and by dropping the highest 
2.1 percent of the outcomes of the control group, I estimate the upper bound. 
Table 4.13 reports the bounds on intent-to-treat effects on all outcome variables64. 
Column 1 reports the intent-to-treat effects from Section 4.6.1 (Table 4.4, Table 4.5 and 
Table 4.6). Column 2 and Column 3 report the lower and upper bounds on the intent-to-
treat effects respectively. As expected, the main intent-to-treat effects in Column 1 lie 
between the estimated lower and upper bounds. The lower and upper bounds are 
significant only for the outcome variables where I report a significant impact of the 
TA+ programme. Given the low levels of attrition, the estimated bounds are tight. For 
instance, the estimated effect size of the TA+ programme on mobility index ranges from 
0.115 to 0.182 standard deviations. From Table 4.12, we noted that the women who 
attrited from the treatment group had relatively lower levels of mobility as compared to 
the women who attrited from the control group.  In this case, we would be worried that 
 
63 I also estimate the bounds using Horowitz and Manski (2000), which is not reported here. However, as has been 
noted in the empirical literature, this method gives very wide bounds with little inference ability. 
64 Appendix B Table C.17 reports the bounds on IV estimates for all outcome variables.  
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our intent-to-treat effect of the TA+ programme is overestimated. However, looking at 
our lower bound estimates in Column 2, these remain significant and close to our intent-
to-treat effects on mobility indicators. Thus, there is little evidence that differential 
attrition influenced our intent-to-treat effects on female empowerment outcomes.  
Table 4.13. Intent-to-treat effects correcting for attrition using Lee bounds 
   (1) (2)  (3)  
Endline outcomes Treatment Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Decision Index -0.047 -0.065 -0.023 
 (0.072) (0.077) (0.077) 
Decision Index excluding child decisions -0.061 -0.080 -0.046 
 (0.078) (0.076) (0.072) 
Cooking -0.032 -0.043 -0.021 
 (0.035) (0.040) (0.034) 
Purchases at local shop -0.018 -0.028 -0.009 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) 
Purchases outside village -0.024 -0.031 -0.013 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.036) 
Child's Illness -0.011 -0.020 -0.001 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) 
Child's enrolment -0.013 -0.022 -0.001 
 (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) 
Child's attendance 0.003 -0.006 0.014 
 (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) 
Mobility Index 0.126* 0.115* 0.182*** 
 (0.062) (0.060) (0.059) 
Leave house without permission 0.005 0.003 0.023 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) 
Go to local shop without permission 0.075*** 0.070*** 0.089*** 
 (0.027) (0.025) (0.028) 
Go to shop outside the village without permission 0.029 0.028 0.046* 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) 
Visit health clinic without permission 0.037 0.036 0.051* 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.027) 
Visit natal family without permission 0.010 0.009 0.024 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) 
Call natal family without permission 0.098*** 0.086** 0.107*** 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.034) 
Go out for entertainment without permission 0.005 0.004 0.024 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) 
Control of assets Index 0.097 0.054 0.119 
 (0.076) (0.070) (0.074) 
Owns mobile phone 0.014 0.010 0.024 
 (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) 
Own back account 0.073* 0.062* 0.081** 
 (0.039) (0.037) (0.039) 
Keeps her own jewellery 0.002 -0.016 0.004 
  (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) 
This table presents the results of regression of endline empowerment outcomes on treatment assignment after 
trimming the sample using the method described in Lee(2009). Column (1) reports the intent-to-treat effects from 
Section 4.6.1..All regressions control for individual and household level controls, as well as the value of the 
outcome variables at baseline. Standard errors for Columns (2) and (3) were bootstrapped with 250 repetitions and 
clustered at thehamlet level.  The number of observations for bounds regressions is 661, after trimming 7 




Spillover could occur when those in the control group who did not participate in the 
TA+ programme, could still be affected by it. Since the randomisation design for this 
study was at the household level, control group women were present within the hamlet 
along with the treatment group women. One cannot rule out the possibility of treatment 
group women discussing the lessons from the TA+ programme with other control group 
women present in their social network. For instance, Basu et al. (2001) find in their 
rural Bangladesh sample that an illiterate adult earns significantly more if living with at 
least one literate household member. These results are strongest for women in their 
sample. Alternatively, spillovers can also be driven by ‘role-model’ effect (see Beamen 
et al., 2012 for the effect of female leadership on women’s aspirations in rural India). 
Exposure to treatment group women who exhibited a change in behaviour as a result of 
TA+ programme, such as free and frequent movement, could have shifted the beliefs 
and aspirations of the control group women.  
Given these channels of possible positive spillovers, the intent-to-treat effects reported 
in Section 4.6.1 are underreporting the effects of the programme. The data did not 
incorporate any measure of social networks or exact residence location of each woman 
to conduct a thorough estimation of the extent of spillovers. However, I attempt to 
provide a crude estimate of the spillover, which in all likelihood, is an underestimation 
of the true spillover effect.  
It is relatively common in India to find that multiple households, although distinct 
consumption units, would reside within the same building or compound. These are still 
different households, only sharing a residence. The data identifies such households and 
I find that 49 of the 327 control group women live in the same physical residence as a 
treatment group woman. Using this indicator variable as an additional control, I re-run 
the estimations of the intent-to-treat effects reported in Table 4.4, Table 4.5 and Table 
4.6. The exact specification used is – 
(5) 
Where the base category is now all control group women who do not live at the same 
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residence location as a treatment group woman. Table 4.14 reports the intent-to-treat 
effects of the TA+ programme on all empowerment outcomes after controlling for 
spillover. I first report the intent-to-treat effects which do not control for spillovers (as 
reported in Section 4.6.1 – βITT from equation 1) and then report the intent-to-treat 
effects adjusted for spillovers (β1 from equation 5). I additionally also report the 
coefficient on the binary variable capturing spillover where the control group woman 
lives in the same compound as a treatment group woman (β2 from equation 5). This 
coefficient is never significant and perhaps, it is because of the low power (only 49 such 
women).  
However, it is interesting to note that the intent-to-treat estimates after controlling for 
potential spillover (Column 2), are now higher for the outcomes that were significantly 
impacted by the TA+ programme65. Curiously, I also find a marginal significant (at 10 
percent) effect of the TA+ programme on the likelihood of going to a health clinic 
without requiring permission.  
 




Table 4.14. Intent-to-treat effects controlling for spillover 
    Regression controlling for spillover 







lives close to 
treatment woman 
Decision Index -0.047 -0.059 -0.079 
 (0.072) (0.075) (0.148) 
Decision Index excluding child decisions -0.061 -0.064 -0.019 
 (0.078) (0.079) (0.148) 
Cooking -0.032 -0.028 0.026 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.074) 
Purchases at local shop -0.018 -0.022 -0.027 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.075) 
Purchases outside village -0.024 -0.027 -0.022 
 (0.039) (0.040) (0.071) 
Child's Illness -0.011 -0.024 -0.087 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.093) 
Child's enrolment -0.013 -0.022 -0.063 
 (0.037) (0.042) (0.068) 
Child's attendance 0.003 -0.000 -0.022 
 (0.024) (0.028) (0.083) 
Mobility Index 0.126* 0.150** 0.153 
 (0.062) (0.066) (0.134) 
Leave house without permission 0.005 0.011 0.040 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.046) 
Go to local shop without permission 0.075*** 0.085*** 0.068 
 (0.027) (0.029) (0.084) 
Go to shop outside the village without permission 0.029 0.030 0.005 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.039) 
Visit health clinic without permission 0.037 0.041* 0.021 
 (0.026) (0.024) (0.043) 
Visit natal family without permission 0.010 0.012 0.016 
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.042) 
Call natal family without permission 0.098*** 0.112** 0.091 
 (0.035) (0.041) (0.093) 
Go out for entertainment without permission 0.005 0.013 0.051 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.051) 
Control of assets Index 0.097 0.108 0.074 
 (0.076) (0.088) (0.173) 
Owns mobile phone 0.014 0.011 -0.024 
 (0.034) (0.036) (0.048) 
Own back account 0.073* 0.087* 0.088 
 (0.039) (0.045) (0.079) 
Keeps her own jewellery 0.002 0.004 0.013 
  (0.022) (0.028) (0.064) 
This table presents the results of regression of endline empowerment outcomes on treatment assignment after 
controlling for spillover. Column (1) reports the intent-to-treat effects from Section 4.6.1..All regressions control 
for individual and household level controls, as well as the value of the outcome variables at baseline. Standard 






India accounts for a third of the adult illiterates in the world (UNESCO, 2020) and is 
critical for understanding the impact of adult literacy programmes. This study directly 
contributes to the small body of rigorous evaluation of adult literacy programmes. It 
evaluates the impact of TARA Akshar+ programme targeted at adult female in the state 
of Uttar Pradesh, the state with the highest illiteracy rate in India and low levels of 
female empowerment. Evaluating the literacy and numeracy impacts of the programme, 
Deshpande et al. (2017) find positive effects. In this Chapter, I study the impact of the 
programme beyond literacy, on a range of female empowerment outcomes – decision 
making role of the woman within the household, freedom of movement and control of 
financial assets.  
I find a significant and substantial increase in woman’s mobility or ability to leave the 
house without having to seek permission, and an increase in the likelihood of the 
woman having a personal bank account. Women in the literacy programme are 22 
percent more likely to leave to house to go to the local shops and 17 percent more likely 
to leave the house to call their natal family, both activities without requiring permission. 
They are also 13 percent more likely to open a personal bank account. I find no 
evidence of an increase in decision-making power over daily household decisions such 
as those involving household purchases, cooking, and children’s health and education. 
Since the TA+ programme enabled women to move out of the house daily to assemble 
at a central location to attend these classes, this may explain the impacts I find on 
mobility indicators but not on decision-making variables. Literature on social networks 
suggests that peer support and companionship can help overcome mobility barriers 
(Anukriti et al., 2020) and encourage financial independence (Field et al., 2016; 
Banerjee et al., 2013). Alternatively, this change may be due to an increase in self-
confidence and self-esteem as suggested by qualitative research (see Egbo, 2000 in 
Nigeria; Archer & Cottingham, 1997 in Bangladesh; Stromquist, 1997 in Brazil). The 
increased likelihood of owning a personal bank account, post the literacy programme, 
may be a more direct result of becoming literate and the women now being able to read, 
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fill out, and sign bank forms.  
However, the null effects on woman’s decision making power may be due to the strong 
patriarchal family and societal structures that exist in India, particularly in rural Uttar 
Pradesh. Other studies in Uttar Pradesh looking at the impact of formal education on 
female empowerment found similar results on decision making power of the woman 
within the household, while finding positive impacts on woman’s mobility (Bloom et 
al., 2001). In a comparative study between women in Uttar Pradesh and women in a less 
patriarchal Indian state, Tamil Nadu, Jejeebhoy and Sathar (2001) find that while 
primary schooling leads to female empowerment in Tamil Nadu, such relationship is 
absent in their Uttar Pradesh sample. Since women’s access to labour market in Uttar 
Pradesh is limited (Foster & Rosenzweig, 1996), it is unlikely that the programme could 
have increased women’s bargaining and decision making power. Additionally, due to 
low availability of information sources in rural (Thomas et al., 1991) and restrictive 
gender norms (Andrabi et al., 2012) settings, women are unlikely to have been able to 
increase their knowledge on household decision making domains, such as children’s 
health and education.  
The chapter also studied a limited form of spillover where the control group woman 
lives at the same location as a treatment group woman. I find suggestive evidence of 
positive spillovers, but I have low power to detect significance. I hypothesise that these 
spillovers may be a ‘role model’ (Beamen et al., 2012) effect where the aspirations of 
the control group women shift due to observing the change in behaviour of the 
treatment group women. This is good news for policy as even women with limited 
agency (who are not permitted by their household to join the literacy programme) may 
be influenced by the positive externality of the programme being offered in their 127  
Investigating the correlates of the programme take-up, I find high levels of take-up 
(self-reported) among the treatment group. 79 percent of the treatment group women 
take part in the programme and attended 77 percent of the instructional classes, on 
average. Women from backward and scheduled castes (the lower castes) were more 
likely to take up the literacy programme, indicative that such programmes encourage 
inclusivity of socially marginalised groups in India. However, such a programme may 
still miss out on the least empowered women, as the study finds that women who 
refused to participate in the programme (and in the randomisation process), are also 
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subject to restrictions on leaving the house freely.  
Despite the TA+ being a rather short programme, spanning only 56 days of instruction, 
the results in this study are encouraging and suggest that adult literacy programmes 
targeted at women can be a cost-effective way of improving women’s position in the 
society. While there are other large scale government interventions that focus on gender 
equity, each aims at a different aspect of empowerment. One such intervention, 
Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT) targeted at women has been shown to reduce inter-
generational gender-based inequity in human capital investment within the household 
(for an overview, see Rawlings & Rubio, 2005; Fiszbein & Schady, 2009, Kabeer & 
Waddington, 2015). However, the effect of such transfers on women’s own agency is 
mixed – while most document no effects on decision making in rural areas (Handa et 
al., 2009; de Brauw et al., 2014; Hidrobo et al., 2014), some find limited impacts 
(Attanasio & Lechene, 2002 for Oportunidaes) or substantial impacts in urban areas (de 
Brauw et al., 2014 for Bolsa Familia). Compared to this narrow focus and mixed 
findings of the impact of CCTs on female empowerment, coupled with the 
overwhelming evidence on increase in domestic abuse due to the increase in women’s 
income (Schuler et al.,1998; Angelucci, 2008), adult literacy programmes seem a more 
attractive policy route to improve women’s own agency.  
As developing countries such as India continue to roll out adult literacy programmes 
with the additional goal of achieving gender equality, it is crucial to contextualise the 
design of these programme. As seen in this study and elsewhere (Jejeebhoy & Sathar, 
2001), achieving female empowerment through literacy programmes in the patriarchal 
society of Uttar Pradesh may be different from achieving the same in less patriarchal 
societies. Literacy is a socially situated experience and the design of such programmes 
should bear in mind the implementation contexts. Given the impacts of adult literacy 
programmes on female empowerment, it is important to reflect how such programmes 
can be better designed to bolster these impacts – for instance, employing a woman to 
deliver the literacy instructional classes (see Beamen et al., 2012 on role-model effects).  
In finding positive impacts of female literacy programme, this study opens up exciting 
avenues for the evaluation of such programmes. There is a need for evaluation projects 
to include a wider range of measures to capture the change in self-esteem, aspirations, 
beliefs about the self and gender roles to understand how literacy translates into female 
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empowerment. Moreover, we need to push the frontier of the measurement of female 
empowerment to find more reliable measures that are appropriate for different contexts 




5. Conclusion to the thesis 
The thesis consists of three empirical chapters investigating questions of key importance 
to policy making in developing countries such as India. Here, I summarise the findings 
of each chapter, discuss their limitations, and possible avenues for future research. 
Chapter 2 (Do preschools add ‘value’? Evidence on achievement gaps from rural India) 
studied the impact of attending a preschool before starting primary school on cognitive, 
early language and numeracy skills. It additionally studied the heterogeneity in value-
added of preschools by their management type.  
Employing a lagged-score Value Added Model (VAM), the study found a positive and 
significant test score premium of attending a preschool before starting primary school. 
The entire effect was driven by children who attend private preschools. Children who 
attend public preschools before starting primary school do not have a significant 
advantage over children who start primary school with no preschool experience. On the 
contrary, children who attend private preschools prior to starting primary school have a 
test score premium of 0.33 SD units when compared with children in primary school 
with no preschool exposure.  
I conducted a series of robustness checks to assess if the lagged test score in the VAM is 
a sufficient proxy for child and parent motivation, and if the results are sensitive to test 
score construction or testing environment. I find the results remain qualitatively similar 
in magnitude and significant.  
A descriptive study of the preschool quality by management type showed that private 
preschools have lower student-teacher ratios, longer hours of operation and a focus on 
formal instructional style of teaching. On the other hand, public preschools conduct 
more play-based activities.  
In the backdrop of the new National Education Policy (Government of India, 2020) that 
emphasises the development of foundational literacy and numeracy in preschool years, 
this study provided evidence that the public preschools in India are a long way away 
from achieving the policy goal. 
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However, preschools should not narrowly focus on development of cognitive skills, 
early literacy and numeracy, as captured by the test score in this study. Empirical 
evidence shows that one of the main benefits of early childhood education lies in 
nurturing of a child’s non-cognitive or socio-emotional skills (see Barnett, 1995, 2011, 
for a review). In this light, there is a need to supplement the findings of this study with 
outcome measures on non-cognitive skills. The play-based activities used in public 
preschools may nurture soft-skills, and it would be incorrect to conclude that they have 
no effect on child development based only on the results of this study.  
Given that children start primary school at varying levels of learning, there is a need to 
push for more research on pedagogical innovations that deal with learning heterogeneity 
within the classroom, such as ‘Teaching at the Right Level’ developed by Pratham 
NGO (Banerjee et al., 2017; Banerji & Chavan, 2020).  
Chapter 3, co-authored with Dr. Annemie Maertens and Dr. Christopher Ksoll, (Intra-
household Efficiency in Extended Family Household: Evidence from rural India) 
studied the intra-household efficiency in the decision-making process in complex 
households. We define complex households as households where multiple generations 
and/or married siblings co-reside. We employed lab-in-the-field public goods 
experiment, which has been used extensively in experimental literature to study intra-
household efficiency (Munro, 2015). The public goods experiment is designed to 
uncover inefficiency which arises due to concealing of personal resources instead of 
contributing them to the household, with potentially larger shared benefits. 
Our study showed that spouses in extended households are less efficient than spouses in 
nuclear households, although in monetary terms the efficiency loss between spouses in 
extended households only amounted to 1.40 Rupees (approximately 3.5 percent of the 
daily wage at the time of the experiment). Within extended households, not all 
relationships were equally inefficient. Household members related by blood were less 
inefficient than members related by in-law status, the relationship between mother-in-
law and daughter-in-law displaying the highest level of inefficiency. We further 
supplement the experimental results with survey data on primary decision makers and 
qualitative interviews. We found that these inefficiencies within extended households 
exist due to multiple decision-makers and fragmented decision-making power, and the 




The findings in this study raise concern over using the traditional intra-household model 
that defines a household as comprised of the married couple and their unmarried 
children, in developing countries. The decision-making process is different in complex 
households, making it vital to come up with more appropriate intra-household models 
and better targeted and designed household-based policies. To this end, a long-term 
panel data documenting changes in household structure will prove useful.   
While a public goods experiment uncovers only a specific type of inefficiency, one 
which is related to hiding of extra income/resources, the qualitative interviews in our 
study also uncovered additional patterns and dimensions of inefficient behaviour, such 
as production inefficiencies (slacking off and other forms of free riding). Developing 
experiments or other empirical methods, perhaps building on Udry (1996), to unpack 
other dimensions of inefficiency within the extended households, is another fruitful 
avenue for future research.    
Chapter 4 (Female Adult Literacy Programme and Empowerment: Evidence from RCT 
in rural India) studied the impact of an adult female literacy programme (set up as an 
RCT) on a range of female empowerment measures – decision-making power within the 
household, freedom of movement and control over assets.  
The study found a significant and substantial increase in a woman’s ability to leave the 
house without having to seek permission, and an increase in the likelihood of the 
woman having a personal bank account. There was no significant impact on decision-
making power over daily household decisions. The increase in mobility could be due to 
the woman having to leave the house on a daily basis to attend the literacy classes. The 
increased likelihood of owning a personal bank account, however, is a more direct result 
of becoming literate and the women now able to read, fill out and sign bank forms. 
The study found high levels of programme take-up (79 percent among the treatment 
group) and that women from lower castes were more likely to take up the programme. 
The study explored a particular form of spillover that arises when the control group 
woman lives with a treatment group woman. It found suggestive evidence on the 
presence of positive spillovers on measures of freedom of movement but not on having 
a personal bank account, although there was not enough power to test for significance. 
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This positive externality may be because of ‘role model’ effects; the control group 
women feel empowered by observing the increased freedom of movement exhibited by 
the treated women.   
While finding positive impacts of the literacy programme, the study remains 
constrained in exploring the mechanisms due to unavailability of data.  There is a need 
for literacy programme evaluation projects to include a wider range of measures to 
capture the changes in self-esteem, beliefs about the self and gender roles, and 
aspirations.  
Additionally, while this study finds positive impacts on some measures of female 
empowerment as does another study based in India by Kandpal et al. (2012); a study by 
Banerji et al. (2017) finds no significant impacts of their maternal literacy programme 
on female empowerment measures. Given that this literature is sparsely populated, there 
is a need to generate more evidence in this area as national policies and international 
agendas continue to roll out adult literacy programmes. It may also be beneficial to push 
the frontier of the measurement of female empowerment (such as, experimental 
measures explored in Almas et al., 2018) to provide more robust outcome variables that 
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A. Appendix for Chapter 2 (Do preschools add 
‘value’? Evidence on achievement gaps from rural 
India) 
A.1.  School Readiness Inventory Test score construction 
Table A.1 lists the 24 items administered to the children in Rounds 1 and 2. The 
classification of each item as per the competency has been provided by the developers 
of the tool (the World Bank in conjunction with Centre for Early Childhood Education 
and Development, New Delhi). 
Table A.1. Description of test administered 














Given pictures of four apple trees, children were asked 
to point to the one with the least and most apples. 
1, 2 
Space Concept 
Given two illustrations of children and houses, 
children were asked to point to the one in which the 
child was behind the house.  
3 
Sequential thinking  
Children were shown illustrations of water filling up a 
bucket and were asked to determine the correct 
sequence for the pictures.  
4 
Classification  
Children were asked to classify six creatures as either 




Children were asked to match three numbers with 
pictures showing the same number of objects.  
8,9,10 
Picture Identification 




Children were asked to repeat and complete a 
pictorial pattern.  
18,19 
Relative comparisons 
Children were asked to point to a number (among 9, 

















Children were asked to raise their hands. Next, the 






Children were asked to identify the beginning sound 
of words and to match the two words with the same 
beginning sound.  
14,15,16,17 
Sentence making 
Children were asked to describe four photographs in 
complete sentences.  
20, 21, 22, 
23 
 
I used Item Response Theory (IRT) to assess the performance of each of the 24 items in 
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uncovering the latent ability parameter. The terminology ‘ability’ used in IRT is not the 
same as inherent ability, but only used to mean the skill or trait that the test intends to 
measure. Based on the observed probability of answering an item correctly in the data, 
the IRT estimates the difficulty and discrimination parameters for each item and hence, 
the latent ability for each individual. IRT models have been extensively used in the 
education literature, for example, in the construction of test score in international 
assessments such as TIMSS and PISA.  
 
I used both the one-parameter logistic (1-PL) model and two-parameter logistic (2-PL) 
model to assess the reliabilty the test score. The 2-PL model is given by the following 
functional form, also known as the Item Characteristic Curve (ICC) – 
 
Where the probability of an individual i with ability  to correctly answer a question q 
is given by two parameters – the difficulty parameter , and the discrimination 
parameter . The difference between 2-PL model and 1-PL model is that 1-PL model 
assumes that the discrimination parameter is constant across items, that is, .  
 
The discrimination parameter measures how well an item differentiates between high 
and low ability individuals. A positive discrimination parameter implies that higher 
ability individuals have a higher probability of answering the item correctly. A negative 
discrimination parameter would imply that a higher ability individual has a lower 
probability of answering the item correctly. Thus, in assessing the validity of an item, 
one would like the discrimination parameter (a) to be positive and high. Holding the 
discrimination parameter as constant across all items, as in the 1-PL model, implies that 
all ICCs have the same slope.  
 
The difficulty parameter tells us how difficult an item is. Ceniza and Cereno (2012) 
provide the interpretation of the values of the difficulty parameter (b): Very Easy = Less 
than -2, Easy = -0.50 to -2.00, Average = -0.49 to 0.49, Difficult = 0.50 to 2.00 and 
Very Difficult = Greater than 2.00. 
 
Using maximum likelihood estimator, I retrieve the difficulty and discrimination 
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parameters for each of the 24 items on the test. I ran the IRT models on the combined 
Round 1 and 2 data. Table A.2 presents the results of these parameters from 2-PL and 1-
PL model. First, the 2-PL model represents a better fit for the test as seen by the lower 
log likelihood value. However, even for the 1-PL model, the constant discrimination 
parameter is high and positive at 1.91. From the 2-PL model, I find that all values of 
discrimination parameter are positive. These results assure me that the test was reliable 
in differentiating between low and high ability children. Looking at the difficulty 
parameter, most items ranged from average to difficult levels. However, items 22 and 
23 have very high values of difficulty parameter and low values on discrimination. 
Values higher than 3 on the difficulty parameter are mostly seen as suspicious and 
invalid. Hence, I drop items 22 and 23 from the test score construction. 
Table A.2. Results of IRT 2 parameter and 1 parameter logistic model 
  2-PL 1-PL 
Log likelihood -157713  -165719  
Item No. Discrimination Difficulty Discrimination Difficulty 
1 1.55 0.39 1.91 0.34 
2 1.57 0.34 1.91 -0.30 
3 1.78 -1.16 1.91 1.11 
4 1.69 0.56 1.91 0.53 
5 1.30 1.19 1.91 0.97 
6 2.08 1.23 1.91 1.28 
7 1.39 0.34 1.91 -0.27 
8 5.76 0.71 1.91 0.96 
9 5.00 0.61 1.91 0.79 
10 6.14 0.67 1.91 0.90 
11 1.86 0.55 1.91 0.54 
12 1.76 0.81 1.91 0.77 
13 2.37 0.76 1.91 0.85 
14 3.31 1.38 1.91 1.74 
15 3.60 1.41 1.91 1.82 
16 3.46 1.40 1.91 1.79 
17 2.62 1.66 1.91 1.92 
18 2.30 0.45 1.91 0.51 
19 1.64 1.52 1.91 1.42 
20 1.72 0.58 1.91 0.55 
21 2.50 0.75 1.91 0.86 
22 0.12 17.79 1.91 1.64 
23 0.38 7.37 1.91 2.08 
24 3.04 0.96 1.91 1.16 
 
In Figure A.1, I graph the ICCs and the observed probability of answering an item 
correctly, to visually check the fit provided by the IRT 2-PL model. As is evident, 
suspiciously low proportion of children answered items 22 and 23 correctly, which 




Figure A.1. Item characteristics curves and observed probability 
 
For simplicity, I used the standardised sum of scores over 22 items in my main analyses. 
In Figure A.2, I present the latent ability parameter using the IRT 2-PL model and how 
it compares with the standardised test scores used in the main paper. The latent ability 
parameter was also standardised to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. As we 
can see, the two distributions are similar. The current IRT score displays a bimodal 
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In Table A.3, I re-run the analysis from Table 2.9 using IRT constructed scores. The 
estimates using IRT scores are qualitatively similar to those using the standardised score 




Table A.3. Preschool VAM estimates using IRT scores 





VAM Lagged score VAM 
              
Lagged - IRT score 0 0 1 1 0.253*** 0.208*** 
     (0.017) (0.016) 
Preschool 0.643*** 0.510*** 0.164 0.146 0.522*** 0.434*** 
 (0.088) (0.091) (0.103) (0.104) (0.085) (0.089) 
Primary school 0.610*** 0.589*** 0.202* 0.215** 0.507*** 0.511*** 
 (0.092) (0.095) (0.108) (0.109) (0.089) (0.092) 
Preschool and school 0.812*** 0.729***  0.325*** 0.688*** 0.645*** 
 (0.090) (0.093)  (0.107) (0.087) (0.091) 
Female  -0.095***  0.017  -0.072*** 
  (0.019)  (0.024)  (0.018) 
Age in months  0.026***  0.000  0.020*** 
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
Years of education - Father  0.014***  0.007**  0.012*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Years of education - Mother  0.023***  0.004  0.019*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Both parents work outside of home  -0.102***  -0.005  -0.082*** 
  (0.033)  (0.040)  (0.031) 
Muslim (Base category: Hindu)  -0.143***  -0.019  -0.117** 
  (0.046)  (0.065)  (0.046) 
Scheduled caste  -0.173***  -0.004  -0.138*** 
  (0.043)  (0.056)  (0.041) 
Scheduled tribe  -0.171***  0.102  -0.114** 
  (0.060)  (0.072)  (0.057) 
Backward castes  -0.060*  0.080*  -0.031 
  (0.035)  (0.045)  (0.034) 
Wealth index  0.034**  0.013  0.030* 
  (0.015)  (0.020)  (0.015) 
Ownership of durables index  0.072***  0.018  0.060*** 
  (0.014)  (0.019)  (0.014) 
HH has children's reading material  0.041  -0.052  0.021 
  (0.027)  (0.036)  (0.026) 
HH has toys/games for child  0.045*  -0.020  0.032 
  (0.027)  (0.036)  (0.026) 
Constant 0.130 -1.412*** 0.599*** 0.517* 0.249*** -1.011*** 
 (0.086) (0.232) (0.100) (0.277) (0.083) (0.220) 
       
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,124 8,124 8,124 8,124 8,124 8,124 
R-squared 0.231 0.288 0.224 0.227 0.286 0.323 
All specifications control for village fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. The variables 
of interest are preschool (attending preschool in Rounds 1 and 2 and not yet started primary school), primary 
school (attending primary schools in Rounds 1 and 2 with no preschool exposure), attending preschool before 
starting primary school. The base category is not enrolled. The child’s age is in months at the time of testing in 
Round 2. Both parents work outside of home is a dummy variable which is 0 when either one of the parent stays at 
home. The base category for scheduled caste, scheduled tribe and backward castes is general caste. The wealth 
index comprises of household building material, having a toilet, piped water, electricity and using higher grade 
fuel for cooking. The durables index comprises of ownership of TV, fan, fridge, cycle, scooter, phone.*** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
In Table A.4, I re-run the analysis from Table 2.10 using IRT constructed scores. The 
estimates using IRT scores are qualitatively similar to those using the standardised score 
in the main paper.  
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Table A.4. Private preschool VAM estimates using IRT scores 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Contemporaneous 
VAM Perfect persistence VAM Lagged score VAM 
Lagged - IRT score 0 0 1 1 0.207*** 0.184*** 
     (0.016) (0.016) 
Private preschool 0.912*** 0.771*** 0.295*** 0.297*** 0.784*** 0.684*** 
 (0.086) (0.089) (0.105) (0.106) (0.084) (0.088) 
Public preschool 0.122 0.132 -0.065 -0.060 0.083 0.097 
 (0.086) (0.089) (0.104) (0.105) (0.084) (0.087) 
Primary school 0.656*** 0.627*** 0.215** 0.229** 0.565*** 0.554*** 
 (0.090) (0.092) (0.108) (0.108) (0.087) (0.090) 
Private preschool and school 1.109*** 0.991*** 0.296*** 0.305*** 0.940*** 0.865*** 
 (0.094) (0.098) (0.113) (0.113) (0.090) (0.094) 
Public preschool and school 0.656*** 0.625*** 0.341*** 0.356*** 0.591*** 0.576*** 
 (0.088) (0.090) (0.107) (0.108) (0.087) (0.089) 
Female  -0.058***  0.034  -0.042** 
  (0.019)  (0.024)  (0.018) 
Age in months  0.021***  -0.002  0.017*** 
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
Years of education - Father  0.010***  0.005  0.009*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Years of education - Mother  0.018***  0.002  0.015*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Both parents work outside of home  -0.076**  0.007  -0.061** 
  (0.031)  (0.040)  (0.030) 
Muslim (Base category: Hindu)  -0.086*  0.009  -0.068 
  (0.045)  (0.065)  (0.045) 
Scheduled caste  -0.080*  0.032  -0.059 
  (0.042)  (0.057)  (0.041) 
Scheduled tribe  -0.101*  0.139*  -0.057 
  (0.057)  (0.072)  (0.055) 
Backward castes  -0.031  0.093**  -0.008 
  (0.033)  (0.045)  (0.032) 
Wealth index  0.006  -0.000  0.005 
  (0.015)  (0.019)  (0.014) 
Ownership of durables index  0.051***  0.006  0.043*** 
  (0.014)  (0.019)  (0.014) 
HH has children's reading material  0.026  -0.055  0.012 
  (0.027)  (0.037)  (0.026) 
HH has toys/games for child  0.022  -0.031  0.012 
  (0.026)  (0.036)  (0.025) 
Constant 0.216*** -1.126*** 0.632*** 0.665** 0.302*** -0.796*** 
 (0.081) (0.222) (0.100) (0.274) (0.080) (0.212) 
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,124 8,124 8,124 8,124 8,124 8,124 
R-squared 0.306 0.330 0.233 0.235 0.341 0.357 
Private preschool=School F-stat 30.81*** 10.44*** 2.190 1.520 24.27*** 8.982*** 
Public preschool=School F-stat 92.32*** 84.06*** 21.57*** 22.63*** 84.83*** 78.55*** 
Private preschool=Public preschool 
F-stat 354.1*** 230.3*** 65.28*** 61.89*** 304.3*** 208.5*** 
Private preschool and 
school=School F-stat 58.53*** 37.80*** 1.439 1.277 43.81*** 29.51*** 
Public preschool and 
school=School F-stat 2.09e-06 0.00126 3.779* 3.893** 0.286 0.212 
All specifications control for village fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. The variables of 
interest are private preschool (attending preschool in Rounds 1 and 2 and not yet started primary school), public 
preschool (attending preschool in Rounds 1 and 2 and not yet started primary school), primary school (attending 
primary schools in Rounds 1 and 2 with no preschool exposure), attending  private preschool before starting 
primary school, and attending public preschool before starting primary school. The base category is not enrolled. 
The child’s age is in months at the time of testing in Round 2. Both parents work outside of home is a dummy 
variable which is 0 when either one of the parent stays at home. The base category for scheduled caste, scheduled 
tribe and backward castes is general caste. The wealth index comprises of household building material, having a 
toilet, piped water, electricity and using higher grade fuel for cooking. The durables index comprises of ownership 
of TV, fan, fridge, cycle, scooter, phone.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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A.2. VAM excluding ‘not enrolled’  
Since only 100 children are not enrolled and are all located in Rajasthan, I re-run the 
lagged score VAM excluding the not enrolled children and use children who attended 
primary school with no exposure to preschool as the base category. In Table A.5, I first 
report the lagged score VAM estimates on the full sample without controls (Column 1) 
and with controls (Column 2). In Columns 3 and 4, I report the lagged score VAM 
estimates on sample excluding the 100 not enrolled children. The coefficients on the 
variables of interest change marginally (by approximately 0.001 SD unit) and remain 
qualitatively similar.  
 
Similarly, in Table A.6, I report the lagged score VAM estimates by management type 
excluding the not enrolled children. Columns 1 and 2 run the same lagged score VAM 
as reported in Table 2.10. The only difference is that I use primary school with no 
preschool exposure as the base category, instead of not enrolled. Columns 3 and 4 
report the estimates on the sample excluding the 100 not enrolled children. The 




Table A.5. Preschool VAM estimates excluding never enrolled 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Current Score Current Score Current Score Current Score 
          
Lagged - Standardised score 0.276*** 0.225*** 0.275*** 0.224*** 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) 
Not enrolled -0.520*** -0.526***   
(Base category: Primary school only) (0.083) (0.086)   
Preschool 0.009 -0.088** 0.012 -0.087** 
(Base category: Primary school only) (0.046) (0.043) (0.046) (0.043) 
Preschool and school 0.190*** 0.140*** 0.190*** 0.139*** 
(Base category: Primary school only) (0.048) (0.046) (0.048) (0.046) 
Female  -0.080***  -0.081*** 
  (0.019)  (0.019) 
Age in months  0.021***  0.021*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Years of education - Father  0.012***  0.013*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Years of education - Mother  0.020***  0.019*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Both parents work outside of home  -0.080**  -0.081** 
  (0.036)  (0.036) 
Muslim (Base category: Hindu)  -0.126***  -0.133*** 
  (0.047)  (0.048) 
Scheduled caste  -0.159***  -0.162*** 
  (0.043)  (0.043) 
Scheduled tribe  -0.122**  -0.127** 
  (0.057)  (0.058) 
Backward castes  -0.040  -0.045 
  (0.035)  (0.035) 
Wealth index  0.034**  0.032** 
  (0.016)  (0.016) 
Ownership of durables index  0.068***  0.072*** 
  (0.015)  (0.015) 
HH has children's reading material  0.023  0.023 
  (0.027)  (0.028) 
HH has toys/games for child  0.026  0.025 
  (0.027)  (0.027) 
Constant -0.043 -1.306*** -0.041 -1.311*** 
 (0.040) (0.226) (0.040) (0.227) 
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Observations 8,124 8,124 8,024 8,024 
R-squared 0.312 0.348 0.304 0.342 
Preschool=Mixed F-stat 25.38*** 44.21*** 24.65*** 43.54*** 
All specifications control for village fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. The 
variables of interest are not enrolled, preschool (attending preschool in Rounds 1 and 2 and not yet started 
primary school), attending preschool before starting primary school. The base category is attending primary 
school with no preschool exposure. The child’s age is in months at the time of testing in Round 2. Both parents 
work outside of home is a dummy variable which is 0 when either one of the parent stays at home. The base 
category for scheduled caste, scheduled tribe and backward castes is general caste. The wealth index 
comprises of household building material, having a toilet, piped water, electricity and using higher grade fuel 
for cooking. The durables index comprises of ownership of TV, fan, fridge, cycle, scooter, phone.*** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.6. Private preschool VAM estimates excluding not enrolled 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Current Score Current Score Current Score Current Score 
          
Lagged - Standardised score 0.224*** 0.198*** 0.224*** 0.197*** 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
Not enrolled -0.581*** -0.571***   
(Base category: Primary school only) (0.081) (0.084)   
Private preschool 0.225*** 0.129*** 0.228*** 0.130*** 
(Base category: Primary school only) (0.045) (0.043) (0.045) (0.043) 
Public preschool -0.513*** -0.488*** -0.510*** -0.486*** 
(Base category: Primary school only) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052) (0.051) 
Private preschool and school 0.400*** 0.332*** 0.400*** 0.331*** 
(Base category: Primary school only) (0.058) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059) 
Public preschool and school 0.024 0.019 0.024 0.019 
(Base category: Primary school only) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.047) 
Female  -0.048***  -0.049*** 
  (0.019)  (0.019) 
Age in months  0.017***  0.017*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Years of education - Father  0.009***  0.010*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Years of education - Mother  0.015***  0.015*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Both parents work outside of home  -0.058*  -0.059* 
  (0.035)  (0.035) 
Muslim (Base category: Hindu)  -0.075  -0.082* 
  (0.046)  (0.047) 
Scheduled caste  -0.076*  -0.079* 
  (0.042)  (0.042) 
Scheduled tribe  -0.062  -0.067 
  (0.055)  (0.055) 
Backward castes  -0.017  -0.021 
  (0.034)  (0.034) 
Wealth index  0.008  0.006 
  (0.015)  (0.015) 
Ownership of durables index  0.050***  0.053*** 
  (0.014)  (0.015) 
HH has children's reading material  0.013  0.012 
  (0.027)  (0.028) 
HH has toys/games for child  0.005  0.004 
  (0.026)  (0.026) 
Constant 0.073* -1.035*** 0.076** -1.039*** 
 (0.038) (0.220) (0.038) (0.221) 
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Observations 8,124 8,124 8,024 8,024 
R-squared 0.367 0.382 0.360 0.376 
Private preschool=Public preschool F-stat 317.8*** 210.8*** 316.7*** 208.5*** 
All specifications control for village fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. The variables of 
interest are not enrolled, private preschool (attending preschool in Rounds 1 and 2 and not yet started primary school), 
public preschool (attending preschool in Rounds 1 and 2 and not yet started primary school), attending  private 
preschool before starting primary school, and attending public preschool before starting primary school. The base 
category is primary school with no preschool exposure. The child’s age is in months at the time of testing in Round 2. 
Both parents work outside of home is a dummy variable which is 0 when either one of the parent stays at home. The 
base category for scheduled caste, scheduled tribe and backward castes is general caste. The wealth index comprises 
of household building material, having a toilet, piped water, electricity and using higher grade fuel for cooking. The 
durables index comprises of ownership of TV, fan, fridge, cycle, scooter, phone.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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A.3. Preschool survey 
The data presented in Section 2.5.3 comes from the preschool survey conducted in 
Round 1. Not all preschools would have been surveyed, depending on whether these 
were open at the time of the visit and granted access to the investigators to conduct a 
survey. Private preschools may be more inclined to not grant such access, and the ones 
that did, could very well be ‘better’ quality. Additionally, if a preschool was located 
outside the village, the facility would not have been surveyed. This is more likely to be 
a private preschool which would be located outside a village in order to cater to the 
catchment area of several nearby villages.  
 
In Table A.7, I present the information on number of preschools surveyed by state. As 
suspected, on average, the study surveyed three public preschools per village and only 
one private preschool per village. In Assam, on average, four public preschools were 
surveyed per village, the highest among the three states. This is expected as the current 
funding guidelines for North-eastern states (of which Assam is one) is that the Central 
government would contribute to 90 percent of the construction and operational costs66. 
Compare this to the guideline for Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh where the Central 
government contributes to 75 percent of the construction cost and 60 percent of the 
operational cost. 
 
While, one would assume that the number of private facilities to be lower than public 
facilities in each village, there is an element of bias introduced by the survey itself. For 
instance, the data shows that one village in Assam and four villages in Rajasthan had no 
public preschool. This cannot be true as the household survey clearly indicates that 
children in these village were going to a public preschool. Additionally, the government 
mandate is to have at least one public preschool in an area of 800 children under the age 
of six years, or a ‘mini’ public preschool in an area of 150-300 children under the age of 
six years67. 
 








Assam, and 64 villages in Andhra Pradesh have no private preschool. However, from 
the household survey, I find that in all the 10 villages in Rajasthan, in 45 out of the 68 
village in Assam, and in 58 out of the 64 villages in Andhra Pradesh, children are 
enrolled in private preschools. Thus, the preschool survey was neither a census of the 
preschool facilities in the village, nor representative of these facilities.  
Table A.7. Preschools surveyed per village  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Rajasthan Assam Andhra Pradesh Total 
Average number of preschools surveyed per 
village 4.136 4.406 3.163 3.902 
 [1.627] [2.499] [1.266] [1.930] 
Average number of public preschool surveyed 
per village 2.272 3.990 2.745 2.983 
 [1.021] [2.231] [1.169] [1.711] 
Average number of private preschool surveyed 
per village 1.864 0.417 0.418 0.919 
 [1.221] [0.706] [0.608] [1.127] 
Village has at least 1 public preschool surveyed 0.961 0.990 1.000 0.983 
 [0.194] [0.102] [0.000] [0.129] 
Village has at least 1 private preschool surveyed 0.903 0.323 0.357 0.535 
 [0.298] [0.470] [0.482] [0.500] 




A.4. Lagged test score proxy for motivation  
Table A.8. Regression of lagged test score on controls, child motivation and parent’s 
motivation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Lagged score Lagged score Lagged score Lagged score 
          
Reads story to child 0.118*** 0.071* 0.062 0.029 
 (0.040) (0.043) (0.038) (0.041) 
Helps with learning tasks 0.293*** 0.186*** 0.183*** 0.106*** 
 (0.032) (0.035) (0.031) (0.035) 
Talk to staff about child's learning progress  0.108***  0.068** 
  (0.032)  (0.031) 
Wants child to read/write  0.100***  0.095*** 
  (0.032)  (0.031) 
Child talks about preschool always  0.193***  0.165*** 
  (0.040)  (0.040) 
Child talks about preschool sometimes  0.120***  0.108*** 
  (0.031)  (0.030) 
Child likes going to preschool  0.153***  0.141*** 
  (0.032)  (0.031) 
Female   -0.105*** -0.097*** 
   (0.020) (0.021) 
Age in months   0.024*** 0.023*** 
   (0.003) (0.003) 
Years of education - Father   0.005** 0.005* 
   (0.002) (0.003) 
Years of education - Mother   0.015*** 0.014*** 
   (0.003) (0.003) 
Both parents work outside of home   -0.087** -0.080** 
   (0.037) (0.037) 
Muslim (Base category: Hindu)   -0.129*** -0.118** 
   (0.048) (0.053) 
Scheduled caste   -0.167*** -0.172*** 
   (0.050) (0.054) 
Scheduled tribe   -0.256*** -0.222*** 
   (0.059) (0.063) 
Backward castes   -0.137*** -0.128*** 
   (0.041) (0.044) 
Wealth index   0.023 0.022 
   (0.017) (0.017) 
Ownership of durables index   0.056*** 0.052*** 
   (0.014) (0.016) 
HH has children's reading material   0.069** 0.025 
   (0.031) (0.034) 
HH has toys/games for child   0.054* 0.036 
   (0.032) (0.034) 
Constant -0.200*** -0.398*** -1.584*** -1.663*** 
 (0.018) (0.032) (0.221) (0.231)      
Sample Full  Preschool Full Preschool 
Controls No No Yes Yes 
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,124 7,263 8,124 7,263 
R-squared 0.290 0.300 0.318 0.324 
All specifications control for village fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. *** p<0.01, 





A.5. Results for sub-sample without mixed (preschool and primary 
school) category – only non-switchers 
Table A.9. Lagged score VAM estimates excluding mixed category sub-sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Current score Current score Current score Current score 
          
Lagged - Standardised score 0.266*** 0.212*** 0.213*** 0.186*** 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) 
Preschool 0.524*** 0.435***   
 (0.082) (0.086)   
Primary school 0.482*** 0.495*** 0.549*** 0.542*** 
 (0.087) (0.091) (0.085) (0.088) 
Private preschool   0.810*** 0.704*** 
   (0.082) (0.085) 
Public preschool   0.073 0.089 
   (0.079) (0.083) 
Female  -0.083***  -0.049** 
  (0.021)  (0.021) 
Age in months  0.020***  0.017*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Years of education - Father  0.015***  0.011*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Years of education - Mother  0.018***  0.014*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Both parents work outside of home  -0.079*  -0.058 
  (0.040)  (0.039) 
Muslim (Base category: Hindu)  -0.120**  -0.061 
  (0.058)  (0.058) 
Scheduled caste  -0.183***  -0.100** 
  (0.049)  (0.049) 
Scheduled tribe  -0.080  -0.011 
  (0.066)  (0.063) 
Backward castes  -0.050  -0.025 
  (0.039)  (0.038) 
Wealth index  0.039**  0.009 
  (0.017)  (0.016) 
Ownership of durables index  0.071***  0.047*** 
  (0.017)  (0.017) 
HH has children's reading material  0.022  0.020 
  (0.031)  (0.031) 
HH has toys/games for child  0.048  0.028 
  (0.030)  (0.029) 
Constant -0.544*** -1.775*** -0.474*** -1.552*** 
 (0.079) (0.260) (0.076) (0.249) 
Controls added No Yes No Yes 
Sample No mixed  No mixed  No mixed  No mixed  
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,263 6,263 6,263 6,263 
R-squared 0.341 0.380 0.401 0.417 
Preschool=School F-stat 0.729 1.748   
Private preschool=School F-stat   28.45*** 12.04*** 
Public preschool=School F-stat   74.52*** 70.30*** 
Private preschool=Public preschool F-stat     300.5*** 193.3*** 
This table reports the results of Table 2.9 and Table 2.10 excluding the children who switch from preschool to 
primary school between Rounds 1 and 2. All specifications control for village fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered at the village level. The variables of interest are private preschool (attending preschool in Rounds 1 and 2 
and not yet started primary school), public preschool (attending preschool in Rounds 1 and 2 and not yet started 
primary school), and primary school with no preschool exposure. The base category is not enrolled. The child’s 
age is in months at the time of testing in Round 2. Both parents work outside of home is a dummy variable which 
is 0 when either one of the parent stays at home. The base category for scheduled caste, scheduled tribe and 
backward castes is general caste. The wealth index comprises of household building material, having a toilet, piped 
water, electricity and using higher grade fuel for cooking. The durables index comprises of ownership of TV, fan, 




A.6. A discussion of choice  
I run a multinomial logit model on the choice of educational participation. The 
categories of participation are – never enrolled, going to a primary school only, going to 
a public preschool only, going to a private preschool only, going to a public preschool 
with primary school, and going to a private preschool with primary school. The model 
includes full set of child and household level controls available for the entire sample. It 
includes state dummies (base category being Rajasthan) to capture the difference in 
educational norms and trends by state (see Section 2.3.3).  
 
In Table A.10, I report the probability of selecting a participation category for each 
covariate, instead of the log odds ratio or relative risk ratio. Both, odds ratio and relative 
risk ratio, are conditional on the base category, making interpretations between 
categories difficult. For direct comparisons, I present the average marginal effect of 
covariates on each participation category.  
 
The results confirm the patterns that emerged from the descriptive statistics reported in 
Section 2.3.5. Girls, Muslims, and children from socially disadvantaged groups (lower 
caste categories) are less likely to attend a private preschool. Older children are more 
likely to be in primary school or to have switched from preschool to primary school. 
Older children are also more likely to be in a public preschool.  
 
Parent’s education, wealth index and consumer durable index are positively associated 
with private preschool attendance. If both parents are employed outside the household, 
the child is more likely to attend a public preschool and less likely to attend a private 
preschool.  
 
Households having reading material at home is negatively associated with public 
preschool attendance and positively with primary school attendance. Parents are also 
more likely to help the child with learning tasks at home if the child attends private 
preschool.  
 
Children in Assam and Andhra Pradesh are less likely to attend primary school than 
children in Rajasthan. Children in Assam are more likely to attend public preschools, 
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while in Andhra Pradesh, they are more likely to attend private preschools.  
Table A.10. Average marginal effects on educational participation estimated from 
multinomial logit model 
















              
Female 0.008 0.012* 0.025*** -0.059*** 0.022*** -0.007 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.004) 
Age in months -0.001 0.002*** -0.009*** -0.001 0.005*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Years of education - Father -0.001** 0.000 -0.003*** 0.006*** -0.003*** 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Years of education - Mother 0.002* -0.002 -0.008*** 0.012*** -0.004*** 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Both parents work outside of 
home 0.002 0.000 0.042*** -0.064*** 0.026** -0.005 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011) 
Muslim (Base category: 
Hindu) 0.010 0.025*** 0.095*** -0.118*** 0.026*** -0.037*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Scheduled caste -0.009 0.033*** 0.091*** -0.132*** 0.055*** -0.039*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.009) 
Scheduled tribe -0.009 0.031** 0.070*** -0.101*** 0.018 -0.010 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.017) (0.015) (0.018) (0.009) 
Backward castes 0.004 0.002 0.032*** -0.024** 0.006 -0.021*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.006) 
Wealth index 0.003 -0.018*** -0.039*** 0.060*** -0.011** 0.005 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) 
Ownership of durables index -0.003 -0.011*** -0.009 0.031*** 0.002 -0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) 
HH has children's reading 
material -0.028*** 0.037*** -0.029*** -0.004 -0.011 0.035*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) 
HH has toys/games for child 0.009 0.010 -0.050*** 0.006 0.010 0.014*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.005) 
Reads story to child 0.001 -0.024** 0.013 -0.004 0.018* -0.004 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.007) 
Helps with learning tasks -0.021** -0.015** -0.036*** 0.043*** -0.021** 0.049*** 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.007) 
Assam 0.031*** -0.158*** 0.577*** -0.194*** -0.103*** -0.153*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) 
Andhra Pradesh -0.007 -0.087*** 0.002 0.078*** 0.106*** -0.092*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.020) (0.015) (0.012) 
       
Observations 9,121 9,121 9,121 9,121 9,121 9,121 
The table reports the marginal effects post running a multinomial logistic regression on the educational participation 
categories. Standard errors were bootstrapped and clustered at the village level. The child’s age is in months at the 
time of testing in Round 2. Both parents work outside of home is a dummy variable which is 0 when either one of the 
parent stays at home. The base category for scheduled caste, scheduled tribe and backward castes is general caste. The 
wealth index comprises of household building material, having a toilet, piped water, electricity and using higher grade 
fuel for cooking. The durables index comprises of ownership of TV, fan, fridge, cycle, scooter, phone.*** p<0.01, ** 




A.7. Robustness check – excluding zeroes and not enrolled 
Table A.11. VAM estimates excluding children scoring zero in Round 1 and not 
enrolled  
  (3) (4) (7) (8) 
 Current Score Current Score Current Score Current Score 
          
Lagged - Standardised score 0.224*** 0.239*** 0.197*** 0.209*** 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) 
Private preschool   0.130*** 0.140*** 
(Base category: Primary school only)   (0.043) (0.048) 
Public preschool   -0.486*** -0.477*** 
(Base category: Primary school only)   (0.051) (0.056) 
Private preschool and school   0.331*** 0.330*** 
(Base category: Primary school only)   (0.059) (0.062) 
Public preschool and school   0.019 0.020 
(Base category: Primary school only)   (0.047) (0.051) 
Preschool -0.087** -0.066   
(Base category: Primary school only) (0.043) (0.047)   
Preschool and school 0.139*** 0.148***   
(Base category: Primary school only) (0.046) (0.050)   














zero on lagged 
score 
Controls added Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,024 7,091 8,024 7,091 
R-squared 0.342 0.342 0.376 0.378 
This table presents the results of Table 2.9 (Column 1) and Table 2.10 (Column 3) for sub-sample of children 
excluding not enrolled. In Columns 2 and 4, it re-runs the same specifications for the sub-sample of children 
excluding children who scored 0 on the tests in Round 1. All specifications control for village fixed effects and 
child and household level controls as in Table 2. 9. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. The 
variables of interest are private preschool (attending preschool in Rounds 1 and 2 and not yet started primary 
school), public preschool (attending preschool in Rounds 1 and 2 and not yet started primary school), attending  
private preschool before starting primary school, and attending public preschool before starting primary school. 





B. Appendix for Chapter 3 (Intra-household 
Efficiency in Extended Family Households: 
Evidence from rural India) 
Table B.1. Characteristics of omitted and experiment extended household sample 





Sample Total t-test 
Selected illiterate woman's current age 41.510 38.71 40.154 2.8 
 [10.229] [10.616] [10.389]  
Selected woman's husband's age 44.881 41.68 42.903 3.201 
 [10.402] [10.360] [10.206]  
Number of years married 27.500 23.47 25.220 4.03 
 [11.331] [11.94] [11.642]  
Husband's education in years 6.024 6.83 6.592 -0.806 
 [4.937] [4.689] [4.720]  
Backward caste 0.347 0.38 0.386 -0.033 
 [0.481] [0.487] [0.488]  
Scheduled Caste 0.388 0.44 0.423 -0.052 
 [0.492] [0.498] [0.495]  
PPIscore 27.714 24.98 25.702 2.734 
 [10.368] [10.95] [10.793]  
Number of household members 8.490 9.838 9.249 -1.348 
 [3.916] [4.352] [3.970]  
Number of adult male household members 2.673 2.865 2.826 -0.192 
 [1.231] [1.404] [1.370]  
Number of adult female household members 2.490 2.708 2.664 -0.218 
 [0.960] [1.087] [1.064]  
Number of migrant members 1.939 1.630 1.693 0.309 
 [2.096] [2.098] [2.097]  
Number of adult male migrant members 1.184 1.203 1.199 -0.019 
 [1.014] [1.191] [1.155]  
Number of adult female migrant members 0.224 0.167 0.178 0.058 
 [0.468] [0.461] [0.462]  
Sample size 37 204 241   
This table presents the mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of the omitted sample for extended 
households where no public goods experiment could be conducted, the experiment sample for extended 
households where at least one experiment was conducted, and the full extended household sample. Column 4 
presents the difference between omitted and experiment sample and reports the results of the t-test of 
difference. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. PPI score is Progress out of Poverty Index ranging from 0 to 100. 
Base category for Backward Caste and Scheduled Caste is General category. Number of household members 
includes migrant labour in the household. Migrant member in the survey was defined as any member who has 





Table B.2. Characteristics of omitted and experiment nuclear household sample 





Sample Total t-test 
Selected illiterate woman's current age 37.036 38.76 37.623 -1.724 
 [8.513] [8.768] [8.774]  
Selected woman's husband's age 39.589 41.95 40.404 -2.361 
 [8.800] [8.874] [9.247]  
Number of years married 21.778 23.333 22.445 -1.555 
 [9.326] [8.902] [9.164]  
Husband's education in years 6.356 4.6 5.654 1.756* 
 [4.620] [4.492] [4.674]  
Backward caste 0.329 0.313 0.322 0.016 
 [0.473] [0.467] [0.469]  
Scheduled Caste 0.565 0.642 0.599 -0.077 
 [0.499] [0.483] [0.492]  
PPIscore 24.153 25.55 24.841 -1.397 
 [10.203] [10.43] [10.253]  
Number of household members 5.212 5.030 5.132 0.182 
 [1.582] [1.714] [1.638]  
Number of adult male household members 1.212 1.343 1.270 -0.132 
 [0.709] [0.641] [0.681]  
Number of adult female household members 1.176 1.239 1.204 -0.062 
 [0.467] [0.495] [0.479]  
Number of migrant members 0.776 0.463 0.638 0.314*** 
 [0.679] [0.659] [0.686]  
Number of adult male migrant members 0.706 0.403 0.572 0.303*** 
 [0.633] [0.605] [0.637]  
Number of adult female migrant members 0.000 0.000 0.000 N/A 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  
Sample size 90 62 152   
This table presents the mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of the omitted sample for nuclear 
households where no public goods experiment could be conducted, the experiment sample for nuclear 
households where at least one experiment was conducted, and the full extended household sample. Column 4 
presents the difference between omitted and experiment sample and reports the results of the t-test of 
difference. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. PPI score is Progress out of Poverty Index ranging from 0 to 100. 
Base category for Backward Caste and Scheduled Caste is General category. Number of household members 
includes migrant labour in the household. Migrant member in the survey was defined as any member who 
has been away from the household for at least 6 months but intends to return. It may not capture shorter-term 
migration. The number of adult female migrants is 0 as in a nuclear household, the selected woman would be 
the only adult female. Her unmarried daughter could also be an adult member, but given the low rate of 




Table B.3. Reason for not playing spousal experiment 
  Extended Nuclear Overall 
Spousal experiment implemented 111 62 173 
Spousal experiment not implemented 130 90 220 
Reasons for no spousal experiment  
Selected woman widowed 17 19 36 
Husband is migrant labour 68 58 126 
This table reports the reason inferred from household survey for not playing the spousal 
experiment in a household. Migrant member in the survey was defined as any member who 
has been away from the household for at least 6 months but intends to return. It may not 
capture shorter-term migration.  












does not exist 
Eligible 
participant is a 
migrant 
Woman and another male 241 86 47 50 
Woman and another female 241 124 41 8 
Husband and another male 241 38 62 90 
Husband and another female 241 52 54 76 
The other male and other female 241 63 65 50 
Total  1205 363 269 274 
This table reports the reason inferred from household survey for not playing the non-spousal experiment in 
extended households. An eligible participant does not exist if 1) the husband is dead and/or 2) there is no 
adult married male member and/or 3) there is no adult married female member. Migrant member in the 
survey was defined as any member who has been away from the household for at least 6 months but intends 




Table B.5. Descriptive statistics for full baseline sample by household structure 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Total Extended Nuclear t-test 
Selected woman's current age 39.237 40.154 37.623 2.531** 
 [9.918] [10.389] [8.774]  
Selected woman's husband's age 42.003 42.903 40.404 2.498** 
 [9.970] [10.206] [9.247]  
Number of years married 24.232 25.220 22.445 2.775** 
 [10.913] [11.642] [9.164]  
Husband's education in years 6.209 6.592 5.654 0.937* 
 [4.723] [4.720] [4.674]  
Backward caste 0.363 0.386 0.322 0.064 
 [0.481] [0.488] [0.469]  
Scheduled Caste 0.49 0.423 0.599 -0.175*** 
 [0.501] [0.495] [0.492]  
PPI score 25.368 25.702 24.841 0.861 
 [10.581] [10.793] [10.253]  
Number of household members 7.656 9.249 5.132 4.117*** 
 [3.836] [3.970] [1.638]  
Sample size 393 241 152   
This table presents the mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of the full baseline sample (including 
where no experiments were conducted) by household structure. Column 4 presents the difference between 
extended and nuclear sample and reports the results of the t-test of difference. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. PPI score is Progress out of Poverty Index ranging from 0 to 100. Base category for Backward Caste 
and Scheduled Caste is General category. Number of household members includes migrant labour in the 
household. Migrant member in the survey was defined as any member who has been away from the 
household for at least 6 months but intends to return. It may not capture shorter-term migration. 








Table B.6. Correlation between participants' contributions 






















            
Player 2 contribution to 
common account 0.056 0.118** 0.010 0.144** 0.058 
 (0.121) (0.060) (0.058) (0.063) (0.067) 
Nuclear 0.522     
Nuclear==0 if extended (1.308)     
Nuclear*Player2 contribution 0.015     
 (0.201)           
Constant 4.361*** 4.500*** 5.054*** 4.516*** 4.944*** 
































spousal game       
Observations 173 474 474 363 363 
R-squared 0.022 0.017 0.515 0.027 0.497 
This table reports the correlation between the two experiment participants’ contributions to common account. No 
controls other than those mentioned in the table were added. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table B.7. Descriptive statistics for spousal experiment sample by household structure 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Total Extended Nuclear t-test 
  Mean/SD N Mean/SD N Mean/SD N   
Wife's current age 40.514 173 41.045 111 38.76 62 2.285 
 [10.137]  [11.028]  [8.768]   
Husband's current age 43.427 164 44.038 104 41.95 60 2.088 
 [10.118]  [10.842]  [8.874]   
Number of years married 25.433 171 26.312 109 23.333 62 2.979 
 [11.354]  [12.552]  [8.902]   
Husband's Education in years 5.762 164 6.452 104 4.6 60 1.852** 
 [4.906]  [5.014]  [4.492]   
Backward Caste 0.364 173 0.378 111 0.313 62 0.065 
 [0.483]  [0.487]  [0.467]   
Scheduled Caste 0.526 173 0.477 111 0.642 62 -0.165* 
 [0.501]  [0.502]  [0.483]   
PPI Score 25.721 172 25.818 110 25.55 62 0.268 
 [11.128]  [11.357]  [10.43]   
Number of household members 8.197 173 9.928 111 5.030 62 4.898*** 
  [4.320]   [4.362]   [1.714]     
This table presents the mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of the experiment sample where the spousal 
experiment was conducted, by household structure. Column 4 presents the difference between extended and nuclear 
sample and reports the results of the t-test of difference. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. PPI score is Progress out of 
Poverty Index ranging from 0 to 100. Base category for Backward Caste and Scheduled Caste is General category. 
Number of household members includes migrant labour in the household. Migrant member in the survey was defined 





Table B.8. Descriptive statistics for spousal experiment regression sample by 
household structure 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Total Extended Nuclear t-test 
Wife's current age 40.484 41.000 39.610 1.390 
 [9.840] [10.560] [8.495]  
Husband's current age 43.333 43.930 42.322 1.608 
 [10.103] [10.808] [8.776]  
Number of years married 25.428 26.380 23.814 2.566 
 [11.147] [12.199] [8.959]  
Husband's Education in years 5.774 6.540 4.475 2.065** 
 [4.920] [5.022] [4.489]  
Backward Caste 0.358 0.380 0.322 0.058 
 [0.481] [0.488] [0.471]  
Scheduled Caste 0.522 0.460 0.627 -0.167** 
 [0.501] [0.501] [0.488]  
PPI Score 26.182 26.100 26.322 -0.222 
 [11.249] [11.742] [10.458]  
Number of household members 8.151 10.010 5.000 5.010*** 
 [4.358] [4.380] [1.712]  
Sample size 159 100 59   
This table presents the mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of the spousal experiment 
regression sample reported in Error! Reference source not found., by household structure. 
Column 4 presents the difference between extended and nuclear sample and reports the results of 
the t-test of difference. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. PPI score is Progress out of Poverty 
Index ranging from 0 to 100. Base category for Backward Caste and Scheduled Caste is General 
category. Number of household members includes migrant labour in the household. Migrant 
member in the survey was defined as any member who has been away from the household for at 









  (1)   
Both players male 0.017 
(0 = players are not both male; 1 = both players are male) (0.060) 
Both players different gender 0.056** 
(0 = both players not different gender; 1 = both players are different gender) (0.028) 
Blood relatives 0.079*** 
(0 = players are not related by blood; 1 = players are related by blood) (0.024) 
Same generation -0.021 
(0 = players belong to different generations; 1 = players are from same 
generation) (0.027) 
Spouses 0.036 
(0 = players are not married to each other; 1 = players are married to each 
other) (0.032) 
Player 1 second game 0.032 
(0 = game is not player 1’s 2nd game; 1 = is 2nd game) (0.024) 
Player 1 third game 0.031 
(0 = game is not player 1’s 3rd game; 1 = is 3rd game) (0.039) 
Player 2 second game -0.021 
(0 = game is not player 2’s 2nd game; 1 = is 2nd game) (0.028) 
Player 2 third game 0.022 
(0 = game is not player 2’s 3rd game; 1 = is 3rd game) (0.048) 
Constant 0.441*** 
 (0.025)   
HH fixed effects Yes 
Number of games 474 
R-squared 0.058 
This table reports the results of the regression mapping the contribution to the common account in 
all experiments (including the spousal experiment) played in the extended households, after 
controlling for the order in which the game for played for each participant. Contributions are 
measured in proportions. Total contribution is the contribution by both players to the common 




Table B.10. Primary decision maker by household type  
 Nuclear 
 Extended       






























Husband 45 Father-in-law   40 47 
Wife 51 Mother-in-law  6  13 
  Husband 31 26 17 13 
  Wife 65 64 40 22 




and attendance  
Husband 49 Father-in-law   22 38 
Wife 50 Mother-in-law  3  4 
  Husband 35 34 21 16 
  Wife 58 54 48 31 
Others 1 Others 7 9 9 12 
Number of 
respondents 
 62  84 38 19 63 
Note: This table reports results from an analysis of survey data recording who is the primary decision maker for 
specific situations in nuclear and extended households. The ‘wife’ is the selected illiterate woman and all 
relationships are with respect to this ‘wife’. This ‘wife’ could herself be a mother-in-law which would not be captured 
in the table here. The ‘others’ category in nuclear household is a child of the married couple who may or may not be 
18 years of age. The ‘others’ category in extended households can be a child of the married couple, a brother-in-law, 
a sister-in-law or a daughter-in-law of the selected illiterate woman. The percentage reported is the average over three 
decision making subcategories (for household chores - cooking, local purchases, and shopping outside the village; for 




Table B.11. Qualitative study nuclear household summary 
 Interview 1 Interview 2 Interview 3 
Village type Poorer Wealthier Wealthier 
Number of children 2 4 7 
Role in the household Wife Wife Wife 
Migrant household 
members 
Yes, husband Yes, husband No 
Livelihood of household Small store,  
remittances 
Remittances,  
sell milk from cow 
Making and selling of 
spice mixtures 
Views on extended family 
households 
Emotional support, public 
goods and joint assets 
Prefers nuclear family as 
extended family is 
characterized by conflict 
Emotional support, risk-
sharing 
Mention of inefficiency? No No No 
Sources of inefficiency Not relevant Not relevant  Not relevant 
 
 
Table B.12. Qualitative study extended household summary 
 Interview 4 Interview 5 Interview 6 Interview 7 Interview 8 
Village type Poorer Poorer Wealthier Poorer Poorer 
Number of 
children 
1 6 2 1 5 
Role in the 
household 








No, but migrant 
brother-in-law 





















































effort with social 










effort with social 








C. Appendix for Chapter 4 (Female Adult Literacy 
Programme and Empowerment: Evidence from 
RCT in rural India) 
 
Table C.1. Baseline characteristics by treatment assignment for full sample (including 
those who attrit) 
   (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  
 Total Control Treatment t-test 
 N Mean N Mean N Mean (2)-(3) 
Nuclear Household 725 0.330 349 0.344 376 0.316 0.027 
  [0.470]  [0.476]  [0.466]  
Backward caste 725 0.472 349 0.464 376 0.479 -0.015 
  [0.500]  [0.499]  [0.500]  
Scheduled caste 725 0.488 349 0.496 376 0.481 0.014 
  [0.500]  [0.501]  [0.500]  
Progress out of Poverty Index 725 22.690 349 22.513 376 22.854 -0.341 
  [9.475]  [9.679]  [9.291]  
Number of adult HH members 725 5.639 349 5.670 376 5.609 0.061 
  [4.220]  [4.378]  [4.073]  
Woman's age in years 725 35.068 349 34.934 376 35.191 -0.257 
  [8.501]  [8.150]  [8.824]  
Woman in paid labour 725 0.063 349 0.060 376 0.066 -0.006 
  [0.244]  [0.238]  [0.249]  
Forward Digit Span score 720 5.603 346 5.526 374 5.674 -0.148 
  [1.504]  [1.521]  [1.486]  
Number of children 4-18 725 2.461 349 2.433 376 2.487 -0.054 
  [1.706]  [1.712]  [1.702]  
Woman has no child 4-18 725 0.153 349 0.166 376 0.141 0.025 
  [0.360]  [0.373]  [0.348]  
Baseline value of outcomes        
Decision Index 725 0.029 349 -0.026 376 0.080 -0.106 
  [0.998]  [1.001]  [0.993]  
Decision Index excluding child 
decisions 725 0.065 349 -0.010 376 0.136 -0.146* 
  [1.010]  [1.003]  [1.013]  
Cooking 725 0.632 349 0.605 376 0.657 -0.052 
  [0.483]  [0.490]  [0.475]  
Purchases at local shop 725 0.512 349 0.476 376 0.545 -0.070* 
  [0.500]  [0.500]  [0.499]  
Purchases outside village 725 0.469 349 0.433 376 0.503 -0.070* 
  [0.499]  [0.496]  [0.501]  
Child's Illness 725 0.550 349 0.536 376 0.564 -0.028 
  [0.498]  [0.499]  [0.497]  
Child's enrolment 725 0.521 349 0.521 376 0.521 0.000 
  [0.500]  [0.500]  [0.500]  
Child's attendance 725 0.521 349 0.501 376 0.540 -0.038 
  [0.500]  [0.501]  [0.499]  
185 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Total Control Treatment t-test 
 N Mean N Mean N Mean (2)-(3) 
Mobility Index 725 -0.009 349 0.001 376 -0.018 0.019 
  [0.985]  [1.003]  [0.969]  
Leave house without permission 725 0.166 349 0.181 376 0.152 0.029 
  [0.372]  [0.385]  [0.359]  
Go to local shop without 
permission 725 0.421 349 0.421 376 0.420 0.001 
  [0.494]  [0.494]  [0.494]  
Go to shop outside the village 
without permission 725 0.218 349 0.223 376 0.213 0.011 
  [0.413]  [0.417]  [0.410]  
Visit health clinic without 
permission 725 0.193 349 0.206 376 0.181 0.025 
  [0.395]  [0.405]  [0.385]  
Visit natal family without 
permission 725 0.141 349 0.138 376 0.144 -0.006 
  [0.348]  [0.345]  [0.351]  
Call natal family without 
permission 725 0.716 349 0.699 376 0.731 -0.032 
  [0.451]  [0.459]  [0.444]  
Go out for entertainment without 
permission 725 0.193 349 0.195 376 0.191 0.003 
  [0.395]  [0.397]  [0.394]  
Control of assets Index 725 -0.006 349 -0.018 376 0.006 -0.024 
  [1.025]  [1.011]  [1.038]  
Owns mobile phone 725 0.407 349 0.410 376 0.404 0.005 
  [0.492]  [0.492]  [0.491]  
Own back account 725 0.407 349 0.387 376 0.426 -0.039 
  [0.492]  [0.488]  [0.495]  
Keeps own jewellery 725 0.714 349 0.719 376 0.710 0.009 
    [0.452]   [0.450]   [0.454]   
This table presents the mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of the overall sample randomised the 
sample of women who were assigned to control and the sample of women who were assigned to 
treatment. Column 4 presents the difference between control and treatment groups and reports the results 
of the t-test of difference. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Base category for Backward Caste and 
Scheduled Caste is General category. Forward Digit Span Test is a subtest of both of Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale (WAIS) and the Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS) with a maximum score of 16.Progress 
out of Poverty Score ranges from 1 to 100 and is a composite index of education level of household head, 
household's main occupation, cooking fuel, ownership of durables such as cupboard, vehicle, TV, 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table C.8. Intent-to-treat effects on control of assets (no controls) 










          
Treatment 0.119 0.019 0.092* 0.004 
 (0.077) (0.039) (0.046) (0.023) 
Constant -0.000 0.422*** 0.575*** 0.865*** 
 (0.100) (0.032) (0.044) (0.028) 
Controls No No No No 
Observations 672 672 672 672 
R-squared 0.004 0.000 0.009 0.000 
This table presents the results of regression of control of assets on treatment assignment with no controls. 
Standard errors are clustered at hamlet level. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Base category for Backward 
Caste and Scheduled Caste is General category. 
 
Table C.9. Intent-to-treat effects on control of assets (controlling for only baseline 
value of outcome) 










          
Treatment 0.109 0.018 0.078* 0.006 
 (0.078) (0.034) (0.043) (0.024) 
Outcome at baseline 0.348*** 0.424*** 0.310*** 0.106*** 
 (0.041) (0.035) (0.034) (0.037) 
Constant -0.000 0.248*** 0.454*** 0.788*** 
 (0.081) (0.032) (0.039) (0.040) 
Controls Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline 
Observations 672 672 672 672 
R-squared 0.136 0.177 0.108 0.020 
This table presents the results of regression of control of assets on treatment assignment with controlling 
only for the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at hamlet level. ***p<0.01, 





Table C.10. Intent-to-treat effects on control of assets (controlling for only 
characteristics) 










          
Treatment 0.048 0.001 0.064 -0.013 
 (0.086) (0.033) (0.043) (0.028) 
Nuclear household 0.252** 0.058 0.047 0.098** 
 (0.111) (0.054) (0.041) (0.038) 
Backward caste -0.009 -0.014 -0.029 0.024 
 (0.196) (0.094) (0.101) (0.085) 
Scheduled caste -0.179 -0.147 -0.066 0.026 
 (0.216) (0.089) (0.109) (0.088) 
Progress out of Poverty Index 0.006 0.004** -0.000 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Number of adult HH members -0.011 -0.011* 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Woman's age in years 0.028*** -0.004 0.012*** 0.013*** 
 (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Woman in paid labour -0.020 0.120** -0.125** -0.010 
 (0.132) (0.046) (0.051) (0.072) 
Forward Digit Span score 0.058** 0.029*** 0.029* -0.001 
 (0.026) (0.009) (0.015) (0.009) 
Number of children 4-18 0.110*** 0.033** 0.032** 0.029** 
 (0.036) (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) 
Constant -1.753*** 0.294* -0.090 0.227* 










Observations 720 720 720 720 
R-squared 0.104 0.050 0.082 0.111 
This table presents the results of regression of control of assets on treatment assignment controlling for 
household and woman level characteristics but no control for the baseline outcome variable. Standard errors 
are clustered at hamlet level. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Base category for Backward Caste and 






Table C.11. Variation in compliance by hamlet 
Hamlet 
Compliance among 
treatment group (%) 
Compliance among 
control group (%) 
1 93 73 
2 100 86 
3 100 64 
4 75 64 
5 67 87 
6 100 67 
7 90 86 
8 57 73 
9 92 38 
10 75 83 
11 89 77 
12 58 100 
13 82 92 
14 88 85 
15 63 67 
16 83 78 
17 91 81 
18 82 60 
19 82 78 
20 77 92 
21 85 100 
22 91 90 
23 58 89 
24 67 100 
25 56 100 
26 100 91 
27 73 100 







Table C.12. Correlates of programme take-up with hamlet fixed effects 






      
Nuclear household -0.064 0.057 
 (0.055) (0.059) 
Backward caste 0.338** 0.190** 
 (0.164) (0.096) 
Scheduled caste 0.405** 0.276** 
 (0.181) (0.125) 
Progress out of Poverty Index 0.004 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Number of adult HH members -0.012* 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
Woman's age in years 0.005* 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Woman in paid labour -0.139 -0.036 
 (0.113) (0.103) 
Forward Digit Span score 0.015 -0.016 
 (0.016) (0.015) 
Number of children 4-18 0.033** 0.014 
 (0.015) (0.014) 
Decision Index at baseline 0.017 0.024 
 (0.028) (0.027) 
Mobility Index at baseline 0.013 -0.028 
 (0.021) (0.027) 
Control of assets Index at 
baseline -0.010 0.007 
 (0.025) (0.026) 
Constant 0.083 -0.063 
 (0.229) (0.183) 
Fixed effects Hamlet Hamlet 
Observations 344 324 
R-squared 0.184 0.140 
This table presents the results of regression of program take up within 
treatment and control groups on observables and hamlet fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at hamlet level. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 





Table C.13. IV regression results on all empowerment outcomes by controls used 
  Local Average Treatment Effect of TA+ programme 




Only HH and 
woman controls 
Decision Index -0.018 -0.080 -0.039 
 (0.126) (0.126) (0.106) 
Decision Index excluding child decisions -0.032 -0.125 -0.045 
 (0.147) (0.148) (0.113) 
Cooking -0.029 -0.056 -0.039 
 (0.071) (0.068) (0.054) 
Purchases at local shop -0.005 -0.044 -0.008 
 (0.073) (0.074) (0.057) 
Purchases outside village -0.008 -0.049 -0.014 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.059) 
Child's Illness -0.009 -0.018 -0.012 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.062) 
Child's enrolment -0.019 -0.012 -0.029 
 (0.061) (0.059) (0.061) 
Child's attendance 0.028 0.017 0.009 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.039) 
Mobility Index 0.220* 0.220* 0.200* 
 (0.120) (0.114) (0.103) 
Leave house without permission 0.003 0.009 0.002 
 (0.033) (0.035) (0.035) 
Go to local shop without permission 0.148*** 0.139*** 0.128*** 
 (0.052) (0.051) (0.042) 
Go to shop outside the village without 
permission 0.045 0.050 0.041 
 (0.042) (0.041) (0.042) 
Visit health clinic without permission 0.058 0.068 0.054 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.040) 
Visit natal family without permission 0.021 0.012 0.023 
 (0.033) (0.031) (0.033) 
Call natal family without permission 0.180*** 0.176*** 0.166*** 
 (0.058) (0.057) (0.055) 
Go out for entertainment without permission 0.010 0.011 0.008 
 (0.040) (0.041) (0.036) 
Control of assets Index 0.195 0.180 0.161 
 (0.124) (0.124) (0.121) 
Owns mobile phone 0.031 0.029 0.020 
 (0.063) (0.055) (0.060) 
Own back account 0.151** 0.129* 0.136** 
 (0.072) (0.069) (0.066) 
Keeps own jewellery 0.007 0.010 0.002 
  (0.038) (0.039) (0.035) 
This table presents the results of IV regression of all outcome variables on self-reported participation. The first 
column reports the dependent variable. The second column reports the LATE of participation in an IV regression 
with no controls. The third column reports the LATE of participation in an IV regression with only baseline value of 
outcome variable as control. The last column reports the LATE of participation in a IV regression controlling for 
household and woman level characteristics but no control for the baseline outcome variable. Standard errors are 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table C.16. First stage results for Table 4.11 IV regression on control of assets 
  IV regression dependent variable 










          
Treatment 0.602*** 0.602*** 0.601*** 0.602*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Nuclear household 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) 
Backward caste 0.239* 0.238* 0.236* 0.239* 
 (0.138) (0.137) (0.137) (0.138) 
Scheduled caste 0.305** 0.303** 0.301** 0.305** 
 (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.136) 
Progress out of Poverty Index 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Number of adult HH members -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Woman's age in years 0.003* 0.003* 0.003 0.004* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Woman in paid labour -0.127* -0.125* -0.130* -0.128* 
 (0.069) (0.068) (0.069) (0.070) 
 Forward Digit Span score -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Number of children 4-18 0.026** 0.026** 0.025** 0.026** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Outcome at baseline -0.001 -0.011 0.026 -0.018 
 (0.016) (0.031) (0.035) (0.042) 
Constant -0.272 -0.266 -0.258 -0.268 
 (0.205) (0.201) (0.205) (0.205) 
     
Observations 668 668 668 668 
R-squared 0.393 0.394 0.394 0.394 
F-stat 54.48 55.20 54.66 53.34 
This table reports the results of first stage regression of self-reported participation on treatment assignment, 
household and woman characteristics and baseline value of outcome variable. This regression is used to estimate 
the second stage IV estimate of the effect of treatment on control of assets among the compliers. Standard errors 





Table C.17. LATE correcting for attrition using Lee(2009) bounds 
        





Decision Index -0.078 -0.106 -0.040 
 (0.115) (0.118) (0.136) 
Decision Index excluding child decisions -0.101 -0.134 -0.077 
 (0.125) (0.134) (0.132) 
Cooking -0.053 -0.068 -0.040 
 (0.056) (0.058) (0.060) 
Purchases at local shop -0.030 -0.044 -0.016 
 (0.061) (0.063) (0.067) 
Purchases outside village -0.039 -0.049 -0.021 
 (0.063) (0.067) (0.071) 
Child's Illness -0.018 -0.032 -0.002 
 (0.064) (0.065) (0.073) 
Child's enrolment -0.021 -0.033 -0.002 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.064) 
Child's attendance 0.005 -0.009 0.022 
 (0.040) (0.042) (0.046) 
Mobility Index 0.210** 0.176* 0.299*** 
 (0.100) (0.099) (0.099) 
Leave house without permission 0.008 0.004 0.037 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.032) 
Go to local shop without permission 0.124*** 0.112** 0.145*** 
 (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) 
Go to shop outside the village without permission 0.048 0.044 0.077* 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.043) 
Visit health clinic without permission 0.062 0.057 0.087** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) 
Visit natal family without permission 0.017 0.011 0.045 
 (0.032) (0.035) (0.029) 
Call natal family without permission 0.163*** 0.140*** 0.181*** 
 (0.055) (0.053) (0.061) 
Go out for entertainment without permission 0.009 0.005 0.039 
 (0.036) (0.040) (0.038) 
Control of assets Index 0.161 0.089 0.199* 
 (0.123) (0.113) (0.120) 
Owns mobile phone 0.024 0.016 0.040 
 (0.055) (0.059) (0.054) 
Own back account 0.121* 0.104 0.135** 
 (0.064) (0.070) (0.057) 
Keeps own jewellery 0.004 -0.026 0.007 
  (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) 
This table presents the results of IV regression of endline empowerment outcomes on participation after 
trimming the sample using the method described in Lee(2009). Column (1) reports IV results from 
Section 4.6.3.All regressions control for individual and household level controls, as well as the value of 
the outcome variables at baseline. Standard errors for Columns (2) and (3) were bootstrapped with 250 
repetitions and clustered at hamlet level.  The number of observations for bounds regressions is 661, 
after trimming 7 observations. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
